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For  news in France see French FE  news page. For  news in Germany see German FE news page.

Week 39, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will be speaking at the conference on Tuesday September 26 at 7.30pm at the ENS. The theme: European soil and people.

Is the European Union a dysfunctional organization?

We often hear it said that the EU is a creation like no other in history, and that its vocation is to preserve its specificity. I have already had occasion to show that the EU is in fact a system of cooperation between states, supported and supplemented by the European institutions, which makes it a confederation with some federal elements.

This complex system sees the Commission and Parliament intervene in areas of competence shared with national states, such as social affairs and the environment, or in areas of supporting competence, such as health.

The first effect of this system is to create European over-regulation. Although the number of European commissioners and civil servants is not massive, their propensity to produce standards is strong, given their political responsibility due to the virtual impossibility of censuring the commission (a 2/3 majority in parliament is required) and to compensate for their lack of budgetary resources. Studies have shown the extent to which bureaucratization in Europe is taking on worrying proportions, particularly as regards the inflation in the number of standards resulting from the sustained creation of new regulations, directives, decisions, etc., without sufficient destruction of obsolete or ineffective standards. 

This system also produces a generalized double regulation on a European scale, as each national state, through its government and parliament, naturally tries to retain its say, or even its leadership, in these areas of competence. 

This over-regulation and double regulation is a serious handicap for startups in particular, but also for larger companies, which have to spend precious time and energy dealing with these issues to obtain financing or authorizations. 

The dual competence of national and European authorities in many essential areas (agriculture, social affairs, industry, energy, transport, etc.), meanwhile, leads to weak and untargeted subsidies, as well as a certain popular rejection of what may be perceived by the players concerned as fussy European bureaucratic interference in matters that are the responsibility of the country or region, as these are already dealt with by local players.   

As a result, start-ups, mid-sized companies and even large corporations, researchers and executives prefer to expatriate or invest in countries with a coherent and efficient political structure, such as the USA, Canada, India or China. This jeopardizes research, innovation, industry, living standards and growth, as demonstrated by Europe's falling behind the USA over the past 30 years. The corollary of this is rejection among the population, which facilitates the rise of the populist and nationalist vote.  

So we need to reform the European Union, a complicated organization that lacks a center of gravity and is largely dysfunctional. But how?  

Clearly, cosmetic reforms such as more qualified majority voting or fewer European Commissioners will not change the problem. What can make a real difference is the gradual establishment of a European political structure which clearly defines the areas of competence of each level, and which entrusts to Europe those subjects which can no longer be dealt with effectively at national level, given the European economic, commercial, financial and security integration resulting mainly from economic and monetary union. 

This means setting up a European federal state with limited powers, probably with a few founding countries. This federal state would be responsible for defense, diplomacy, industry (including energy) and research. Everything else would remain the responsibility of national states, with the possibility of transferring additional powers on a case-by-case basis. Only the possibility of coordinating the action of local states should be provided for through supporting competences. Shared competences, i.e. competences exercised by the federal state that could also be exercised by local states, such as transport, social affairs or agriculture, should be avoided wherever possible. And if they do exist, the European federal state should have supreme authority over how they are organized.  

As the European federal state, which should be a member of the EU in order to ensure the continuity of the single market and currency, welcomes new members and gradually replaces the EU, those shared competences exercised by the EU which are not essential will be retroceded to the national states. This will reinforce the coherence of the policies pursued, the proximity between public officials and citizens, and the accountability of political decision-makers.

This is how politics works in the USA. Congress can only exercise its prerogatives in the areas expressly enumerated in Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution. This does not totally eliminate dual powers, but it does keep them at a low level, unlike in Europe. And the few powers listed in Article 1 of the US Constitution that can also be exercised by local states are subject to the authority of Washington. In the event of conflict between the federal government and the states on these matters, federal law has the final say, in accordance with the Constitution, which makes it possible to rationalize, coordinate and effectively manage shared competences. This federal supremacy on certain important subjects also gives greater authority and effectiveness to coordinate the action of local states via supporting competencies.       

So it's time to move on from a confederal Europe that regulates and backslides, to a federal Europe that produces and succeeds.​

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or via paypal at dakhan75@hotmail.com. The amount and frequency of donations are entirely up to you. 

This is necessary to enable me to finance the time I devote to this activity, as well as my travel, membership and participation.
 
To create a European federal government, the French President and the German Chancellor should make the creation of a Franco-German or European federal state an essential and official horizon of their policy. Leading figures in both countries could then influence public opinion in favor of this idea, which would become feasible thanks to credibility and institutional will. Finally, French and German political parties would be encouraged to incorporate the now-popular idea of a Franco-German federation into their political programs and election campaigns, in order to make electoral gains. In 2021, the German government made the creation of a European federal state, with the help of a group of founding countries, an official goal of its policy.  

While 30% of French and Germans are in favor of setting up a European federal government, and 30% are against, some leaders in France and Germany still reject this solution. This is due to their lack of vision, their lack of competence and their lack of political courage. Such a European federal government would be better than the European Commission and better than the European Parliament.

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Week 38, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will be speaking at the conference to be held on September 19 at 6:30 p.m. at the Conseil économique et social (Economic and Social Council) on the theme: Europe for women's health and protection.

Majority voting for a group of pioneering European countries? 

To break the deadlock on fiscal, energy, migration and foreign policy issues, some are advocating majority voting by the European Council, or by a group of countries that have set up enhanced cooperation in these areas, 
This would remove the paralysis or inefficiency that currently characterizes the governance of the European Union on major political and economic issues. 
The introduction of majority voting on these major issues seems easier than the creation of a European federal government. It does not require the transfer of budgetary resources and armed forces from European countries to the European level. This solution therefore seems more reasonable, and it could also represent an intermediate stage between the national sovereignty currently in force and European sovereignty exercised by a European federal state capable of making its own decisions.

However, crucial transfers of sovereignty without a government accountable to the electorate would increase the democratic deficit in Europe and the distance between citizens and European institutions. It would also be politically very difficult to gain acceptance in many European countries, particularly those which still consider themselves independent powers, such as France, Poland, Italy and Spain. What's more, a referendum would be needed in France to legitimize the loss of most of France's national sovereignty as a result of such a majority vote.  
What's more, if the European Council or a group of countries were to decide by majority vote, national sovereignty would be lost, without providing the means to act effectively and democratically at European level, given the separation of armies, budgetary resources and administrations on a national basis, which would pose problems of coordination and motivation. These shortcomings are unlikely to generate popular support for the project, and could lead to its rejection.    

This solution also carries with it the risk of fracturing European institutions in the event of profound disagreement between European states on a crucial question of defense, diplomacy, industrial policy or energy choices. Separate European governments, each with the bulk of their own armed forces, administrations and budgetary resources, defending their own particular interests and subject to distinct electoral constraints, would regain their freedom of action by refusing to submit to majority voting in the event of a serious European political crisis.

To get around these serious drawbacks, some would like to build ad hoc coalitions of European countries, depending on the subject, for example in the nuclear or defense fields. But this approach does not make for a coherent and stable policy, given the constant changes of government within the countries belonging to these coalitions, given the non-participation of certain financially or strategically important European countries such as Germany, and given the separation of administrative and military resources on national bases. It should be added that synergies between the areas covered by these coalitions, for example between European defense and European energy policy, will most often be impossible to implement, given the politically heterogeneous nature of these coalitions. 
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On the contrary, the creation of a European federal government offers numerous advantages.

An elected European federal government can legitimize important transfers of sovereignty, such as taxation and defense. Indeed, a European federal state will have the budgetary, administrative and military resources and the institutional coherence to conduct an effective and democratic European policy, which is attractive to citizens. The merger of diplomatic administrations, certain economic administrations, the armed forces and the existence of a single European government will make it possible to create a credible, powerful and solid European power. This could generate popular support for the federal project. 
Info FEDERAL EUROPE will be speaking at the conference on March 29 at 7.30pm at the Heinrich Heine House. Theme: threats to democracy in Europe.

Clearly, this solution requires a strong federalist political will, which already exists in Germany, but which is still lacking in France, given its real or imagined history, often taught in schools and frequently relayed in the media.
It would therefore probably be easier to win people over to the idea of a federal European government than to that of majority voting on major political and economic issues. It is therefore now necessary to move from the technocratic and institutional stage of European construction to the political and democratic stage, in order to convince citizens to give more power to European institutions of a federal type.

Week 26, Year 2023

Are the EU institutions democratic?

It is often said that the institutions of the European Union could become fully democratic if the President of the European Commission were the candidate nominated by the leading European party in the European elections. In 2014, Jean Claude Juncker, the EPP candidate, was appointed by the European Council to head the European Commission. And yet the EU's democratic malaise has by no means dissipated. 

This is explained by the reality of power within the EU. Formally, executive power is entrusted to the European Commission, which submits measures, directives, treaties and budgets for approval by the European Parliament, the EU's lower house, and the European Council of Heads of State and Government, the EU's upper house. 

In reality, however, it is the European Council that runs the system, since it is the European governments that have the legislative, administrative, fiscal, budgetary and military means to implement decisions taken at European level, in an attempt to deal with migratory, health, military or financial crises. And if a European state does not wish to implement a European decision, it can simply ask its national administration or institutions to do so. For example, by not respecting the Stability and Growth Pact, reintroducing border controls, withdrawing from previously validated cooperation agreements, or failing to implement European directives concerning the single market. These are all recurrent practices in all EU member states.  

Yet this European Council, the centerpiece of the European institutional architecture, is not an institution that is accountable to the electorate. The 27 heads of state and government are elected one by one on different dates on these mainly national issues. The European Council cannot be sanctioned by voters for its policies, and voters cannot vote on its project for the EU. 

As far as the European Commission is concerned, its responsibility is insubstantial and of little interest to parliamentarians and citizens. Indeed, a 2/3 majority in Parliament is needed to censure it, the EU budget it manages is very small, and its budgetary and security powers are minimal. In reality, therefore, the European Commission is a largely unaccountable technocratic body, dependent on the governments of the European states and therefore subject to their pressure. Under these conditions, the European Commission is obviously incapable of putting pressure on governments to obtain additional transfers of powers and additional financial resources. 

The European Parliament, for its part, lacks the political will and technical capacity to conduct a coherent and effective European policy, and is of course unable to impose its authority on national parliaments.   
 
The European Union is thus an institutional entity characterized by political and technocratic irresponsibility, which undermines its effectiveness and legitimacy. For a truly democratic and efficient Europe to emerge, it is necessary to transfer the bulk of budgetary and military power to a European government elected by and accountable to European citizens or their representatives, starting with a Franco-German government. This European federal state would have to be a member of the EU, in order to ensure the continuity of the euro and the single market.

I think it would be far preferable for the constitution of this European federal state to be presidential in nature, as in the USA. The parliamentary system does not provide sufficient political stability to ensure the effectiveness and credibility of government action, particularly in foreign and defense policy. Coalitions formed between parties to form a government can dissolve at any time, for reasons of circumstance and politics, as was the case under the 4th Republic in France. What's more, inter-party negotiations to form a government do not allow voters to express their opinion on a clear political project, thus reducing their influence on the political sphere and constituting a step backwards for democracy. This is the case, for example, with the financial policy of the Tricolor coalition in Germany, which was not approved by a majority of coalition voters, but which characterizes the actions of the Scholtz government, given the key role played by the FDP in this coalition.

Week 25, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will not be intervening this week. 

The UN, nuclear weapons and France's international influence

It's often said that France's permanent seat on the UN Security Council and its nuclear weapons give it great-power status.

In reality, France's international influence is inferior, not only to that of the true great powers such as the USA or China, but also to that of many countries which do not have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and which are not nuclear-armed.

France has very little influence over major countries such as the USA, China, Russia and India, and relatively little influence over regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Yet the truly great powers are those that can influence the direction of important countries and thus regional and world affairs, directly via bilateral relations and indirectly via multilateral cooperation. 

If we look at international affairs from this angle, we realize that France's influence is outstripped not only by that of the great powers, but also by that of Germany, Turkey, Iran, and probably also by that of Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Japan. How is it that these countries, which do not have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and which do not possess nuclear weapons, have a greater influence on regional and world affairs than France?

Firstly, because the functioning of the UN in the event of an international crisis depends on the unanimous agreement of the permanent members of the Security Council. But such unanimity is almost always impossible to achieve on sensitive issues involving the spheres of influence and national interests of the major powers. The USA was determined to intervene in Kosovo and Iraq, and so dispensed with the need for a UN mandate. Ditto for France, which wanted to implement regime change in Libya. The same goes for Russia in Ukraine, and perhaps tomorrow for China. Given these dysfunctions, calls to reform what General de Gaulle called "le machin" are becoming increasingly insistent, but they are coming up against opposition from France and the United Kingdom in particular.

Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are extremely difficult to deploy, even in the event of an invasion of national territory, as demonstrated by the Yom Kippur and Falklands conflicts. And its use would provoke an uncontrollable wave of nuclear proliferation, as many countries have the technology to cross the nuclear threshold in just a few years. All this explains why, in reality, nuclear weapons are not a decisive factor of power, even if they remain an important element that France and Europe must have at their disposal.  

The weakness of French influence is also due to the decisive factors of power.  

In the decisive economic and technological field, France has a lead in certain areas, particularly in military aeronautics, but this lead is diminishing over time. France is now an industrial and technological power, outclassed by numerous competitors such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, China and the USA, and this will have long-term consequences for its defense industrial and technological base. In economic terms, it is clearly unable to match the size of the economies of continental countries such as the USA and China. 

In the decisive field of conventional forces, France cannot wage a high-intensity war outside its borders alone, except perhaps against very weak adversaries. And while its presidential institutional political structure enables it to decide to employ forces quickly, its long-term political will suffers from its limited financial and military resources. In Libya, for example, after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, no French ground military force was deployed to reduce instability in the country and incorporate the Libyan state into the French zone of influence, in contrast to what was done in Iraq by the Americans. Above all, France has not been in a position to protect continental Europe since 1945, and these countries remain primarily attached to American military protection.   

In the ideological and cultural sphere, its defense of human rights is still generally credible, but its proclaimed defense of democratic regimes clashes with its policy of intense cooperation with authoritarian regimes, particularly in North Africa, the Persian Gulf and India. Instead of claiming to defend democratic values, France should be defending its national interests by letting civil societies decide for themselves the nature of their political regime. The Americans, for example, defend their national interests not only through cooperation with authoritarian regimes, but also through coups d'etats and invasions, using their political and military power (Iran 1953, Cuba 1960, South Korea 1961, Zaire 1965, Chile 1971, Grenada 1982, Iraq 2003, Venezuela 2022 etc.) to force certain countries to remain within or join their sphere of influence.   

These 3 elements can no longer be redressed by France on its own, given its situation of integration and heavy dependence in Europe, and the emergence of new powers. Only the creation of a federal European state will enable us to acquire the economic and military resources that characterize a great power. This is the only way for the French to once again become citizens of a great power, in which they can play a crucial role commensurate with their talents.
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Week 24, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will be speaking at a conference on nuclear energy in Europe on June 16 at 2pm at the Maison des travaux publics. 

The SCAF, an example of the inefficiency of European defense.

It is necessary to develop the Air Combat System of the Future in cooperation because of its cost, and not to lose a good part of its military power since the air superiority constitutes a decisive element of the battle. It is also necessary to develop this project for geopolitical reasons. In the event of French and German dependence on American deliveries of spare parts, munitions and aircraft, the diplomatic and military room for manoeuvre of these 2 countries would naturally be considerably reduced.

The SCAF project has fallen well behind schedule.  

Its entry into service is scheduled for 2040, instead of 2030 for the equivalent American and Chinese projects, which already constitutes a significant military and commercial handicap for the Europeans. This delay is caused by rivalries, disagreements and divergences between manufacturers and between the French and German governments. These difficulties very often characterize intergovernmental cooperation. 

The French want to maintain their lead in aeronautical technology, and need an aircraft that can also operate from aircraft carriers. The Germans want technology transfers, because they need the SCAF less than the French, since they are not seeking to develop a German defense and security policy that is very different from that of the USA, unlike France. And the Germans don't have an aircraft carrier.

There is therefore a real risk that France will withdraw from the SCAF project, as it did with the Eurofighter, if the conditions demanded by Germany do not suit it. Plan B would be to modernize the Rafale. However, such modernization would not enable France to maintain its current level of military air power, and could even relegate it to the rank of minor air power, since competing American and Chinese air combat systems will have a stealth base and a better cloud architecture due to their more recent design.

Beyond the problems encountered by the SCAF, it's the Europe of the defense industry, not to mention European defense or a European army, that is not working. Without coordination of European countries' military planning, their capability needs remain too different to be able to undertake targeted investments and strategic company mergers at a level that would strengthen the European Defense Industrial and Technological Base.  This is particularly true of France, which is seeking to ensure its strategic independence, and Germany, which wants to defend itself through close cooperation with the USA and NATO. Military programming choices are obviously made independently by each European country, according to their particular interests and specific geopolitical constraints, whatever the strategic concepts and other strategic compasses established by certain experts within the framework of NATO or the EU.  

All this is to the advantage of American industrialists, since the European armaments offer remains insufficient, dispersed and expensive. American arms companies are constantly gaining market share in Europe, to the detriment of European projects, which have been halved in number since the end of the Cold War, and American hegemony has been reinforced on the continent since 1990.

A federal European state, on the other hand, would enable arms company mergers and innovative arms projects to be carried out systematically and on a large scale, thanks to centralized decision-making, thus maintaining and developing the European Defense Industrial and Technological Base. Instead of being doomed to inexorable technological and commercial decline, particularly in the face of China and the USA, the European armaments industry would become a considerable asset for European technological progress and strategic independence.​


Week 23, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will not be speaking this week. 
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Europe equidistant from the USA and China?

It is often said that Europe cannot and should not be equidistant from the USA and China, given the military alliance, values and culture shared by Europeans and Americans. 

It is obvious that, in the absence of a European federal state, the EU and European countries are incapable of defending themselves without the help of the USA, and cannot guarantee peace within Europe without the USA. 
This security dependence necessarily entails a high degree of sensitivity to commercial and diplomatic pressure from the USA, which is able to promote its interests in these areas, sometimes to the detriment of European interests, for example by imposing the purchase of F-35s to replace Tornados, or by enlisting European countries to support its current Taiwan policy. *

Given its financial power and the size of its market, China also has means of exerting pressure and influence on Europeans, but these are far less powerful than those available to the USA in Europe. 
It's also clear that European values are closer to American values, as they are more individualistic than Chinese values. European and American culture are also fairly close, given the linguistic and historical factors that link the 2 continents. 

What will happen the day Europeans create their own federal state to manage issues of defense, diplomacy and industry? Then they will have put an end to their security dependency. And once Europeans are able to defend themselves without the help of the USA, it's hard to see how a Europe-US military alliance would still make sense. The USA certainly doesn't need European military help to maintain its sphere of influence in Asia. And Europeans united in a federal state will probably not need US help to defend their territory, except as long as the Baltic States, Poland and Romania in particular have not yet joined the European federal state, or as long as this federal state is not in a position to propose a security solution at least as credible as that of the USA via NATO. A European federal state would eventually have the means to defend European territory against a Russian threat, thanks to a European army combining at least French, German and Benelux forces. 

Nevertheless, China and Russia are strategically close, particularly in the Pacific. This could in some cases have implications for the military situation in Europe, given China's conventional military overpower. Thus, federalised Europeans could remain closer to the USA than to China when it comes to defending their territory, without necessarily needing direct American military intervention, 

On the other hand, if Russia detaches itself from China, or if China chooses not to give priority to the Russian alliance, in order to concentrate on its economic and commercial development rather than on its global geopolitical power, then federalised Europe could very well be more nuanced in matters of defence and security, if the USA or China wish to leave federalised Europeans with responsibility for stability in Africa, the Middle East, the Russian world and the Indian sub-continent. If the USA or China wish to leave responsibility for stability in Africa, the Middle East, the Russian world and the Indian subcontinent to federated Europe, then it is clear that Europeans will move diplomatically closer to the superpower that has made this choice. Let's not forget that, in the 1970s and 1980s, the USA did not hesitate to favour rapprochement with China on trade and the Taiwan question, to the detriment of the medium- and long-term interests of its democratic ally Japan in two areas of crucial importance to Japan. 
But if the USA wants to be able to concentrate on defending its national interests in the Far East, and avoid domination of the Eurasian mass by the Chinese superpower, it has an interest in promoting the emergence of a federal European power and cooperating with it, since it will be outclassed economically and militarily by China within a few decades. Only a federal European state would have the budgetary and military means to defend its territory autonomously, to maintain stability in Europe's neighborhood in place of the USA if necessary, and to cooperate powerfully with Washington when this is useful for both sides of the Atlantic. They also have an interest in investing in Europe in the field of information and communication technologies. 

​Federalized Europe and the USA are therefore likely to remain political friends who maintain their technological, economic and cultural ties. They could also remain strategic partners who do each other no harm, cooperate militarily in certain cases, and support each other in the event of a serious threat to their vital interests. On the other hand, they are unlikely to be military allies, given their ability to defend themselves, their different geostrategic priorities, their desire not to take part in conflicts that are not essential to their security, and their sometimes divergent geo-economic objectives, for example in Iran or China, or in terms of industrial policy.  
As for ecological issues (climate, biodiversity, certain types of pollution), they will certainly not be dealt with without the support and adherence of both China and the USA, as misunderstood carbon taxation measures, for example, could always be the subject of reprisals, particularly in trade. This requires European diplomatic power, and therefore a European federal state.

​Week 22, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will be speaking at the conference on Tuesday May 30 at 6.30pm at the Hôtel de l'industrie. The theme: The EU and the climate 

Can the European federal state be created from above?

Some believe that the lack of a European public space, fully European media and affectio societatis between the peoples of Europe make it impossible to envisage the creation, in the short term, of a European federal state, even starting with the French and Germans.

Yet there are examples of states that have been created despite the absence or weakness of these three elements: Switzerland, India and, to a certain extent, Italy and France. 
How can this be explained?

Primarily by the State's ability to create a certain affectio societatis, produce a public space and attract media attention. As long as the culture of the populations destined to live within the same federal state remains close, and as long as these populations wish to live in this state, a process of gradual reinforcement of European national cohesion by the federal state can develop. 
But how exactly will the European affectio societatis, the European public space and the European media dimension be strengthened by the creation of a European federal state?

First and foremost, the creation of a European federal state will considerably and rapidly strengthen the sense of belonging to Europe, both among politicians and among the general public. The importance of public institutions in social life should not be underestimated, as they largely determine the future, security and prosperity of our citizens. Under the pressure of events, collective life and the course of history, citizens' attachment to the new federal state they have created is likely to be strong, even for those who would not initially be in favor. This was the case for the euro, initially rejected by almost half of the French population, but now widely accepted. 

Secondly, the creation of single European administrations for diplomacy, defense, industry, research and the environment will create a framework for mixing talent from all European countries and defending European interests, as is currently the case at the European Central Bank. Whole sections of national administrations will be Europeanized, creating interested and loyal supporters for the European federal state and powerful relays for European public life. In addition, major European companies and their suppliers will benefit from the subsidies, loans, regulations, simplifications and incentives decided and implemented by the government and administrations of this European federal state, on a vast scale and in many fields. This will strongly develop the attachment of their managers and employees to the new European state and its objectives. 

Finally, the military power and considerable budgetary surface of the new European federal state will necessarily constitute a major and permanent focus of interest for the press and media, not only in all European countries, but throughout the world. This marked media interest will contrast with what is happening today with regard to the EU's institutions, which are of no interest to the general public given their budgetary insignificance and military non-existence, which turns the media away from the EU. And the power - indeed, the grandeur - of the European federal state will considerably enhance European pride, the sense of European belonging and European national cohesion.  
It is therefore entirely possible to create a European federal state without a particularly powerful European affectio societatis, public space and media. Indeed, it is likely that without the creation of a European federal state, the European affectio societatis will never become sufficiently powerful to enable the creation of a European federal state from below.

Week 21, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will speak at the conference on Tuesday May 23 at 6:30 pm at IRIS. The topic: EU-NATO articulation

The Joint European Disruptive Initiative

The JEDI (Joint European Disruptive Initiative) is a privately funded European research program that supports applied research in Europe for an amount of several hundred million euros per year.

The added value of this initiative lies in its pragmatic and concrete approach. Funded projects are supported more quickly and are also evaluated more regularly, which makes it possible to be more reactive and obtain better results. Funding is mainly allocated to projects that the private sector is not able to support, in order to obtain real technological breakthroughs.

This methodology is inspired by the one used by the American DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency).
JEDI is useful in trying to change what is not working in the methodology of European research policy because research policy is part of industrial policy in the broadest sense. Technological innovation is indeed a decisive factor for industrial competitiveness, for economic growth and for national security. 

Unfortunately, however, we cannot count on the JEDI to make up for the growing European backlog in research and development.    

First of all, research governance in Europe is fragmented between the administrations of 27 countries. How can we believe that a reform that will bring about a change in mentality and governance for research issues will take place in the 27 countries of the European Union?
 
Secondly, because funding from JEDI remains marginal in relation to the amounts allocated, which can be explained by the fact that in all countries it is primarily the State that funds applied and advanced research, in the USA as in Europe. The risks and amounts required to obtain breakthrough innovations require that the particularly heavy initial investments be assumed by a state structure.

In this respect, DARPA and the other American research agencies (energy, space, health, agriculture, etc.) are able to concentrate resources and target priorities because of the existence of the American federal government, which steers research policy for the whole of the USA and has a considerable budget. Spending on basic research, applied research, experimental research and equipment in the USA amounts to 158 billion dollars, mainly divided between the defence, health, energy, space and agriculture sectors. This amount obviously exceeds by far the public funds allocated to research in France or Germany. In addition, these centralized American public funds can effectively direct a very large ecosystem of funding from large companies and universities, which allows the United States to post total research spending close to 3.3% of its GDP. 
In Europe, on the other hand, public funds are dispersed among the States and private actors are segmented by country, notably due to the absence of a European public market, while technological skills and industrial value chains are highly integrated and Europeanized. This situation leads to an inability to target and prioritize funding for promising European breakthrough projects. It should also be remembered that the few joint projects between European countries obtained after bitter negotiations between industry and governments do not constitute a policy of research, development, production and marketing of European breakthrough technologies.   

Clearly, research and development in Europe will only be able to achieve results comparable to those of the United States once Europeans have instituted a federal state that is responsible for industrial policy and therefore for research and development policy.​
Week 19, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will speak at the conference on Tuesday May 9th at 7.30 pm at the ENS. The topic: The EU as a lever for economic and social transformation.

Should a European Assembly of national parliaments be established?

Some on the left believe that the situation of inefficiency and unaccountability that characterizes the institutions of the European Union can no longer be ignored. In order to address this, they propose to create a European assembly of national parliaments. This assembly would have significant resources of its own (tax on the profits of large groups, European wealth tax, etc.) and therefore a substantial budget enabling significant expenditure on infrastructure, industry, ecology or social matters. 

The observation is quite correct and it is indisputable that an ecological (and therefore industrial) and social policy cannot be conducted effectively under the current institutional conditions.  The proposed solution is less convincing: how could this European assembly of national parliaments effectively manage a budget and conduct a policy that produces results without a government?  In all countries, it is the government that is responsible for determining and conducting policy through a permanent and hierarchical structure that constitutes the executive power.  

We should therefore at least think about establishing a parliamentary system to have a chance of convincing public opinion, citizens and politicians to allocate significant resources of their own to a European assembly in order to manage ecological and social issues.

Moreover, managing funds solely dedicated to ecological and social issues does not allow for a coherent policy, even if industrial issues can partly be linked to ecological and climate issues. Indeed, without the independence, power, influence and prestige of the armed forces, this purely civilian European government will not be able to negotiate effectively with the great powers and will not be able to properly defend European industrial and commercial interests, given the divergence of security and geopolitical interests between the European national states. The creation of a European assembly with purely civilian competences will therefore have the effect of accentuating the fragmentation of power and decisions in Europe by withdrawing from the national states a significant part of their resources without constituting a credible European power pole. This is another major obstacle to convincing voters and political leaders. 

Finally, this purely civilian European government will not be able to oppose the possible budgetary excesses of European national states, particularly those of debtor states such as France or Italy. These states will have a majority in the European assembly and, given their national military forces and their strong internal legitimacy, they will be in a position not to respect their budgetary commitments while benefiting from the considerable transfers that the budget of the European assembly will allow. Indeed, a "too big to fail" debtor State will be able to demand transfers in the form of investments to maintain its solvency while refusing the European recovery measures decided by the European assembly. An American State, on the other hand, would not be able to oppose the binding financial and fiscal measures negotiated with Washington, the holder of the power conferred by the command of most of the armed forces.  This position of strength of the debtor states will be a major obstacle in convincing the creditor countries to commit themselves to this purely economic European federalism

Week 18, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will intervene at the conference of Wednesday May 3rd at 18h00 in the Senate. The topic: European democracy and the role of parliaments

The causes of the Franco-German disagreement

The climate between the French president and the German chancellor is not good, despite the occasional displays and the obligatory anniversaries. The French reproach the solitary visit of Olaf Scholz to China and the project of anti-aircraft defense equipped with American material. The Germans highlight the lack of French armament effort to support Ukraine and the French will to tarnish the preponderant role within the SCAF project. 

Beyond these momentary disagreements, it seems that the Franco-German tandem no longer functions and is no longer able to impulse an ambitious economic, industrial and military project for the European continent in order to create European sovereignty.  Both Paris and Berlin are relying on the proposals of the European Commission and come what may, 

If we look at the responsibilities of each party in this affair, we see that Germany is proposing an ambitious project for Europe, which is undoubtedly the only one capable of creating real European efficiency and true European sovereignty.  Chancellor Adenauer, Wolfgang Schauble, Joschka Fischer and the Scholtz government have publicly stated their willingness to build a European federal state, including a group of founding states including France and Germany. In France, on the other hand, no institutional or political will is seriously displayed.

The Germans certainly conclude that Europe is, in the eyes of the French, only a means of reinforcing France's power or of coming to the rescue of its weaknesses, notably monetary and financial. They therefore take precautions and invest in their relations with Eastern Europe, the USA, China, Russia, etc., to the detriment of their relations with France.

We can also see that Germany has agreed to abandon its Deutschemark, which has been the symbol of its power, pride and success since 1945. In France, on the other hand, they are still clinging to France's permanent seat on the UN Security Council, even though it does not provide much benefit. There is constant talk of France's independence thanks to its nuclear deterrent, while the use of nuclear weapons remains extremely problematic and while many countries are at the nuclear threshold, have allies who offer nuclear protection or possess nuclear weapons themselves.  The Germans certainly conclude that France is perhaps not capable of adapting to the new international realities in order to progressively lead a European federal state, and they turn to other partners and other solutions.

 Finally, we note that populism and nationalism of the right and left, both of which have a Germanophobic aspect, are reaching record levels in France, regrouping almost 2/3 of the electorate. The AFD, the German nationalist right-wing party, on the other hand, is stagnating at around 10% of the vote. The Germans certainly conclude that France could suddenly put an end to Franco-German or European cooperation, as Marine Le Pen and Jean Luc Mélenchon wish. So they probably also think that the path of Franco-German cooperation is a risky one that should be used with caution. 

The Franco-German disagreement is therefore mainly linked to a problem of French political orientation and will. It cannot be solved until the French elites and the French population have been made truly aware of their European destiny through a federalist European project that takes up the German federalist proposal. This is the only project that can effectively combat French nationalism and offer a real prospect of efficiency and European sovereignty.  
 
To create a European federal government, the French President and the German Chancellor should make the creation of a Franco-German or European federal state an essential and official horizon of their policy. Personalities in both countries could then influence opinion in favour of this idea, which would become feasible thanks to credibility and institutional will. Finally, French and German political parties would be encouraged to include the now popular idea of a Franco-German federation in their political programs and election campaigns for electoral gain. The German government made the creation of a European federal state with a group of founding countries an official policy goal in 2021.  

While 30 per cent of French and Germans are in favour of a European federal government, and 30 per cent are against it, some leaders in France and Germany still reject this solution. This is due to their lack of vision, their lack of competence and their lack of political courage. This penalizes all European citizens and damages their economic and security interests. Such a European federal government will do better than the European Commission and better than the European Parliament.​​

Week 17, Year 2023

European federal perspective best weapon against populism?

Some believe that the French government would strengthen populist and nationalist forces by proposing to gradually create a European federal state. 
To think of transferring France's military and budgetary sovereignty to a European government would act as a red rag and turn public opinion against Europe. 

This red rag theory is probably justified as far as the parties, movements and personalities of the nationalist right and, to a lesser extent, of the radical or nationalist left are concerned. But there is nothing to suggest that the European federal perspective would alienate moderate political forces and leading political, economic and media figures, who generally accept that a European federal state would be a solution if it became possible.  
And there is nothing to say that this prospect would alienate public opinion or voters. 

Voters who vote for populist and nationalist parties of the left or the right blame Europe for its lack of industrial, migratory and military efficiency, which is real given the permanent divergences and disagreements between European countries. It is above all this lack of efficiency that turns voters against the European project, rather than the form of future European institutions. It is also the lack of European political responsibility that is turning voters against the European project, since they have no means of democratic control over the decisions taken by the EU.  
Yet the federal perspective makes it possible to propose a European federal state and thus a European institution capable of playing a major economic protection role and exercising considerable military and police power. This perspective also makes it possible to propose a European government that is truly accountable to the voters. These two elements can reconcile some of the voters who vote for populist parties with the European project. 

The European federal perspective also makes it possible to weaken the ideological position of nationalist parties of the right and left. It is the notion of national sovereignty that gives nationalist parties an important ideological and political influence, since France, a formally independent and sovereign country, has no reason to transfer its monetary, migration or trade sovereignty to European institutions. 
But the prospect of European federalism allows the concept of nation to be transferred to Europe, since there is no example of a state without a nation. The nation is understood as a population living on a common territory and sharing a common culture and history. 

This deprives the nationalists of their main ideological weapon and may therefore gradually reduce their political and media audience as the concept of a European nation grouping together the small nations of Europe gains ground.  

Under these conditions, wouldn't the prospect of European federalism be a necessary means to weaken Eurosceptic populism? These Eurosceptic populisms are on the rise in France, Italy and Poland, even though the federal perspective is not on the agenda in these countries.

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Week 16, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will speak at the conference on April 18, 2023 at 5:30 pm at the Musée de la Poste. The theme: how to reactivate political thinking in Europe?

European sovereignty and Taiwan  

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Emmanuel Macron has defended the idea of European sovereignty on the issue of Taiwan, to allow Europeans to defend their interests instead of following American or Chinese policy on this issue.

This approach is entirely justified because it allows Europeans to become aware of their specific geopolitical position and therefore of their own interests, which are necessarily different from those of the United States or China.

But this presidential reminder remains insufficient. Indeed, the European sovereignty that he calls for cannot become a reality under the current European institutional conditions. No European country is powerful enough to protect and lead the EU, which remains a union of sovereign states in budgetary, military and industrial terms, each with a different vision and each defending its particular interests in the medium term, if not the short term. Cooperation between European states cannot therefore produce any significant results apart from a few increasingly rare successes. 

It is therefore the USA, the dominant military and diplomatic power in Europe, which ensures the geopolitical coherence of the EU.

No real European sovereignty can therefore emerge today, and in particular no capacity to defend European interests properly against American pressure. To become independent of the US and thus achieve real sovereignty, Europeans must speak with one voice and conduct a single policy at the diplomatic, military and industrial levels.  This will only be possible when a federal European state has been created, the only one able to go beyond the particular interests and electoral constraints of each European country to define and implement a single policy on the major issues.

Emmanuel Macron should have completed his speech by mentioning the possibility and the necessity of a federal union in Europe. This would allow the creation of a common political goal for all European countries, which would harmonize their current divergences and prepare the future of European citizens. This future is today compromised on the industrial, economic and security level by the European geopolitical subjection and by the political division of the European countries.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Week 15, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will speak at the conference on Thursday April 13 at 6:30 pm at the University of London Institute. The topic: The war in Ukraine and the idea of Europe

France's European Archimedean lever

Dear European citizens, dear members, dear sympathizers, dear friends,

The European construction is often compared to an archimedean lever allowing France to multiply its power thanks to European achievements. France would be able, notably through the European Space Agency, the euro, the single market and the European trade policy, to considerably strengthen its economic and military power. This would allow it to play a role of great power in the world, without losing its budgetary and military sovereignty.

It is true that European technological, economic and financial achievements benefit France, as they do other European countries. France's power is therefore indisputably strengthened by European cooperation and by the European institutions. But this does not mean that this reinforcement is sufficient for France to reach the status of great power, nor even that its economic, diplomatic and military power is significantly increased thanks to European construction.

If we look at the military, diplomatic, economic and cultural elements of French power, we see that European construction provides support but does not constitute a multiplier factor for French power. 
At the military level, the European Space Agency provides significant support to the French space army and Airbus facilitates the maintenance of a French industrial and technological defense base, but space and aeronautical technologies are increasingly mastered by emerging powers such as India and Iran or re-emerging powers such as Russia. This support does not allow France to compete militarily with the great powers of the United States and China, especially in space, in the air and in cyberspace. This support does not compensate for the reduced size of French conventional forces. 
French diplomacy benefits from the solidarity of European countries and the EU on consensual issues, but it cannot count on massive support on sensitive issues such as relations with Russia, Turkey or China. Nor can it compete with the American influence, nor with the growing influence of China or Russia, nor with the regional influence of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, India or Brazil as current events show.
The French economy benefits from the single market and the single currency, without which it would probably be experiencing debt repayment difficulties today. But its growth remains weak, its foreign trade deficit, its industry often downgraded and its economic and financial surface limited. 
French soft power, mainly based on human rights, democracy and French culture, is supported by the European framework, which includes the notions of human rights and democracy. However, this support does not fundamentally change the ideological balance of power, which remains dominated at the global level by the United States for democracy, by Russia for authoritarian conservatism and by China for authoritarian efficiency. 

It should be added that the support given to France by the European institutions and achievements is dependent on American protection and leadership. Without this leadership, European construction of the confederal type as we know it today could not flourish. The absence of a dominant European country capable of protecting, organizing and leading the continent would lead to the return of the primacy of national interests in the short term and thus to the resurgence of national rivalries, even blocs and wars, in Europe. This fundamental European geopolitical reality places France, like the other European countries, in a situation of subordination to the United States in political and military terms since 1945. This considerably limits France's military and diplomatic power in the European context and consequently in the world. 

France is actually the second European power and is also a regional power in West and Central Africa. Its international influence remains limited and inferior to that of Germany, for example, with the USA, China, Russia, Turkey, Japan and Brazil.

The European institutions do not allow France to regain the rank of great diplomatic and military power in Europe and the world that it had until 1939. 
The end of the French great power is an inevitable historical process, given France's reduced military and economic surface and the geopolitical realities since 1945. The only way for the French to become citizens of a great power again is to build a European power and thus a European federal state, in which they will be able to play an important, even crucial role in certain domains. This European federal state could embody a stronger form of democracy, so that it would be more effective and able to govern European diversity.



Week 14, Year 2023

The European response to US industrial policy

The Inflation Reduction Act signed by Joe Biden provides subsidies of around $400 billion to green industries that set up shop in the US and distributes advantageous premiums for consumers who buy green products made in the US. 
It complements the Chips Act, which provides the U.S. semiconductor industry with an equivalent amount of money, ten times the amount the Europeans have made available to support their semiconductor industry.
  
These measures have been in place for months, but Europeans have not yet agreed on how to respond to this industrial challenge.

The European Commission's main proposals are to simplify the rules on aid, to speed up their implementation, to make the framework within which European states can subsidize their industries more flexible, to redirect the investments of next generation EU and to create a sovereign investment fund. 

As for simplification and acceleration, this has been a constant theme of the commission for decades, yet it has not yielded satisfactory results. The explanation probably lies in the absence of a European authority that is actually accountable to the citizens, which constantly generates new, fussy regulations that are far removed from reality.
As far as the relaxation of subsidies granted by the European States is concerned, although it is desirable, it nevertheless poses a major problem. It will disrupt the functioning of the single European market by creating distortions of competition between European companies of different nationalities, according to their means, which will increase the industrial backwardness of certain European countries with deficits and possibly lead to new financial difficulties for them. But as it is very difficult to release new common European resources, given the financial irresponsibility and budgetary drifts that this would generate in the medium term and the opposition of frugal European countries, the commission is forced to proceed in this way. 

Concerning Next generation EU, it is not only about green industrial projects, but also about social, health and educational projects, whose priority is defined by the member states, so that the reorientation of Next generation EU towards green industries will not be likely to produce substantial industrial results, without sufficient targeting and precise objectives.  

As for the European sovereign wealth fund, it seems very complicated to set up, due to opposition from creditor countries and differences of opinion between European states.

In addition, it should be remembered that the Buy European Act is almost impossible to adopt and that European trade policy remains rather incoherent given the political division between European states and their geopolitical subjection. 

Finally, there is the absence of a capital markets union and a banking union. The union of European capital markets is necessary to direct private capital towards the most interesting European industrial projects by geographical area and by industrial sector. The current situation of competition between European markets leads to the fragmentation of financing and its insufficiency. The absence of a European banking union, due to the fears of certain countries, which are undoubtedly justified, weakens European banks and disrupts the financing of the economy.

Under these conditions, what should Europeans do to maintain their industrial competitiveness and defend their position in value chains? 

Almost all the levers of industrial policy have been Europeanized following the single market. Public procurement, regulation and trade policy are conducted at the European level and cannot be re-nationalized. Only subsidies can be re-nationalized, but in addition to the problems already mentioned, this would run up against the high degree of independence of production sectors and value chains between European countries in many promising industrial sectors and for many key technologies. Industrial policy cannot therefore be renationalized.

However, the Europeanization of industrial policy is not enough. Industrial policy must also be steered by a European federal state. Indeed, only a European federal state with a central government would be able to conceive and use subsidies in a targeted and powerful way, to use public orders at the European level, to create a coherent regulation, to lead a firm commercial policy, to favor vertical and horizontal sectoral concentrations at the European level, to lead a centralized European research policy, to complete the banking union and to make the union of capital markets. All of this is essential to achieve meaningful results and to halt the gradual decline of Europe, and it is beyond the reach of the EU, which is subject to obvious and constant divergences of interest among its member states. 
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Some believe that the level of populist votes makes it impossible to go down the federal path. But the populist vote is largely induced by the ineffectiveness or non-existence of sovereignty and regalian policies, especially industrial policies, in the EU and European countries. The resulting decline in the standard of living and quality of life is a fact and often explains the strength of the populist current. Proposing real and effective sovereignty through the creation of a strong and coherent European federal state would partly meet the expectations of those voters who vote for populist parties. European state sovereignty could also one day appeal to a potentially majority proportion of the electorate, which remains attached to the European project despite everything. 

It should be added that refusing to propose a federal future to European citizens strengthens populist parties by admitting the sole existence of national interest, since interests are above all defended by states. But this "sovereign" national interest has no reason to be defended primarily through European cooperation rather than with extra-European powers such as Russia, China or the USA, if this is less interesting for the country. The populists will therefore be intellectually right when they propose to break away from European solidarity, which will allow them to be electorally victorious. This will lead to the weakening and probably eventual collapse of the European system as a result of national egoisms and resurgent national rivalries.  

Others believe that the creation of a European federal government, which requires the emergence of a European nation, would take centuries. They forget that it took less than 70 years for the Italian states, which did not share the same language, to achieve political unification and give birth to an Italian nation, even though they were still at war with each other at the beginning of the 19th century.

Week 13, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will speak at the conference of March 30, 2023 in Saint Denis. The theme: European industrial policy. 

Is European federalism coming too soon?

Dear European citizens, dear members, dear supporters, dear friends,
Some people think that European federalism, i.e., the desire to create a federal European state responsible for major issues, is an interesting idea, but politically ineffective for the moment, given the state of public opinion. Indeed, the public is not familiar with this notion and is not mobilized in its favor.

In doing so, they forget 3 decisive factors.

The first is the geopolitical, geostrategic and economic constraints that weigh on European countries and that make European public opinion aware of the need to act at the European level in order to be effective on the major issues. Eurobarometers show that 60 to 70 percent of Europeans want more Europe for defense, foreign policy, industry, energy and immigration. If public opinion does not support a federal European solution, it is because it is not sufficiently informed about the possibilities of implementing such a solution, which seems out of reach, and about the shortcomings of the EU, which it still believes to be capable of dealing with these issues.  
However, it is quite possible to show public opinion that the EU can no longer deal effectively with the problems facing Europeans, particularly in the industrial and military fields. The federal solution is therefore perfectly feasible, if governments advocate it and if credible personalities defend it.  

The second factor is the great risk incurred by Europeans in their situation of political disunity and high degree of economic interdependence. 

The risks of pandemic and war in Europe have been ignored, will we ignore the financial, geopolitical and political risks that can suddenly shake the stability of the European continent and call into question the monetary union and therefore the single market? The rapidity of financial and banking crises, the increasingly precarious nature of the American umbrella and the considerable progress of populists who favour their short-term national interests could lead to a weakening or dismantling of the monetary, economic or security architecture in Europe, as began with the Brexit. Yet potential rivalries between European countries persist under the pacification provided by the United States. France continues to delude itself about its status as a world power, when in reality it is the second European power with a sphere of influence in West and Central Africa. This pride, which is totally inappropriate in 2023, borders on populism, even nationalism, and in any case feeds it. It also leads to a moralistic foreign policy in an attempt to compensate for the reduction of French material power by increasing its ideological power through the defense, not only of human rights, which is justified, but also of universal democratic values throughout the world. This makes it not only rather ineffective but also highly suspicious, given France's intense cooperation with certain authoritarian countries in the Gulf and North Africa, for example. The resulting failures can fuel the development of French nationalism. Germany, for its part, understands that it cannot count on an American commitment in Europe without limit of duration and intensity. But, given its past, Germany will probably not be able to compensate for an American withdrawal by developing its own military and political power to try to protect and lead Europe. Under these conditions, the absence of a Franco-German power pole, which requires a Franco-German federal state, bears the seeds of political destabilization and economic fragmentation of the continent.  

The risk of downgrading has become a tangible reality. The main indicators confirm the technological and industrial decline of Europe in most strategic sectors and high-tech products, with a few exceptions, notably in relation to the USA and China. This is due to the inability of the EU and European countries to conduct an effective industrial policy, given the inevitable economic and geopolitical differences of opinion between the 27 European governments, each of which has specific electoral constraints and particular interests. These inevitable divergences of view lead to confused regulation, insufficient subsidies, almost non-existent public ordering and an overly open trade policy. 

As far as the geopolitical and military decline of Europe is concerned, it is no longer in question. For decades, in the Russian world, in Africa and in the Middle East, the influence of European countries has been in sharp decline relative to that of the superpowers and emerging countries.

The third factor is the time required for the emergence of a European federal state. It will take years, even decades, before the federalist vision can be transformed into a political reality, given the time needed to orient opinions and establish institutions. In that time, the European downgrade will continue. Therefore, the longer it takes to start the process of forming a European federal state, the more Europe will fall behind and the harder it will be to catch up.

The question is therefore rather: can Europeans still hope to preserve their standard of living, their internal security and their instruments of power through federalism? Is European federalism too late?

Week 12, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will speak at the conference on March 21 at 18:30 at the Maison de l'Europe in Paris. The topic: the Swedish Presidency of the EU

Can the new Africa-France partnership be effective?

French influence in Africa is declining, especially in comparison with other powers. If we analyze the causes of this decline, we realize that military errors, the moralistic foreign policy and the lack of performance of some French companies explain it to a great extent. But this decline is also caused by the insufficient financial and military power of France in the face of its Chinese, Russian or American competitors. The French colonial heritage in Africa is, I think, rather neutral in total: anti-French feelings may exist but on the other hand the French language and human contacts with the French are very powerful in West and Central Africa. 

French military mistakes are well known: intervention in Libya beyond the framework decided by the UN and which led to the bankruptcy of the Libyan state since 2011. Subsequent exponential growth of the Islamist threat in the Sahel and heavy French intervention without decisive participation of the armed forces of the states in the region, when it was necessary to be satisfied, as soon as possible, with supporting and training the local armies. 
The errors of foreign policy are mainly due to France's moralizing policy through its proclaimed defense of democratic regimes. This is often experienced in Africa as interference, even hypocrisy, not only by the leaders but also by a large part of the population. The Chinese and the Russians are more popular than the French in Africa, even though their principle is not to make a difference in treatment according to the nature of the regimes, but only according to how their interests are received.  Finally, the lack of performance of certain French companies can be explained by their long-standing habit of rent-a-sit in certain African countries, provided by France's diplomatic and military ascendancy in these countries. When this ascendancy is greatly reduced, competition becomes fiercer and these French companies find it difficult to react. 

But this decline is also the result of France's lack of financial and military clout against its geopolitical rivals. The dispersion of humanitarian and development aid between European countries and the EU, as well as the scattering of investments between the EU, European countries and France, does not allow for the satisfactory use of these levers, particularly in the face of China, which is increasing its influence and taking public and private market shares. The weakness of France's military resources compared to those of the United States and China leads many French-speaking African countries to consider that France cannot conduct a truly independent policy with respect to the United States. It also leads them to consider that France would not be able to stand up to the China-Russia pair in the event of a confrontation between their state and hostile countries or with rebel forces. 

Under these conditions, some would like to develop cooperation between European countries in Africa, particularly between France and the United Kingdom. This type of cooperation is relatively useful, but it does not solve the major difficulties mentioned. The divergent priorities between the 2 states, their different and sometimes opposing foreign policies on certain subjects and the divergent colonial histories of the 2 nations make the formation of a coherent and powerful Franco-British African bloc illusory.  

Only a federal European state could compete in Africa with China, Russia, the United States and other powers thanks to its financial surface and its military credibility. It should be added that its diplomatic power would be far superior to that of France, which would be a major asset. 
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The Africa-France partnership could therefore be somewhat improved if France takes the necessary measures.  But it can only become truly effective if it becomes an Africa-Europe partnership through a federal European state in which the French will play a key role in the design and implementation of European foreign policy towards West and Central Africa. 
This double observation is also valid for industrial policy, migration policy, military policy and foreign policy in particular.


Week 11, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will speak at the conference on March 14 at 6:30 pm at the Hotel de l'industrie. The topic: the consequences of the war in Ukraine for the Franco-German relationship.

Europe and Latin America

Europe's relations with Latin America are rather good: there are no major disputes between the two zones and human relations are significant, particularly via Spain and Portugal.

However, the free trade agreement with Mercosur, which is desirable for developing trade and growth, is blocked following opposition from environmentalist forces and certain European agricultural countries. The supply of European military equipment to the region continues and allows Latin American countries to have a different supplier from the US, without having to resort to Chinese or Russian equipment. 

It would not be desirable to further develop European-Latin American relations by setting up security agreements, military cooperation or to question the security architecture of the region by supporting the Bolivarian alliance. The security architecture and military cooperation in Latin America are the responsibility of the United States, given the importance of the migratory, economic and strategic stakes of the region for the national interest of the United States and given the importance of the economic, security and human links between Latin America and the United States. 

The USMCA (formerly NAFTA), complemented by a social and environmental treaty valid for all of North America, organizes the economic and social links between the countries of North America and gives the United States a decisive influence on Mexican and Canadian politics. The Inter American Treaty of Recroprocal Assistance signed in 1947 instituted a system of collective defense between all the countries of the Americas against armed aggression from one of them or against an external threat. Only 6 Latin American countries are not part of it: Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Mexico (which proclaims itself pacifist and whose armed forces are very small). 23 South American countries have military cooperation with the USA. Some countries also benefit from a state partnership that gives them access to exchanges with American military institutions. Military exercises between the USA and the countries of the zone are regularly organized for special forces, for the security of the Panama Canal and for maritime security in particular. Numerous cooperations in the fields of climate change, health and women's rights complete the system. 

Under these conditions, European interference in Latin American security affairs would be perceived in the United States as an aggressive move aimed at undermining order in the region and potentially posing a direct threat to U.S. security. It would make the American attitude towards Europeans much more distrustful and much harder. It would hinder possible Europe-US cooperation in Africa or the Middle East. Moreover, these European attempts would have little chance of succeeding, given the resources available to the United States in the area. 

Finally, such attempts to interfere in the affairs of the Americas would facilitate a possible Russian or Chinese military presence in Latin America, for example in Argentina, Venezuela or Cuba, even if for the moment China is content with non-traditional military cooperation (counter-terrorism, military education, technology and logistical support). Russia, on the other hand, has already deployed equipment and troops in Venezuela and Nicaragua. 

It should be added that the dispersion of American financial, material and human resources across the globe, particularly in Asia and Europe, prevents the Americans from conducting a fully effective investment and cooperation policy in Latin America, which has more than 500 million inhabitants and is their essential area for their external and internal security. Under these conditions, Chinese investments and Russian deployments could one day threaten American influence in many Latin American countries and place the US in a difficult strategic situation. 

Attempts at confederal or even federal political unification do not yet really exist in South and Latin America, although some projects are moving forward. The rapprochement of Argentina and Brazil in particular could eventually create a political entity with the critical mass and political potential to achieve South American unity. However, this rapprochement remains very uncertain given the political and social instability in Brazil and more generally in the region. Europeans cannot therefore take part in these developments for the moment. 

Finally, the growth of the Latino vote in US elections through immigration and fertility rates, as well as the growing number of Hispanic politicians in the US, will accentuate the importance of Latin America for US foreign policy. However, the Latino vote is a Democratic vote for 2/3. 

For the Republicans and the majority of the non-Hispanic population in the USA, it is therefore mainly a question of stopping the immigration from Latin America and controlling the foreign policy of the countries in this zone to fight against the Russian and Chinese influence.
For the Democrats and the majority of Hispanics in the United States, it is a question of making this immigration possible under certain conditions and of promoting cooperation with the countries in the area while maintaining American domination, if possible, in order to limit Russian and Chinese influence. 
It is interesting to note that the Democrats are often more interested than the Republicans in changing the nature of the regimes in countries that could constitute valid interlocutors or even useful partners for Europeans. They also want to maintain and extend the influence of the United States in the world as much as possible, even if this means disproportionate spending and free trade agreements that penalize American industry. As for the Republicans, a portion of them seek to end the EU following the Brexit, particularly because of their opposition to international organizations that limit the sovereignty of nation states. Republicans, on the other hand, are more inclined to limit the U.S. sphere of influence in the world in order to avoid reckless spending, to protect U.S. industry and to avoid exposure to setbacks. 

Europeans should be aware of their particular geopolitical positioning, characterized by their fundamental interests in Africa, the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, the Russian world, as well as in the Indian subcontinent, but not in Latin America. To defend these interests, they must be able to cooperate with any power if necessary by establishing mutually beneficial and evolving partnerships, which will allow them to truly contribute to stability and world peace. 

But this obviously requires the emergence of a European government, the only one capable of conceiving and conducting a single European foreign policy and European defense policy.

In order to create a European federal government, the French President and the German Chancellor should make the creation of a Franco-German or European federal state an essential and official horizon of their policy. Personalities in both countries could then influence opinion in favour of this idea, which would become feasible thanks to credibility and institutional will. Finally, French and German political parties would be encouraged to include the now popular idea of a Franco-German federation in their political programs and election campaigns for electoral gain. The German government made the creation of a European federal state with a group of founding countries an official policy goal in 2021

Week 10, Year 2023

Info FEDERAL EUROPE will speak at the conference on Monday March 6th at 7:30 pm at the Heinrich Heine House. The theme: feminist foreign policy in France and Germany.
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The ECB and European inflation

Inflation disrupts economic exchanges and reduces confidence in the currency. This necessarily has negative consequences for the country's productive activity and for its growth.

The energy shock is one of the main causes of inflation in Europe, through the rise in gas and oil prices. Combating this shock therefore requires an energy policy that provides companies and households with abundant and cheap energy. But because of the lack of a common energy policy and the irrationality of the ecological attitude towards nuclear power, and despite the coordination efforts of the European Commission, such a European energy policy is still non-existent. Each country develops its own energy mix and its own green projects, while the energy industries and technological skills are highly integrated in the European single market. Moreover, energy projects are highly capital-intensive and therefore require investments on a European scale first and foremost. As a result, the cost of energy remains much higher in Europe than in the US and Europeans are much more dependent on imported energy.

Under these unfavorable energy circumstances, the ECB cannot easily raise rates and reduce its debt buyback program to reduce demand and thus anchor inflationary expectations. This is necessary in order to ensure price stability by keeping medium-term inflation at 2%, as is part of its mission. Indeed, given the need to keep the interest rate differential between creditor and debtor countries in the euro zone at a low level, in order to avoid a new financial crisis on the debt of debtor countries, a sharp rise in interest rates and a significant reduction in the debt repurchase program would present a systemic risk for the euro zone. 

Jacques Delors has clearly identified the fragility of the European monetary system. To resolve it, he called for the completion of economic and monetary union through the creation of a European debt, Eurobonds, to allow debtor countries to finance themselves without recourse to the intervention of the ECB, which poses a political risk to the euro zone, particularly in Germany. But debt and the budget are eminently political prerogatives that the creditor countries will never agree to mutualize, except on a one-off basis and because of an extraordinary event such as the COVID 19 pandemic.

The ability of the ECB to fight inflation effectively and to create a European debt would in fact require the existence of a European federal government. Only a European federal government accountable to the voters for its taxation and accountable to the financial markets for its debt would be able to manage a European budget comparable to the US budget. This would put an end to the risk of fragmentation of the Eurozone by the monetary authority and budgetary power of the federal government and would allow the ECB to fulfil its mission properly.  

To create a European federal government, the French president and the German chancellor would have to make the creation of a Franco-German or European federal state an essential and official horizon of their policy. Personalities in both countries could then influence opinion in favour of this idea, which would become feasible thanks to credibility and institutional will. Finally, French and German political parties would be encouraged to include the now popular idea of a Franco-German federation in their political programs and election campaigns in order to make electoral gains.  

While 30 per cent of French and Germans are in favour of a European federal government, and 30 per cent are against it, some leaders in France and Germany still reject this solution. This is due to their lack of vision, their lack of competence and their lack of political courage. This penalizes all European citizens and harms their economic and security interests.


Week 9, Year 2023

Info: FEDERAL EUROPE will speak on Wednesday March 1st at 7:30 pm at the Maison de l'Europe in Paris. The topic: the European stakes of the Cloud.

1 year of war in Ukraine: what lessons for Europeans?

We can already draw four main lessons after 1 year of war in Ukraine.

1/ Weakening of the credibility of the USA.  Their precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan, for electoral and financial reasons, probably weighed heavily in the Russian decision to invade Ukraine, a direct intervention of the USA, especially from the air, becoming impossible. In this context, will the United States still have the political will and the budgetary and military capacity to intervene in Europe, especially in view of its very committed policy towards Taiwan? It should be added that the US arms deliveries after the outbreak of the conflict on February 24, 2022, while the most important and vital for Ukrainian indếpendence, were not sufficient. Tanks, fighter jets and the intelligent artillery systems should have been delivered massively from the beginning of the conflict, to allow the Ukrainians to re-establish control over their territory and organize their defense before the Russians reinforced themselves. This might have forced Russia to make peace. 

2/ Almost total inability of Europe (i.e. the EU and European countries) to protect Ukraine. Without the delivery of arms and intelligence provided by the USA for the invasion, Ukraine would no longer exist as a sovereign state. And yet the Europeans have the arms and intelligence resources that could have protected Ukraine. What they lack is the political will. It is lacking because each European state defines its foreign policy sovereignly and mainly according to its immediate electoral and national interests and because no European state is powerful enough to direct the others. 

3/ Russia's operational and tactical weakness. The failure of its plan of conquest comes from the dispersion of its forces on 5 axes, the absence of a significant surprise effect as well as the lack of coordination, concentration and logistic support of its units in the fighting.

4/ Russia's strategic superiority, which can count on the direct or indirect help of China, India, Iran, Turkey and Brazil to escape sanctions or to strengthen its war economy. This, added to the gradual improvement of the tactical and logistical performance of the Russian army, the very superior human potential of Russia compared to Ukraine and the determination of the Russian elites and people not to let Ukraine join the Western camp via the EU or NATO, gives Russia a long-term superiority in this conflict. But this superiority will not change the detestation of the Ukrainian population towards the Russian regime. 

In this context and given this observation, Europeans must above all set in motion the process of creating a credible European political and military force capable of protecting its neighbors and partners. This necessarily requires the creation of a European federal state. Could the US have defended Ukraine if it did not have a central government in Washington and if the 52 US states each conducted their own foreign policy with independent armed forces?
 
Europeans must also devise a Ukrainian policy that preserves the independence and freedom of choice of Ukrainians without integrating Ukraine into the EU. Ukraine by its language, its religion, its history and even by its political functioning remains closer to Russia than to Eastern Europe. But a possible rapprochement of Ukraine with Russia could only happen one day on a voluntary basis from the Ukrainians. Such a rapprochement would not prevent Ukraine from maintaining economic cooperation with Europe, via a possible integration into the single market and security links with the Europeans in order to preserve the free orientation of Ukraine.  

To do this and to contribute to putting an end to this conflict which is costing Europeans a lot of money and causing a considerable number of deaths and injuries, Europeans should provide weapons more quickly, especially fighter planes, to give the Ukrainians the possibility to take back the territories conquered by Russia, including Crimea, before Russia strengthens itself through waves of mobilization and the full use of its war industry. Defense is still easier to organize than attack.

But such deliveries would have to be offset by the Ukrainians accepting their neutral status, postponing their possible entry into the EU to an indefinite date and abandoning the idea of joining NATO. European countries should propose to Russia the gradual lifting of general economic sanctions (SWIFT blockades and freezing of assets of the Russian central bank), which are rather ineffective, in exchange for the cessation of strikes on civilian infrastructure and the acceptance of the armed neutrality of Ukraine.

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Week 8, Year 2023

INFO
FEDERAL EUROPE will speak at the conference on Tuesday 21 February at the Heinrich Heine House at 7.30 pm. The theme: the Franco-German relationship

The cost of American protection

American protection comes at a very high cost to Europeans, even though this protection remains necessary for internal and external security in Europe as long as there is no European federal state capable of creating and commanding European armed forces to preserve peace in Europe.
It is not always clear, but if we look carefully at the situation of European security dependence on the United States, we can see that it generates considerable costs and problems. 
This situation of dependence is first of all a means of American pressure to conclude civil and military contracts in Europe but also in the world in the face of European competitors. It is also a means of blocking or reducing European retaliatory measures following American protectionist measures (aluminium taxes, Chips act, IRA etc.). It is also a means of pressure to control, orient or reduce the influence and trade of the EU and European countries and a way of obtaining auxiliaries for more or less justified military expeditions and of increasing the contribution of these auxiliaries to 2% or more of their GDP.

This situation of dependence also leads to a clear decrease in the spirit of defense and the will to resist of Europeans. This is reflected in an extremely low tolerance for losses, particularly in France and Germany, which is a European societal characteristic compared to the rest of the world, including the United States. It also leads to a headlong rush in the fight for ecology and universal values, which is supposed to dominate, in the eyes of many political forces in Europe, the traditional diplomacy in the relations of Europeans with the rest of the world. This constitutes a European political peculiarity in relation to the rest of the world.

Finally, this dependence offers a means of exerting pressure to maintain the political division of Europeans into smaller states in order to dominate them, even if this division is primarily caused by those who submit to this pressure or who do not mobilize for European unity. This type of pressure was notably used by the Kennedy administration at the time of the Elysée Treaty, to have the Bundestag adopt an Atlanticist preamble to this treaty. 
It should be added that nothing says that American protection and pacification are sustainable, given the geopolitical (pivot to Asia), political (electoral divide and populism on the right and left), financial (trade and budget deficits) and social (poverty and inequality) problems facing the United States. 

It is therefore urgent that Europeans take their security in hand. They will only be able to do this through the creation of a federal European government responsible for matters of defense and diplomacy in particular, since separate states always have different, even divergent, electoral and national interests, but rarely opposed in Europe. This would produce a truly independent Europe, not just the formally independent Europe that the EU and European countries are today. This could also be useful for the USA in the medium and long term. They have an interest in a lasting pacification of Europe to avoid resurgent rivalries between competing alliance systems on the continent supported by extra-European powers such as Russia and China, which could produce new European wars with very serious consequences for their security and prosperity. This would also allow a certain sharing of the burden of the world order between Europeans and Americans.
  
What would be the financial cost of an independent defense for Europeans? 

A European defense within the framework of a European federal state and with a budget of 3% of the GDP (3.5% in the USA) would completely cancel the massive moral and material cost of American protection for European citizens. It would also considerably improve the quality of European debt and bring down government borrowing rates considerably, since the risk of the euro zone breaking up in a European federation would be almost zero.

Week 7, Year 2023

FEDERAL EUROPE will speak at the conference of Wednesday February 15th at the Senate at 6pm. The theme: Geopolitical Europe

Peace in Europe and federalism

Dear European citizens, dear members, dear supporters, dear friends

In addition to power and interdependence, peace is the third major reason for creating the European federal state.

Contrary to popular opinion, peace between European countries is not guaranteed by the existence of the EU. It is in fact the USA that ensures peace within the continent thanks to its military power and the security provided by the defensive alliance system of NATO. An invasion of a European NATO member country against another European NATO member country would provoke the intervention of the USA and its allies, which have overwhelming air, naval and land superiority in the European theater, not to mention cyber and space superiority. This intervention could even be conducted by NATO after the exclusion of the aggressor country, via provisions provided for by international law in the absence of appropriate provisions in the North Atlantic Treaty. 

If tomorrow the United States abandons NATO and withdraws its forces from the European theater, we will probably not see the emergence of a credible European defence due to the lack of a European federal government able to command and create armies. On the contrary, the European countries will each seek a protector or will each try to create their own intra-European alliance system. France might be tempted by an alliance with Poland or Russia, while Germany might move closer to China and other Eastern European countries. Italy would seek security with Russia or even China, while the United Kingdom would remain an ally of the United States. The narcissism of small differences and the divergence of short-term interests exacerbated by the high degree of interdependence between European countries would quickly lead to a new geopolitical division in Europe. This new geopolitical division, which would be mitigated for a time by the common European interests represented by the single currency, the European internal market and the European trade policy, would gradually resurface national rivalries, excited as they often are by the press. These national rivalries would create a significant risk of war, for example over financial quarrels between eurozone countries in the event of an Italian or French debt crisis or in the event of ethnic tensions between Hungarians and Romanians. 

But American protection in Europe is far from assured. The US is facing unprecedented geopolitical challenges in its rivalry with China, major political problems due to the radicalization of part of its electorate, major social problems due to poverty and low wages, and financial problems due to its recurrent and growing trade and budget deficits. Who can predict what the US attitude towards Europe will be in 5 years, 10 years or 15 years?
Moreover, American protection comes at a significant economic, commercial, security and moral cost. American hegemony in Europe gives the United States access to civilian and military contracts, to protectionist and extraterritorial measures that are virtually immune to a serious European response, and to virtual control over the diplomatic orientation of European countries. 

It is therefore necessary, in order to preserve peace in Europe, which is also in the interest of the United States, to put a definitive end to potential rivalries between European states. This necessarily requires the creation of a federal European state with a strong executive able to discourage separatist temptations and preserve peace in the area. This is not necessarily much more difficult to accept for France than for Germany. Let us not forget that the Germans agreed to abandon the deutschmark in favour of the euro, even though the German currency was a central element of Germany's post-war success, pride and power.
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Week 6, Year 2023

Interdependence between European countries and federalism


We often insist on the need to create a real European power in order to be able to properly defend the interests of Europeans against large states such as the United States or China. This fully justifies the creation of a European federal state, the only way to create a great European power. 
But there is a second major reason for creating the European federal state. This is the strong interdependence between European countries that results from the civilizational unity of Europe and the economic, monetary and commercial integration of the continent since 1945. This strong interdependence forces Europeans to organize themselves politically in an efficient way, therefore with the help of a federal state.  

First of all, financial interdependence requires the creation of a European federal state. The durability of the euro zone in particular, and thus of the single market and of European domestic production, depends on the financial solidity of the debtor countries. This financial solidity cannot be conceived without financial transfers, not only exceptionally during crises such as that of Covid, but also without regular transfers to avoid de-industrialization and loss of tax revenue in the debtor countries, which lead to populism and rejection of the EU. But regular financial transfers require a budgetary responsibility that only an electorally responsible federal government can assume in order to avoid the excesses of public debts and the ECB's debt buy-back policies.

Second, fiscal interdependence. Large groups, such as those in the high-tech sector, take advantage of the disparities created by tax competition between European countries on corporate taxes to escape a normal tax rate. It is also very difficult to tax the profits made on European territory by these groups because certain countries that export to the United States are sensitive to their threats of targeted retaliation. With a European federal state, these problems would no longer arise.   

Trade interdependence. The trade agreements and tariff and non-tariff measures decided by the 27 concern all EU countries. But the political division of the Europeans allows non-European powers to play on the divergence of interests between European countries in order to obstruct retaliatory measures or to scupper trade agreements or investment pacts. Some countries, for example, want above all to export their automobiles, while others want above all to benefit from American military protection or to tax foreign technology groups. With a federal European state, the European trade position would be unique, without the possibility for other powers to divide the Europeans in the negotiations.

Industrial interdependence is also a factor. The value chains and production sectors are highly integrated in Europe in many key sectors such as the automobile, aeronautics and IT industries, which requires an industrial policy via subsidies and regulation at the European level via a federal state.

Energy interdependence. The cost of energy in Europe is largely explained by the absence of a coherent policy at the European level to organize nuclear and renewable energy production and the electrification of transport systems, whereas these industries are highly integrated at the European level, which requires concentrations and a single European regulation instead of subsidies and incentives dispersed among 27 states. Moreover, the European electricity market makes the price and quantity of electricity available in a European country depend on the production choices and energy mix decided in the other countries.  

Migration interdependence. The absence of internal borders in the Schengen area creates migratory interdependence between European countries. The inability to properly protect the external borders via Frontex shows that only a European federal state would have the means to properly protect its borders. A Franco-German federal state, plus Benelux, would already be able to protect its borders effectively through reinforced controls, even systematic controls, while waiting for Spain, Italy, Poland, etc. to be incorporated into this European federal state. 
Finally, institutional interdependence. The European Commission is a relatively useful institution that exercises its powers on a European scale. But this largely unaccountable body can make ill-considered decisions, especially in areas that closely affect the economic sovereignty and security of states.

Finally, institutional interdependence. The European Commission is a relatively useful institution that exercises its powers on a European scale. But this largely unaccountable body can make ill-considered decisions, especially in areas that closely affect the economic sovereignty and security of states. Only a European federal state, Franco-German at least, could impose its will on the commission in these sensitive matters to safeguard the true European interest, as in the case of the Alstom Siemens merger. France and Germany separately do not have the means to get along nor the critical mass necessary to impose their will on the commission if necessary or to override its decisions if necessary.

It is therefore more necessary than ever to set in motion the process of creating the European federal state in stages. The first step is the willingness of the highest political authorities in France and Germany to move in this direction to make the federalist idea feasible. Half of this first step has already been achieved, since the German government is ready to move in this direction, which is approved by 58 per cent of the French (Odoxa 2021 poll). The second step is to launch the media debate on this feasible idea to allow social and political relays to work on the opinion in this direction. The third step is for political parties to take up this idea that is favored by the public in order to increase their popularity and to hope for electoral success.​


Week 5, Year 2023

Industrial policy in Europe

 
According to Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz, the Chips Act and the American Inflation Reduction Act threaten the competitiveness of European companies and the attractiveness of the European territory for investments. The Chips Act provides $280 billion to the US semiconductor industry, provides social and tax benefits to companies that invest in the US and penalizes those that produce chips in certain countries. The Inflation Reduction Act provides $380 billion in subsidies to the U.S. energy and climate change sectors and encourages U.S. consumers to buy electric vehicles assembled in the U.S. 

To address these measures, the French President and German Chancellor propose to fund European projects in key technologies such as semiconductors and renewable industries by accelerating the implementation of the Next Generation EU, which provides 800 billion euros of investment. They also want to simplify and accelerate funding procedures, including those of the European Chips act, which provides 43 billion euros of aid. 

The problem is that the 800 billion euros of Next Generation EU are intended to finance health, higher education and equality in addition to green energy and digitalization, and European states often present the commission with projects that focus on health and economic aid. And very few coherent digital and green projects have been identified, which explains why only 20% of the planned funds have been released so far.  As for the European Chips Act, it is clear that the 43 billion euros will not significantly increase the European market share in semiconductors, which currently stands at 10%. The much higher amounts spent by the USA in this decisive sector and their tax incentives will attract manufacturers to the USA rather than to Europe. 

These examples show the limits of industrial policy in Europe when it is conducted by a commission plus 27 European states.  The amount of subsidies is too low because of the reluctance of creditor countries. Subsidies and incentives dispersed over too many sectors due to the inability to define clear priorities at 27, each country having a particular industrial problem and specific electoral constraints. Great difficulty in creating European champions through industrial rapprochement because of rivalries between companies in the same sector belonging to different countries or because of the pro-competition and anti-concentration approach of the European Commission. Increased industrial rivalry between companies in the same sector because they belong to different countries, each of which wants to satisfy its industrialists and employees in order to know who should take the lead in a European project. 

All these factors explain why industrial policy in Europe is of dubious effectiveness, as evidenced by the lack of emergence of European champions and European unicorns in satisfactory numbers, especially in strategic sectors. This also largely explains the deterioration of the EU's trade balance since 2016 and the EU's trade deficit in 2022. 

Only a European federal state would have the budgetary and political means to conduct a coherent and effective European industrial policy

While 30% of the French and Germans are in favour of the establishment of a European federal government, and 30% are against it, some leaders in France and Germany still refuse this solution. This is due to their lack of vision, their lack of competence and their lack of political courage. This penalizes all European citizens and harms their economic and security interests. 

Week 4, Year 2023

France and European federalism


Since 1945, Germany has abandoned the national path in matters of defence. It therefore sees its future either in the Atlantic framework or in the European framework. 
France has not yet abandoned the idea of a national path in military and industrial matters because of its nominal victory in 1945. But this idea does not correspond to the reality of power relations in Europe, dominated by the United States, nor to the reality of power relations in the world, characterized by the growing influence of emerging countries, 
This idea does not correspond either to the reality of the strong interdependence between European countries which makes any national economic and industrial policy more and more inefficient.   

This explains why France rejected the German proposal to form a federal core in the heart of the European Union: in 1994 following the Schauble-Lamers proposal, and in 2000 following Joschka Fischer's speech in Berlin.  

But in the spring of 2022, President Macron accepted the principle of European federalism for the first time when he defended the principle of majority voting in the European Council on defence and taxation issues. This acceptance in principle shows that France implicitly recognizes that it must move towards European federalism, but it still has difficulty doing so openly and using an effective method. 

Indeed, majority voting in the European Council will not be possible or viable because of the persistence of separate administrations and governments for defence and taxation issues.

In order to truly move towards federalism, France must accept the German idea of creating a federal core within the EU. 

This can provide a viable and mobilizing project that can push back the nationalism of the right and left that threatens its prosperity and security. To convince the French, it will be necessary not only to recall that a European federal state is the only one capable of providing real independence from other powers. It will be necessary to explain that the strong interdependence between European countries requires a common European state capable of organizing industrial and environmental policy. It will also be necessary to say that peace in Europe cannot really be guaranteed without a European federal state, given the geopolitical, political, economic and financial challenges facing the United States. 

It will then remain to define more precisely who should be part of this initial core, but France and Germany will necessarily be part of it. Creating a federal core comprising France and Germany would be the best way to concretize the Gaullist idea of an independent Europe capable of exercising real power, which was the objective of the Elysée Treaty. 

This initial Franco-German core will probably grow rapidly (Benelux, Italy, Spain, Austria...). This rapid enlargement must be taken into account in the design of institutions and administrative and military arrangements. In particular, the initial name (Franco-German Federation or Franco-German Confederation, for example) will have to rapidly replace the word "Franco-German" with the word "European" and the language of communication (which is not the language of education nor the language of culture) will have to rapidly include English, in addition to French and German.  

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Week 3, Year 2023

The nature of the international system and its consequences for Europe

Some, notably in Germany, on both the right and the left, believe that the international trading system based on law is threatened by the resurgence of spheres of influence and, to a lesser extent, by authoritarian regimes.

This point of view is erroneous because it fails to distinguish between different elements of international life which have always co-existed.
It reflects the feeling of a country that has benefited from the globalization of trade for these exports and that does not take on important responsibilities in the world given its dependence on American protection and its nationalist past.

To design an effective foreign policy, it is necessary to understand how the international system really works, which has 3 distinct elements.

The first element is the system of commercial exchange, interdependence of production chains and global cooperation (climate, health, terrorism, etc.). It is only partially based on law, since very many breaches of international law have been proven by the great powers (USA, China, Russia, etc.) in the military, commercial or financial fields. This system is nowadays very open to trade since 20% of the world's GDP is linked to trade and since the means of travel, communication and information are globalized and very powerful. This open trading system tends to close down a little because of the industrial policies implemented by most States to obtain a competitive advantage and capture the best positions in the production sectors and in the trade value chains. international.

The spheres of influence of each power constitute the second element of the international system. This element manifests itself today as much as in the past and can be defined as the capacity of a country to weigh more than the others on the diplomatic, commercial or military behavior and performance of a third country. Who can deny that most European countries, the Gulf countries, Australia, Canada, most Latin American countries, Japan and South Korea are part of the American sphere of influence given their diplomatic behavior of US military bases on their soil? Who can deny that Cambodia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Djibouti, Tanzania, North Korea and to some extent Pakistan, Sudan and Angola are within China's sphere of influence? Who can deny that Algeria, Syria, Mali, Belarus and to some extent Kazakhstan are in the Russian sphere of influence? Who can deny that many West African countries are within the French sphere of influence and some East African countries are part of the British sphere of influence?

The existence of these spheres of influence, which are in competition, is compatible with globalized exchanges regulated by multinational institutions which attenuate the economic rivalry between States but which cannot make it disappear. Economic growth and the resulting purchasing power are indeed electoral issues and parameters of political stability.

Finally, the diversity of political regimes constitutes the third element of the international system. It may perhaps lead to friction or ideological rivalry between states and between spheres of influence given the stakes for the legitimacy of the political regime in place, but it too remains compatible with vigorous international exchanges. From this point of view, one can only observe that China does not seek to change the nature of regimes abroad, whereas the United States is much more inclined to trigger or facilitate regime change.
And it is not always authoritarian regimes that free themselves the most from multilateral legal and political rules. Let us not forget that the USA invaded Iraq in 2003 and placed a pro-American regime in defiance of international law and that they still refuse to apply the decisions of the WTO when they do not suit them. The most protectionist measures come as much from the USA as from China when we look at the amount of subsidies that are granted, the protection of public contracts provided for and the use in particular of the dollar as a means of applying extraterritorial sanctions.
In reality, the nature of political regimes throughout the world presents a great diversity: liberal and participatory parliamentary regime as in Switzerland, hereditary totalitarian regimes as in North Korea, presidential representative democracies as in the USA, parliamentary representative democracies tatives as in Germany, liberal parliamentary democracies as in India, pseudo-democratic regimes with legal control of the parties as in Singapore, semi-presidential autocratic regimes as in Russia, military dictatorship as in Equatorial Guinea or semi-military dictatorships as in Egypt, dynastic religious regime like in Saudi Arabia etc. In general, the most democratic regimes respect human rights more, but this is far from always being the case. For example, there are still capital executions in Japan while they are non-existent in Venezuela.
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The authoritarian nature of political governance has clearly increased in the last two decades according to all studies, and competition for spheres of influence has also increased, while the volume of international trade has continued to grow.

There is therefore no equivalence between the growth of global trade, the absence of spheres of influence and the decline of authoritarian regimes.

This is why those who observe the reality of power relations and the concrete evolution of events go even further. They demand for the European Union a philosophical transformation allowing it to assert itself in the international political and economic competition by becoming a real geopolitical actor, and not only an organization which takes economic sanctions, often ineffective, and which defends moral values. , frequently misunderstood. Geopolitical positions and spheres of influence indeed support business and trade, as does US military power and the network of alliances that support US business in Iraq, Europe; in the Gulf and in Asia in particular.

But to become a geopolitical player worthy of the name, an industrial, energy, ecological, military and foreign policy is required. This can only become a reality when a federal European government responsible for these issues exists. to other powers
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While 30% of French and Germans are in favor of setting up a European federal government, and 30% are against it, some leaders in France and Germany still refuse this solution. This is due to their lack of vision, lack of competence and lack of political courage. This penalizes all European citizens and undermines their economic and security interests.​

Week 2, Year 2023

Allow me first of all to wish you a very happy new year 2023 and the best possible health. Thank you again for your interest in FEDERAL EUROPE's ideas, for your support or for your remarks and comments, which are always welcome.

This beginning of the year is, as usual, the opportunity to take stock of the action of European countries and the European Union for the past year. This assessment concerns the areas of political life in Europe that European citizens consider to be the most important according to the Eurobarometers: 1/ the economic situation, 2/ international influence, 3/ the environment, 4/ health, 5/ security and 6/ immigration.

1/ The economic situation in European countries has improved less than in most other regions of the world.

This is still mainly the consequence of the absence of a European industrial, energy and research policy. Mainly national local industrial policies are not able to produce enough European champions and to effectively organize research and innovation in Europe, despite some few successes. Energy policy in Europe remains incoherent and inefficient in terms of energy costs, energy independence and environmental protection.

As a result, production in the European Union increased in 2022 by only 3.2% after an increase of 5.4% in 2021 and a decline of 7.6% in 2020, i.e. an increase of 1% for the period 2022 -2020. In Germany, growth was 1.5% in 2022 (after an increase of 2.6% in 2021 a decline of 3.7% in 2020) i.e. an increase of 0.4% for the 3 years. In France, growth amounts to 2.5% (after an increase of 6.8% in 2021 and a decline of 7.8% in 2020) i.e. an increase of 1.5% for the 3 years. In the United States in 2021, production growth in 2022 is 1.6% (after an increase of 5.7% in 2021 and a decline of 3.4% in 2020) i.e. an increase of 3.9% for 3 years. In Russia, growth is negative at 3.4% in 2022 due to the war against Ukraine (after an increase of 4.7% in 2021 and a decline of 2.7% in 2020), i.e. a decline of 1. 4% for 3 years. In Turkey, growth reached 5% in 2022 (after growth of 11.9% in 2021 and 1.9% in 2020), i.e. an increase of 18.8% for the 3 years. In China, production increased by 6.8% (after an increase of 8.1% in 2021 and a decline of 2.2% in 2020), i.e. an increase of 9.1% for the 3 years. In India, production increased by 6.8% in 2022 after an increase of 8.7% in 2021 and a decline of 6.6% in 2020, i.e. an increase of 8.9% for the 3 years. (IMF and World Bank figures).

With a European federal government, the economic situation in Europe would be much better. Greater European funding to support fragile economies via major European projects, a coherent European industrial policy and a shared research policy would make it possible to revive economic growth in Europe and avoid the progressive technological downgrading of Europeans.

The deteriorating economic situation in Europe also has social consequences. Weak European growth is leading to a gradual deterioration in the standard of living of Europeans, to an increase in short-time working, and to stagnation or a drop in purchasing power among certain socio-professional categories. As local national European governments are not subject to a federal European government capable of regulating market forces, the deteriorated economic situation also increases social and fiscal dumping in Europe. Tax havens like Ireland persist. On the other hand, the condition of the working poor in Germany is improving partly thanks to the efforts of the Scholz government for minimum wages, housing allowances, pensions and protection against rising energy prices.


2/ The international influence of the European Union and European countries has further diminished during the year 2022 in almost all regions and on almost all issues. This has serious consequences for exports, investments, security and the prestige of Europeans.

Even if the international influence of the EU is not at the top of the concerns of European citizens, the influence of France for the French of the influence of Germany for the Germans remains an important concern which is added therefore to expectations regarding the influence of the EU.

The international influence of the European Union and European countries is first diminishing on the geopolitical level.

Russia invaded Ukraine, discrediting the Minsk agreements obtained by France and Germany. It is the USA which ensures the protection of Ukraine with arms deliveries
es and the provision of intelligence before the conflict and during the conflict, preventing Russia from winning the classic war quickly.

The EU, France and Germany are of course incapable of protecting Ukraine alone, which would however be necessary in particular to allow this country to choose its diplomatic and military orientation freely. This free choice by Ukraine is necessary, particularly in view of the Russian policy of aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

A European federal government could create a European army capable of protecting Ukraine through the supply of arms, instructors and intelligence of a quality and quantity comparable to the American effort. This European government would also be able to guarantee the application of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement for its economic part, while allowing political and economic rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia on a fair and voluntary basis.

The EU and European countries are still very divided on what to do with Russia regarding economic cooperation or European political interference in Russia, the degree of European influence in the countries of the former USSR, the issue of NATO expansion and the level of risk posed by Russia. They are therefore not credible partners for Russia. As a result, Russia remains turned primarily towards China and considers Europe as a weakened and divided area that the United States will not be able to defend forever and whose real policy consists in wanting the end of Russia as a power, in particular because Europeans are not able to defend themselves without the USA..

Only a European federal government could encourage Russia to move away from China and move closer to Europe.

The influence of France and the EU is declining in North Africa and the Middle East. It is Turkey, supported by the USA and by Russia, which is increasing its influence in all these areas. A European federal government would have the credibility to offer Turkey a mutual defense agreement to promote European interests in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia and to roll back American and Russian influence on Turkey.

The influence of the EU and European countries is almost non-existent in Iran, Pakistan and India. It is China that has concluded trade and security agreements with Iran and with Pakistan. India continues to be isolated by Chinese policy in Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Pakistan. It is the USA that is developing military cooperation with India, even though France is making its naval bases in the Indian Ocean available to Indian forces.

Only a European federal government would have the means to carry out a policy of investments and military cooperation with these countries to prevent China from managing to dominate the Eurasian supercontinent and to replace the declining influence of the USA in this area.

European influence is also decreasing further in Africa to the benefit of China and Russia, particularly in economic matters but also concerning military cooperation, notably in Kenya, Mali, DRC, Tanzania, Angola and in African regional security organisations. Only a European government can stand up to Russia and China in Africa, which are particularly seeking to secure their energy and mineral supplies.

In Latin America, the influence of the EU and European countries is very small given the inability to conclude a free trade agreement with the Mercosur countries due to the refusal of certain European countries to facilitate imports of products South American farmers, when this agreement would favor European industry and support global growth. This agreement also faces opposition from environmental pressure groups that influence decision-makers. Apart from economic cooperation, it is not desirable for the EU and the European countries to establish important security and military links with the countries of the area, which remain above all linked to the USA for their intra-continental security and for their defence.

The international influence of the European Union and the European countries is also decreasing geo-economically.

It is however necessary to mention the Global Gateway project of the European Commission intended to invest and develop high quality infrastructures throughout the world, to complement and compete with the new Chinese silk roads and to a lesser extent the American B3W.

But the Global Gateway project will not have sufficient public funds to finance investments in countries that are not always solvent according to IMF criteria but which are of great geopolitical interest.
like Egypt, Iran or Pakistan. Moreover, the Global gateway project will not benefit from the support of a European diplomacy and army, which will prevent it from imposing itself in many important countries which prefer partners capable of protecting them. or who are encouraged to prefer such partners.

The EU concluded an investment agreement in 2020 with China which goes in the right direction but is still far from being adopted by the European Council and by the European Parliament given the divisions between European countries on this subject.

Only a European federal government could negotiate on an equal footing with China to maintain and develop trade with China which contributes to the fight against inflation and which improves the purchasing power of Europeans, to develop Chinese investments in Europe in sectors that do not present significant security issues because this promotes growth but also to protect strategic European companies and to quickly implement an embargo against products that benefit from the forced labor of the Uyghurs.
 
Only a European federal government independent of the USA for its security could agree with China on Taiwan and the South China Sea. Regarding Taiwan, the Europeans could encourage Taiwan to progress on the path to reunification, the principle of which cannot be called into question. With regard to the China Sea, the Europeans could favor a solution involving the countries of the region without interference from the USA.

The EU and European countries are still not able to respond to American legal and trade sanctions properly, especially after the extraterritorial sanctions against Iran which prevent European companies from operating in this country and protect European strategic companies from American takeovers.

Only a European government independent of the USA for its defense could retaliate and therefore dissuade the USA from taking trade sanctions against European companies, from buying them up without difficulty or from creating protectionist subsidies.

And given the differences in commercial interests between European countries, a single trade policy is very difficult to implement since the USA can, for example, threaten Germany with taxes on German car exports to dissuade the Germans from taxing the GAFAMs. or to support European taxation of American exports of steel or aircraft.


3/ The drop in CO2 emissions remains very low (3% compared to 2021, source IEA).

The electrification of cars, industries, heating systems in Europe is still too slow. Moreover, coal and gas will continue to be used massively in 2022. The EU's environmental objectives therefore still have little chance of being achieved.

The reform of the common agricultural policy of 2020 is unsatisfactory, for lack of sufficient funding, to clean up agricultural production. Moreover, the agri-food industry is still not properly regulated in Europe, despite useful efforts announced by the German Minister of Agriculture. This always leads to an increase in diabetes and healthcare costs.

Only a European federal government could initiate the massive electrification of the economy via major European infrastructure programs and clean up food in Europe by strongly encouraging all European countries to act decisively.

4/ The quality of the healthcare system in Europe in 2022 remains insufficient because some countries are still not investing enough (Ireland, Slovenia, etc.) or are investing poorly. (France with hospitals that are still too small and an administrative health staff that is still too large despite emergency plans that do not target these problems).

This can have serious consequences for all Europeans because the Europe zone is an integrated health zone given the single European market and the intensity of trade and human exchanges in Europe.

In 2020, the Member States of the European Union decided to entrust the purchase of vaccines against the coronavirus to the European Commission in order to have greater purchasing power. It is a step in the right direction. But since the European Commission is not elected directly by European voters, since it is not really responsible (it can only be censured by a 2/3 majority of European parliamentarians), since early European elections can be organized and as the local European States intervene heavily to guide its action, the effectiveness of the European Commission is mediocre.

Only a European federal government could act effectively to protect the health of Europeans. And only a federal government
responsible to its voters and to its population could have a truly effective medical purchasing policy.


5/ Security in Europe in 2022 has been further penalized by the absence of a European intelligence service even though there has been no notable terrorist act in Europe. Terrorism has also remained largely absent in the USA, China, Russia and India.

The absence of a European intelligence service greatly facilitates the action of terrorists because the internal security services of each European country do not have all the elements to identify terrorist groups.

Only a European federal government could create a European intelligence service and could conduct European diplomacy to eradicate terrorism on European soil.

6/ European borders were not protected against illegal immigration in 2022.

The migration and asylum pact recently proposed by the committee contains elements which are useful but which will not be able to significantly reduce illegal immigration. Indeed, aid from destination countries to host countries to take charge of migrants obviously remains voluntary given the importance of the electoral issues involved.

The European countries indeed each defend their electoral interest. They are therefore not able to distribute the migrants among themselves and to set up a single procedure which guarantees the expulsion of those who do not obtain the right of asylum. Greece and Italy must protect their borders and manage the refugees, while the refugees are mainly looking for Germany, Benelux and France.

Italy and Greece therefore have no interest in arresting illegal immigrants and the host countries (Germany, France, Benelux) do not want to encourage neighboring countries to take on too many migrants, in order not to welcome them. . This explains why despite the efforts of Frontex, which nevertheless uses the illegal technique of pushback to solve the problem, the number of refugees in Europe is still much higher in 2022 than in the United States, Russia or India. (Source UNHCR)

Only a European government could protect European borders and drastically reduce illegal immigration.

It should be added to this 2021 European report that in all the Eurobarometers we still see a significantly higher rate of satisfaction with the ECB than with the EU. This is due to the federal and therefore efficient nature of the ECB, whereas the EU is a confederal structure that is often inefficient due to the political division of resources and decision-makers.
The time has come to create a European Federal Republic, starting with a Franco-German Federal Republic, responsible for defence, diplomacy, industry, research and the environment.​

Week 50, Year 2022

Can the European Parliament become sovereign?

Dear European citizens, dear members, dear supporters, dear friends,

Some people believe that the formation of the European federal state requires the affirmation of the sovereignty of the European Parliament and its authority over the national parliaments.

They believe that increasing the resources managed by the European Parliament and extending its competences could considerably strengthen its influence. They also believe that transnational lists with the automatic appointment to the presidency of the commission of the head of the list of the party winning the most seats would provide high visibility and legitimacy to the European Parliament. All of these elements would shift the center of gravity of power from national parliaments to the European Parliament and bring about the emergence of a parliamentary-style European federal government; 

But if we examine these elements more closely, we quickly understand that they do not allow us to modify the political balance of power between the European and national levels. The own resources will remain marginal (less than 2% of the European GDP) as they have been for the last 30 years, no important competence can be transferred to the European Parliament given the unanimity rule for changing the treaties and the transnational lists do not allow for the creation of a sufficiently powerful European political conscience given the power of the media and national issues. 
 
And to make the European Parliament sovereign in a federalist constitutional convention would require the agreement of the European peoples or national representations in Europe. But, as already mentioned, getting the agreement of all the countries represented in the European Parliament at the same time is a practically impossible task. This is why it is necessary to start by creating a federal core with a few countries, preferably France and Germany, by creating a sovereign Franco-German parliament for the major issues (defense, diplomacy, , environment).
This parliament should work with a sovereign Franco-German executive directly elected by European citizens, which is more democratic than the appointment of a prime minister following negotiations between political parties. It is also more efficient, since, as Emmanuel Macron reminded us, the presidential type of regime provides the capacity to decide and act in a very short time. 

To make this Franco-German federal core project a reality, it will be necessary to proceed in stages. First of all, it is important that France and Germany agree on the principle of this project. Germany has given its agreement on the occasion of the coalition agreement, but France's agreement remains to be obtained. Then the support of French and German public opinion for this Franco-German federal project, supported by the highest authorities of the two countries, can be obtained by the explanations of personalities and institutions of political, economic and social life. Then the priority will to implement this Franco-German federal project could be manifested by political formations or leading pro-European candidates, taking into account the electoral profitability and political attractiveness of the project. 
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Week 49, Year 2022

The European dimension of the French deterrent

Emmanuel Macron has confirmed the European dimension of France's vital interests. According to him, French nuclear forces contribute to the security of Europe.  

The French nuclear deterrent could therefore be used to protect Europe. This protection concerns the territory, the population or the European state structures that are vital to French interests. And it is indeed indisputable that the security and prosperity of the French depend directly on the security and prosperity of Europe.

If the vital interests of France are located in Europe, it would not be illogical that the definition of these vital interests and the implementation of the deterrent forces capable of protecting them fall to a European head of state. 

Indeed, the French deterrent force will be fully credible when it can be implemented at the European level. It will always be difficult for a French president to appear totally credible in his desire to use French nuclear forces to defend European interests that are not directly those of the European country he leads. 

And given the French doctrine of deterrence based on strikes against military and economic power centers, it is not certain that the threat of such strikes would deter a conventional aggressor with nuclear weapons. Such an aggressor could then immediately attack the French and European centers of power while continuing its aggression to conquer the country, which would compensate for its losses. As for anti-city strikes, their dissuasive character is unreliable since the enemy might not take the threat of collective suicide seriously, despite the disproportionate risk he might run.  It would be preferable, as Kissinger said at the end of the 1950s, to use nuclear weapons in a graduated manner in case of a threat to our vital interests. This would be done in order to inflict damage that would discourage the aggressor, without necessarily leading to the destruction of France or Europe. Obviously, this strategy of graduated response involves a risk of graduated retaliation and thus a very significant risk of escalation.  

Moreover, for political, media and nuclear proliferation reasons, it is extremely difficult to use nuclear weapons against a state that unleashes conventional aggression, even if that state does not have nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons to retake the Falklands was not an option for the British, and the Arab invasion during the Yom Kippur War did not trigger an Israeli nuclear response. 

The best defence therefore remains conventional defence, which must be modernised and improved in Europe.

However, the nuclear component remains necessary, in particular to face nuclear blackmail. And, mainly thanks to General de Gaulle, France will be able to make Europeans benefit from it once a European federal state capable of conducting a credible European deterrence policy has come into being. 

Week 48, Year 2022

A European ministry of culture ? 

It is often said that a European ministry of culture would be an aberration because of the strong cultural specificities of each European country, given their particular language and history 
This point of view expresses in fact an a priori which is often the product of the national education and the national media of each European country. In reality, diverse national traditions and cultures are very often promoted by a common ministry of culture. This is the case for example in India, Canada, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
In the case of Switzerland, it is interesting to note that the French, German, Italian and Romansh cultures coexist without difficulty. This successful coexistence between Switzerland's cultural traditions is explained by their proximity and by crucial common elements: Greco-Latin thought, Germanic heritage, Christian spirituality and Enlightenment values. These four close cultural traditions have gradually produced a specifically Swiss culture influenced by the territory and history of Switzerland.
The proximity of cultural traditions in Switzerland and the existence of a specifically Swiss culture led the Swiss to create a ministry of culture, the Federal Office of Culture. It is responsible for supporting cultural creation and preserving cultural heritage. It does so in coordination with the Cantons, which remain the main actors in cultural policy.
The cultural situation in Europe is from this point of view quite similar to that of Switzerland, except that we must add the Western Slavic cultural traditions in particular. The European cultural traditions are unquestionably close. And a common European culture has existed at least since the Renaissance. It manifests itself in painting, music, literature and thought in similar forms, in similar concerns, in deep reciprocal influences and in an assiduous European public. 
The Swiss cultural model is therefore perfectly transposable to Europe, and a European ministry of culture is fully conceivable. The European ministry of culture should obviously carry out its task in close coordination with the ministries of culture of the European countries and by respecting their prerogatives which will remain preponderant. But this ministry will be able to underline the common points, the convergences and the complementarities between the European cultural traditions, in the course of their history as in their contemporary expressions. This will strengthen the European sense of belonging and facilitate the affirmation of European culture. 
It is difficult to see national governments in the European Council accepting the idea of creating a European ministry of culture, given their lack of federal and national legitimacy at the European level. This is probably why the European Commissioner is called the Commissioner for Culture and not the Commissioner for European Culture. 
Week 47, Year 2022

The myth of enhanced cooperations


Enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation allow a small number of European countries to develop collective projects and common policies. The agreement of the European Council by a majority vote is necessary to implement them. 

Some believe that this cooperation will be able to remove the blockages in the European Council, particularly in the areas of taxation, energy and defence, because of the unanimity rule required in these areas. 

It is true that enhanced cooperation makes it possible to bring together European countries that are willing to make progress in certain areas. The problem is that these European countries retain their state structure without creating a common federal state structure. And as soon as the agreement of several states is necessary to conduct a common industrial or defense policy, the chances of success are minimal. Each state has distinct traditions, particular interests and specific electoral constraints, which considerably weakens the will and capacity to act. This lack of political power capable of deciding and directing prevents the implementation of common policies on major issues such as taxation, the army or industrial policy. How effective, how sustainable and how credible would be a tax, military or industrial policy directed by two or more different governments? Would it be conceivable for France, for example, to have two separate governments, one in the north of the country and one in the south, to manage its defense, taxation and industrial policy?

This explains why, since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which made their conditions of application more flexible, enhanced cooperation has not created anything noteworthy, with the exception of the European patent. But the European patent is a technical matter that does not need effective political power. Enhanced cooperation therefore does not solve the problem of the EU's powerlessness on most major issues. 


Week 46, Year 2022

The commercial weakness of Europeans


Despite all the talk about European trade power, we can only observe that the EU's trade negotiating capacity remains very limited. 

It is true that the EU can make promises of better access to its large market or threaten to take the matter to the WTO when negotiating with small or medium-sized countries.

But it cannot alienate its American protector, given its almost total security dependence on the US;
Nor can it threaten China with sanctions that would deprive it of access to the Chinese market, given the German dependence on exports to China. This German dependence on exports to China is more pronounced than the Chinese dependence on exports to the EU. China has a large and rapidly growing domestic market. Its exports to Germany represent 0.6% of its GDP and those to the EU 2.6% of its GDP and these percentages are decreasing. Germany's exports to China represent 2.8% of German GDP and this percentage is increasing. 

Moreover, the different European governments have divergent national and electoral interests due to the absence of a European federal framework. This regularly allows the great powers outside Europe to target certain European countries to prevent a coordinated European trade response.

The US and China are thus able to impose their trade conditions to a large extent. This allows them to obtain agreements to their advantage, such as for aluminum in the case of the United States or for technology transfers in the case of China. Most of these transfers still take place while China refuses to fully open its domestic market, which remains protected through investment restrictions, targeted regulations, pressure and subsidies. This policy is intended to create Chinese industrial and technological champions in all fields. The USA, especially with the Democrats who are more interventionist, are also developing an ambitious, protectionist and coherent industrial policy thanks to their centralized federal state.

The Europeans therefore have no chance of properly defending their commercial interests, their industry, their investments and the attractiveness of their territory in the face of the USA and China.  
Unless they decide to create a federal European state to be able to speak with one voice commercially and to set up an independent European defense. But this requires abandoning national dreams of grandeur and fully accepting one's European destiny. 

Week 45, Year 2022

The risks of European dependence on the USA 

It is not disputed that the USA, and not the Europeans, ensure the security of Ukraine by supplying weapons and military intelligence.

But the US is showing signs of fatigue even though the war has only lasted 8 months. Some members of Congress are calling for a reduction in costly military aid, and others believe that the U.S. is not able to provide security to Ukraine, Eastern Europe, South Korea and Taiwan simultaneously.

In its competition with China, the US military spending is very high, more than 700 billion dollars per year. This represents a significant burden as trend growth slows and inflation and interest rates rise. The reinforced American presence in Eastern Europe and Asia contributes significantly to these expenses and divides the American forces between 2 fronts. How can we believe that the US will be permanently ready to assume this burden when Europe is an economic competitor, when Chinese industry is already outperforming American industry? How can we believe that American conventional forces, which are much less powerful than those of China, will be able to continue to ensure the security of Europe, Asia and the Middle East? Moreover, the traditional American establishment is increasingly isolated in the US. The US is crying out for more attention and financial support, rather than spending lavishly to maintain an alliance system that it does not really see the point of and that presents significant risks.   

And how can we believe that the US will constantly protect Eastern Europe when Russia no longer represents a planetary threat as it did in the days of the USSR. Russian expansionism may eventually destabilize and threaten the territorial integrity of Finland, the Baltic States and Moldova in particular. Will the US take the risk of intervening militarily and provoking a nuclear escalation in the event of a Russian power grab? This is not certain. 

The USA, for financial, political and military reasons, may not be willing to protect some of its allies by jeopardizing their prosperity and their own security. 

This is logical. One cannot rely on a distant ally, even a very powerful one, to defend one's interests as well as one would. Moreover, relying on the Americans weakens the will to defend and the spirit of resistance of the Europeans, which may have harmful consequences for their future federal state.   

Europeans must therefore organize the defense of their continent. For that it is necessary to create a European federal state. Indeed, only a European federal state can create a credible political power and a European armed force capable of defending the European territory and of effectively supporting the European allies in the Russian world, in the Middle East and in Africa... But as long as this European federal state is lacking, only NATO and the American power are able to protect the Europeans; 

As for Taiwan, it is not in the interest of the Europeans to be dragged into a quarrel which is essentially about American interests and in which the usefulness of European support for the USA is minimal. Instead, Europeans should push the US and China to agree on a timetable for reunification that guarantees a form of democratic local government for the Taiwanese or face severe trade and financial sanctions from the US and its allies.  

Week 44, Year 2022

The United Kingdom after the Brexit


Eurosceptics and nationalists insist on the alleged relative success of the English model with its very low unemployment rate and its strong growth. This would prove, in their eyes, the uselessness and the harmfulness of the European treaties and mainly of the single European market and the single European currency;

What is the real economic and financial situation of the United Kingdom since the Brexit, especially compared to France?

Economic situation 
Growth 2020 to 2023 United Kingdom: 2% Source IMF 
Growth 2020 to 2023 France: 2.1 % Source IMF
Inflation 2022 United Kingdom: 9.1% Source IMF
Inflation 2022 France: 5.8% Source IMF
There is therefore a small advantage for France regarding economic growth. This is despite the UK's lighter taxation and more limited regulation, which had for decades given the UK a growth advantage over France. Inflation in the UK is significantly higher and this presents a major risk to UK growth in the medium term.  If the UK were still in the EU, it would probably grow more than it does now, thanks to better exports and easier imports. If it were in the euro, inflationary pressure would be much lower.

Financial situation
10 year government bond yields: 3.6% in the UK and 2.6% in France
Debt ratio 85% in the UK and 96% in France. 
The UK cannot borrow as easily as France because of its non-participation in the euro. This can hamper its investment policy and its attractive tax policy. as Liz Truss has experienced.  And if the U.K. were to increase its tax burden, which is quite low (35%) but does not finance higher education, for example, this would have a negative impact on its growth and unemployment rate. France, on the other hand, could easily reduce its tax burden from 55% to 45% by better managing its national and local public finances. 

Social situation
Unemployment rate 3.5% in the UK and 7.4% in France. Source: IMF
Poverty 13 million compared to 9 million in France with an equivalent population. (Source INSEE, Legatum Institute)
Life expectancy 81 in the UK and 82 in France. 
Rigidities in the labor market, excessive taxation and the low number of working hours in France explain the much higher level of unemployment. 
The more advantageous British tax system is to the detriment of the most fragile social classes, which is a major handicap for the human potential of this country.

The United Kingdom is at risk of falling behind, at this stage mainly economically and financially, because of its isolation in Europe following the Brexit and given its non-participation in the euro. Despite having much stronger links with the rest of the world (Global Britain) than France, the United Kingdom cannot do without the European environment. 

This should give pause to those in France who advocate a policy of retreat to the former colonial empire and to the French-speaking world at the expense of France's European destiny. But in order to perpetuate the single currency and the single market, a European federal state is necessary, in order to put an end to the risk of the euro zone breaking up and to rebalance the financial flows to the benefit of the debtor countries thanks to common European goods (army, diplomacy, infrastructures, industrial policy) which will improve the situation of each European country and of all European citizens. 

The time has come to create a European Federal Republic, starting with a Franco-German Federal Republic, responsible for defense, diplomacy, industry, research and the environment. 
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While 30% of the French and Germans are in favor of the establishment of a European federal government, and 30% are against it, some leaders in France and Germany still refuse this solution. This is due to their lack of vision, their lack of competence and their lack of political courage. This penalizes all European citizens and harms their economic and security interests. 
Week 43, Year 2022

French Universalism and French Exception: two European dead ends


The political and media classes have difficulties in accepting the integration of France in a European federal  structure. This is notably due to the notion of French universalism which considers that the universal spirit of reason of which France is the representative is culturally superior and has the vocation to spread throughout the world. France could not therefore be satisfied with a primarily European vocation. 

This universalist vision is paradoxically completed by an exceptionalist vision of France, whose particular culture and extraordinary destiny since Vercingetorix (who did not speak French and was not Christian) would justify the maintenance at all costs of its national independence and of the full, if not total, sovereignty of its State.

In reality, these two visions are erroneous. France is obviously a European country like any other, that is to say a country with a specific culture as regards modes of thought and social habits, this culture being close to that of its European neighbors. This French and European culture also has points in common with the culture of every people on the planet, since it is men who carry cultures and all men are indeed capable of reasoning and living in society. This probably explains why the elites throughout the world, generally more called to reason, have more points in common than the peoples It is only to this extent that one can speak of universalism. 

The notions of French universalism or French exceptionalism are therefore outdated and inappropriate ideologies. In reality, there is a French culture of the European type that is open to the universal and therefore more or less linked to the culture of every people on the planet.   

It is by abandoning the flattering but unrealistic notions of French universalism and French cultural exceptionalism, which often resemble crypto-nationalism and which have no equivalent elsewhere in the West, that we will be able to better accept the idea of integrating France into a European federal entity. Within this ensemble, French culture will naturally be preserved, as in Switzerland, but it will be more closely linked to that of its European neighbors. 
The time has come to create a European Federal Republic, starting with a Franco-German Federal Republic, responsible for defense, diplomacy, industry, research and the environment. 

Week 42, year 2022

Anti-Americanism: a European dead end


Some believe that it would be useful to designate the United States as an adversary of the federal unification of Europe in order to mobilize European wills in a European direction.  This would accelerate the formation of a European state, just as Bismarck had used hostility against France to unite Germany.

It must first be said that a political unification cannot be realized only by opposition to the foreigner. It is necessary to have an identity and a will to live together, otherwise simple military alliances with the aim of defending against a common enemy would be enough to create a state. China and the USSR did not form a single country following their alliance against the USA in the 1950s, despite their close alliance and common ideology. 

Secondly, one can only designate an external enemy if there is indeed a hostile behavior to European unification. Bismarck could point to Austria and France as the enemies of German unification because Austria was actually fighting Prussia's unification policy, as was France.  The USA is not opposed to the federal unification of Europe, it even promoted it in the 1950s. If today they prefer to see Europeans divided in order to better dominate them and defend their interests, they have never really opposed the process of European political unification. The United States has been much more supportive of European federalism than France or the United Kingdom since 1945, in order to bring peace to Europe once and for all, which is in their interest.   

Moreover, to point to the U.S. as the enemy of European unification would run the risk of turning into a rejection of the U.S. presence in Europe before the Europeans have created their federal state. This would be the best way to see the resurgence of rivalries between European states or even war between European countries, divided into opposing blocs and supported by their respective powerful extra-European allies. 

If Europeans are not able to unite politically, it is mainly because of the short-sighted and unreasonable politics of most of their politicians and not because of the USA. 

The time has come to create a European Federal Republic, starting with a Franco-German Federal Republic, responsible for defense, diplomacy, industry, research and the environment. 

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While 30% of the French and Germans are in favor of the establishment of a European federal government, and 30% are against it, some leaders in France and Germany still refuse this solution. This is due to their lack of vision, their lack of competence and their lack of political courage. This penalizes all European citizens and harms their economic and security interests. 
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Week 41, Year 2022

The European energy crisis 

This European energy crisis is first of all the consequence of the irrationality of the thinking of the ecological forces which prefer the CO2 emitting gas to the nuclear energy, which does not produce any. Secondly, it is the consequence of the war in Ukraine, which the Europeans were unable to prevent even though Ukraine is their partner. This war has reduced the supply of Russian gas and oil. Finally, it is the result of the incoherence and inefficiency of the European energy policy, which is not surprising since it is conducted by 27 sovereign states plus a commission.

But today, what should Europeans do to get out of this crisis?

To lower the cost of energy and make it decarbonized, a European nuclear program that could supply all European countries would be necessary. To dissuade Russia from attacking its neighbors, a militarily strong Europe would be very useful. And to make the European energy policy more efficient, a European renewable energy program should be imposed on all European countries through a European infrastructure of electric production and transport. Only this vast European infrastructure program could massively and rapidly electrify the transport of goods and people in Europe as well as the production and heating systems. The current European programs are not fast and massive enough.  

All these solutions require a European federal state able to decide in a coherent way and to invest massively as only a state can do. To really get out of the crisis and the European energy mismanagement we need more than ever a federal European government responsible for industrial policy and thus for energy policy as well as for foreign policy and defense. 

Week 40, Year 2022

Populism and the European project.

The national right-wing party Brothers of Italy won the Italian elections. This party insists on national sovereignty and the defence of Italian national interests at the expense of European solidarity and the European project. This success confirms the rise of populism in Europe. 

Populism can be defined as the use of demagogy (recourse to scapegoats, refusal of economic or cultural realities) for political purposes. Populism rejects the notion of European solidarity because it refuses to recognize the strong interdependence of European countries and their common destiny 
Populist parties are, however, obliged to admit the existence of the single market and the single currency in order not to frighten voters and to come to power. But European solidarity does not exist for them. Their aim is to take maximum advantage of the EU without regard for the European partners.

The EU will not be able to survive for long a breakthrough of right or left populists in the heart of Europe, namely in France and Germany. such a breakthrough is quite possible given the victory of populists in Italy, Poland, Hungary, and to a certain extent in the United Kingdom with the victory of the brexiters
What can be done to avert this danger, which threatens the European institutions and above all concrete European achievements?

The main strength of the populists is the use of national legitimacy. A sovereign European country must necessarily be able to decide alone and defend its interests. However, European countries are inserted in a European institutional network that strongly limits their freedom of action, which seems unbearable for the democrat as well as for the patriot.  Populists, who are generally nationalists of the left or the right, therefore denounce this European system, promising to make the most of it for their country alone. But they promise not to destroy it immediately so as not to harm their country's interest. They will destroy it later perhaps, when it is possible, in order to return to the old intra-European alliance system that produces opposing European blocs and eventually wars, supported by the great powers outside Europe.

The best antidote to this national legitimacy used by the populists is therefore to create a European national legitimacy by proposing to the citizens of a small number of countries in the heart of Europe to create together a European state that will be able to defend their interests and decide sovereignly. This requires a change in the reading grid of the pro-European parties who reason in terms of economic, ecological and social issues, without taking into account national and political realities. 

Recourse to ecological and climatic legitimacy will not be enough, as the Brexit experience has shown and as the results of elections in Europe month after month demonstrate.  

It is clear that the current European system, useful for the emergence of the European unification process, is not viable in the long term and must be completed by the constitution of a European federal state if it does not want to have been a failed European construction. This system will crumble the day when the United States will no longer have the will or the capacity to ensure peace on the European continent by dissuading the small European states from becoming rivals again, or even from waging wars with the support of their extra-European allies. This system will also unravel the day the populists have taken over politically from the pro-European forces in the heart of Europe. Let us not forget that the natioanlist virus has not been eradicated in Europe. it is only dormant. 

Week 39, Year 2022

Majority voting in the European Council or European federal government? 


Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz have both proposed to move to qualified majority voting for decisions taken by the European Council. Their goal is to make the EU more effective in foreign policy and economic policy, among other things.

Federal Europe wants to create a single European government responsible for defence, diplomacy and industrial policy.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of these two solutions?   

Majority voting in the Council

Advantages
Implementing majority voting seems easier because it does not directly call into question budgetary means and national armed forces, and it seems to be possible to achieve this without resorting to a referendum.
This solution therefore seems more reasonable and it could constitute an intermediate stage between the national sovereignty currently in force and the European sovereignty exercised by a European federal state capable of deciding alone.

Disadvantages
Crucial transfers of sovereignty without a government and elected officials accountable to the voters would increase the democratic deficit in Europe. This solution would also be politically very difficult to accept in all European countries and particularly in those that still consider themselves independent powers: France, Poland, Italy, Spain in particular. It is therefore very unlikely to be implemented and a number of these countries would probably need a referendum to legitimize this solution. 

Moreover, there is a risk that the European institutions will break up in the event of profound disagreement between European states on a crucial issue of defence, diplomacy, industrial policy or energy choices. Indeed, separate European governments could always regain their freedom of action by refusing to submit to a majority vote.  


Federal government

Advantages
The creation of an elected European federal government actually legitimizes important transfers of sovereignty, such as fiscal and defence issues, in the eyes of the people. This solution may therefore be more attractive and politically legitimate than majority voting in a European council that is distant from the citizens and not accountable to the voters. Indeed, it is easier to convince the voters of the advantages of a federal European state than of a European Council deciding by majority vote, in which the European citizens do not recognize themselves and rightly doubt the power of the European Union, given the continued separation of national administrations and national armies. 
The merger of diplomatic administrations, certain economic administrations and the armed forces would, on the contrary, make it possible to constitute a credible, strong and effective European power.
Finally, the creation of a European federal state with a small group of founding countries would trigger a federalist dynamic in Europe and considerably strengthen the feeling of European belonging. 

Disadvantages
This solution requires an assumed political will, which already exists in Germany, but which is still lacking in France, given its real or imaginary history, often taught in school and frequently relayed by the media.

Conclusion
It is now necessary to move from the technocratic and institutional stage of European construction to the political and democratic stage in order to convince citizens to give more power to the European federal institutions.


Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Week 38, Year 2022

Ursula von der Leyen's speech

Ursula von der Leyen in her state of the EU speech raised several points that are worth discussing: 

First of all, she emphasized the role of the EU in supplying arms and financial aid to Ukraine. But she forgets to say that it is the USA which allowed Ukraine to resist the Russian invasion thanks to their delivery of arms before the invasion and thanks to the quantity and quality of these. If the Europeans had been the only ones in charge, the Russian forces would probably have been in Kiev long ago. 

The president of the European Commission then wished the integration of Ukraine in the European internal market for goods and services, this is a good idea given the need to support Ukraine economically and benefit from Ukrainian energy exports. It can also replace the prospect of Ukraine becoming a member of the EU, which is neither desirable nor realistic.  

She wants the taxation of fossil and electric energy superprofits to help companies and households. This is a good idea, but as the Commission does not have the means or the authority to lead a single energy or tax policy in Europe, it will not be possible to really fight against tax competition between European states by energy producers. 

It wants incentives for clean energy producers in the European electricity market. This is a good thing, but it will be very difficult to implement given the divergent energy choices between European countries; 

It proposes the creation of a European bank to facilitate the production of hydrogen. This will duplicate national means, and its efficiency will therefore be low

She wants a fiscal policy that allows strategic investments, especially green and digital, and she wants more flexibility in the management of the deficits of European countries, but with more control. This will work poorly or not at all given the lack of fiscal authority of the European Commission. The Commission cannot really influence the fiscal policy of countries that are too big to fail (Italy, France in particular) and is dependent on the goodwill of creditor countries (Germany in particular).

It wants small and medium-sized companies to be protected against inflation and shortages of workers and raw materials. The EU cannot guarantee this. It can only contribute to this through measures that facilitate the training of workers and the import of raw materials, which often come up against the divergent foreign policies of European countries or the bad management of certain European countries.

She wants trade agreements with Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia, India to facilitate the import of rare minerals, with strategic projects to invest in the top of the value chain of this sector. It proposes a European sovereign wealth fund to achieve this. This fund will duplicate the national political sovereign wealth funds and will therefore not allow Europeans to properly defend their interests against the foreign and energy policies of China, the USA and Russia.

All the measures and objectives listed by the President of the Commission would be much more effective and more surely achieved if Europeans had a single government responsible for industrial and defense issues. 

Let us add that Ursula von der Leyen's willingness to fight against subversive activities directed against the institutions and personnel of European states, or spreading disinformation and corruption, is a good thing. 

But this should not lead to a democratic messianism that intends to spread European values and institutions around the world through economic sanctions and military operations. Each region of the world has its own political traditions and its own pace of political development.  This explains the failure of democratic messianism since the end of the Cold War.  

Beyond the community of democratic and legal values between Europeans and Americans, there are necessarily divergent economic and geopolitical interests between the United States and Europe. This is partly why Europe must unite politically to acquire diplomatic and military independence through the creation of the European federal government. 

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Week 37, Year 2022

Olaf SCholz' speech

In his speech in Prague, Olaf Scholz emphasized that Europe is the future of Europeans and that the weight of the EU must be used to enable Europeans to weigh in against other powers. 

In order to strengthen the weight of the EU, the German chancellor proposes, among other things, to move to majority voting in the European Council for fiscal and financial issues, to organize a division of labor among Europeans to support Ukraine in its war effort and to produce a European air defense system.

These proposals are going in the right direction but they have very little chance of being implemented.

Majority voting on fiscal and defense issues will be opposed by most member states for domestic political reasons and would risk leading to a fracture between European states in case of fundamental disagreement, with minority states refusing to submit to the will of the majority states

The division of labour between European countries in support of Ukraine will come up against the need to cooperate with the United States, which is by far the largest supplier of arms and financial aid to the Ukrainians, because of the power and political determination provided by the American federal government

The creation of a European anti-aircraft defense system, if it remains possible, will come up against the inevitable and important rivalry between the defense industries of the different European states and will be hindered by the American arms manufacturers who can use the security dependence of Europeans on the USA. 

To increase the weight of Europe, it is now necessary to create a federal European government in the heart of the EU, starting with France and Germany and obtaining the agreement of the French and the acorns or their representatives. This solution is provided for in the coalition contract of the German government and must be implemented in stages. First of all, the highest political authorities will create a European federal state in the near future, then the best method to achieve this goal will be discussed and selected, and finally the main pro-European political formations will conduct an election campaign to convince the citizens.  


Week 26, Year 2022

The green deal, a very insufficient program?
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First of all, a clarification concerning the war aims in Ukraine. It is the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine that must be defended by Europeans, not membership in the EU or NATO. 

Ukrainians should not need and they actually do not need the prospect of EU or NATO membership to defend their independence. The prospect of membership alone cannot justify the Ukrainian war effort or Western support. To fight, Ukrainians need patriotism and weapons, especially tanks, fighter planes and long-range anti-aircraft missiles, not EU candidate status. 

The green deal includes a series of European regulatory and financial measures to accelerate the emergence of renewable and sustainable energy, to improve energy efficiency and to encourage the digitalization of the economy. 

Next Generation EU is the financial component of the green deal, for 750 million euros, including 500 million in grants. These funds are intended to finance projects planned by the green deal and which will be presented by European countries individually.  We are struck by the absence of major European projects developed in common capable of profoundly influencing the energy policy of all European countries by creating a vast European solar and nuclear program. We are also struck by the absence of industrial concentrations and large commercial support programs in the field of renewable and sustainable energies. These concentrations and support would be able to strengthen the competitiveness of European players in this sector.

Poland, Italy and Spain, for example, will continue to favor coal or gas. Germany, on the other hand, is forced to revive coal mining in order to cope with reductions in Russian gas supplies.
The impact of the green deal on CO2 emissions, pollution, energy prices and European energy independence is therefore expected to be small. 

At the macroeconomic level, the green deal is not sufficient to reduce the European growth gap with the USA in 2021. (5.7% growth in the USA in 2021 compared to 4.8% growth in the Eurozone in 2021). The European recovery will remain below the US recovery in 2022 and will be impacted by high inflation despite European stimulus plans that are two to three times lower than those of the US and China. 

In addition, the carbon tax mechanism at the borders will have to be implemented very gradually so as not to penalize European industry, which uses free CO2 emission certificates, and so as not to expose itself to retaliation from countries that export to the European market. This mechanism will therefore not significantly improve the effectiveness of the green deal. 

Only a European federal government could lead an effective and economically efficient environmental policy by creating large-scale nuclear, wind, river and electricity infrastructure projects on a European scale and by supporting the European green industry through concentrations, subsidies and preferential access to European markets, as China or the USA do. 

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Week 25, Year 2022

The French legislative elections and Europe

The presidential party won a relative majority in the second round of the French legislative elections.

It is now necessary to set up a political coalition to govern France. This formal or informal coalition can be formed by Ensemble, by part of the ecologists, by part of the socialists, by part of the Republicans and by some elected representatives of the right and left. 

The complicated political situation in France is proof that the election of the President of the Republic by universal suffrage does not guarantee a parliamentary majority and does not eliminate the risk of cohabitation in the subsequent legislative elections. This is undeniably detrimental to the efficiency and coherence of government in France. 

It is therefore necessary to consider creating a presidential regime in France in which the President governs and the Assembly legislates, which is much clearer and more efficient. A parliamentary regime in France would be a serious handicap for this country. It would make France difficult to govern, given the problems French parties have in forming stable and lasting government coalitions. This would also be true for future European federal institutions, given the size and diversity of Europe.

In a future government coalition, the President of the Republic must first and foremost commit the country to European federalism, even if it means making some concessions on taxation, pensions or nuclear power, for example. It will still be possible to change direction on these issues after the next elections. On the other hand, every month lost on the road to European federalism proposed by Germany is a serious threat to the prosperity and security of the French people in a world where American military protection of Europe and European financial solidarity are no longer guaranteed and can weaken very quickly given the growing geopolitical threats and economic risks.  

Moreover, only the European federalist project implemented jointly with Germany can constitute a sufficiently attractive political horizon to stop the progression of nationalist and populist forces that flatter the instincts of withdrawal and disorganization.  


Week 24, Year 2022

Industrial policy in Europe: a programmed failure?

We often hear that industrial policy in Europe is making progress, particularly with the European battery alliance, which should boost battery production on European soil and increase the European market share from 7% to 25% within a few years. 

But the European battery alliance pools research funding of around 20 billion euros, sets a regulatory framework and creates an institutional environment that facilitates cooperation between European manufacturers. It does not create any concrete industrial projects, nor does it bring about any industrial concentration.

The pooled funding between European countries for battery research is a good thing, given the amount of capital required and the financial risks involved. But this funding is insufficient because each European country maintains an independent research policy that generates significant costs and prevents it from contributing enough. Under these conditions, there is no guarantee that the Europeans will be able to regain significant market share from the Chinese and the Americans, who are implementing industrial policies for batteries with greater financial resources and by subsidizing industrial projects. 

The semiconductor legislative package for Europe is in a similar situation. This legislative package provides public and private funds for existing companies and start-ups in the semiconductor sector, it sets up a fiscal and social framework to attract investments and it institutes a coordination mechanism between European states and the European Commission to monitor the semiconductor market and anticipate its needs. It does not provide for any cooperation, joint projects or industrial concentrations. 

The current European industrial policy initiatives are better than nothing, but they cannot replace cooperation between industries, joint industrial projects and industrial concentrations, which are indispensable elements to obtain good results. These cooperations, projects and concentrations come into being in large numbers when they are promoted by a single government responsible for industrial policy. Only a single European government would have the will and the means to create enough industrial cooperation and to concentrate industries. Such a government would also be able to mobilize far more funds than the European Commission because of its financial strength and its European loans. 

In the current situation, there is some industrial cooperation, but it is difficult to set up and complicated to implement because of rivalries between European governments, because of the lack of a single vision on subjects that are often linked to electoral issues and national sovereignty. 
If we look at the example of Eurocopter, we see that the decision to create the Tiger combat helicopter was taken to pool costs and skills. But France continues to procure purely French helicopters, which is detrimental to the development of military cooperation, and the Germans continue to procure purely American helicopters. Moreover, rivalries between industrialists, each responsible for a part of the project, dilute the responsibility and can be detrimental to the quality of the product, and thus to its reliability or efficiency, as the numerous failures of the Tiger helicopter prove.   

There are also some industrial concentrations in Europe, but they remain the exception for the same reasons. When they are set up, they generally function well, as is the case for Airbus. Nevertheless, for every 1 Airbus, how many European industrial mergers are not implemented because of the divergent views of European governments and their lack of common will? Rail transport, air transport, telecommunications, land armament, information technology, renewable energies, so many sectors that have not given rise to European industrial mergers, in areas where mergers are nevertheless necessary to boost European industry in the face of the USA and China in particular and to create European champions. 

This explains why the main regulatory, structural and financial efforts concerning industrial policy are still and above all the responsibility of the European national states, with results that remain poor due to the high degree of industrial and technological interdependence in Europe. This leads to the progressive downgrading of Europe. 
If we look at French industrial policy, we see that it is still effective in some sectors such as nuclear power, but this effectiveness is decreasing because of the interdependence of its supply chains in Europe and the dispersion of technological skills in Europe. France is constantly falling behind the rest of the world in terms of economic growth and the number of industrial patents. It is true that France has produced nearly 25 unicorns by 2022 thanks to a dynamic public and private financing system, which is a very good result, but these unicorns cannot compensate for the fact that the French economy is falling behind due to the lack of an effective European industrial policy. Moreover, these unicorns must become European and world champions, which will not be easy without an effective industrial policy capable of reserving certain markets for European companies. 

The situation in Germany is similar. Economic growth rates and industrial innovation are falling behind China and the rest of the world every year. The German nuclear industry has almost been dismantled and the renewable energy sector is not developing properly. The German mittelstand and the German chemical, automotive and useful machinery giants continue to support the German economy, but their competitiveness is eroding. The electrification of vehicles remains slow and costly for the consumer, with energy prices rising sharply.   
​
Only an industrial policy steered by a Franco-German or European government will make it possible to relaunch innovation and growth in Europe thanks to coherent decisions, massive financial resources, and regulatory and sectoral measures that are valid for the entire European territory. This is the price that Europeans will have to pay to maintain and increase their market share in the high value-added sectors of the international production value chain, which is the only way to sustainably defend the purchasing power of European citizens.   

Week 23, Year 2022

Weakening Russia or strengthening Europe?

The war in Ukraine has revealed the expansionist character of the Russian regime which claims to turn Ukraine into a protectorate or a Russian province. 

This war puts an end to the French and German illusions concerning a Franco-Russian or German-Russian partnership capable of strengthening the French and German position in Europe in the face of the USA.

This war also makes it possible to understand that Russia, tacitly supported by China to circumvent the Western sanctions, is able to use its power and its will to successively subject its neighbors: Kazakhstan, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia, Ukraine. This is the continuation of the Muscovite expansionist policy.

Faced with a Russia that is revealing its capacity for conventional, cyber and even nuclear aggression, Europeans now have two solutions: weaken Russia or strengthen Europe.

Those who seek to weaken Russia, to prevent it from dominating the European continent have certain reasons to do so. The American security guarantee ́ is far from absolute since the vital interests of the USA are not at stake if Russia were to attack Moldova or the Baltic countries and insofar as the American budgetary problems are likely to reduce the financial and military aid they can provide Moreover, Russia no longer represents a world superpower capable of jeopardizing the social organization of the Western countries, but it still possesses a considerable nuclear and missile arsenal that can deter or prevent the USA from intervening in certain cases.

To weaken Russia militarily and diplomatically, it would be necessary to prevent any prospect of voluntary unification of the Russian world and to reduce the verticality of power in Russia. To do this, it would be necessary to integrate Ukraine into the EU and to support the Russian democratic opposition. But political interference is unlikely to have any effect in Russia and may lead to disorganization or dislocation of the country. The integration of Ukraine into the EU has the major disadvantage of blurring the European consciousness by complicating the answer to the question of Europe's borders and it risks creating a casus belli between Russians and Europeans over Ukraine. It is much better to support the Ukrainian army and resistance on a massive military scale. 

Ukraine is situated between Europe and Russia, but because of its history, culture and ties it belongs to the same world as Russia, even if its future development could slowly change its orientation.

Seeking to weaken Russia is therefore not an attractive option and may prove counterproductive.

Instead of trying to weaken Russia, the best way to secure the continent is to strengthen Europe. What does strengthening Europe mean? To allow Europeans to defend themselves alone, especially against Russia and perhaps against China, and to give them the capacity to govern themselves effectively.

In order to defend itself, only a European federal state, Franco-German to begin with, is indispensable to constitute and use very powerful European armed forces. On this point, the German rearmament of 100 billion euros, including 50 billion euros over the next five years to reach 2% of GDP in military spending, does not change the problem of European defense.  The renewed German army will not allow Europeans to defend their eastern border alone. 

In order to be governed effectively, Europeans must create a European political organization that is able to decide and act sovereignly on essential issues that can no longer be dealt with at the national level, such as defense, diplomacy, industry-energy and the environment. 

The real strengthening of Europe therefore necessarily involves a process of federalization, which must be launched as soon as possible for the current institutional and political authorities. This will then allow this process to be continued by a vast societal debate in France and Germany on the best way to federalize Europe. This process will be completed by the parties and political forces taking European federalism into account in their political programs and election campaigns.   


Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Week 22, Year 2022

European and American interests in Ukraine 

American and European interests in Ukraine are not identical.

Supporting the Ukrainian army and resistance to protect Eastern Europe, especially Moldova and the Baltics, and to roll back reactionary nationalist and leftist forces in Europe are goals on which Europeans and Americans can agree. A definitive Russian victory in Ukraine would unquestionably be dangerous for security in Europe, for the continent's economic and social stability and for the strength of NATO. 

But there are nevertheless fundamental differences of interest between Europeans and Americans in Ukraine. 

The Europeans have an interest in promoting a rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia after the war in order to re-establish possible normal relations with the Russians, who are important neighbors. They have no interest to integrate Ukraine in the EU or in NATO
They should contribute to make Ukraine an independent country, partner of Europeans and able to defend its independence by delivering heavy weapons in large quantities (fighter planes, tanks, artillery, long range anti-aircraft missiles) without compromising a possible future rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia.

There is also a real danger in integrating Ukraine into the EU given the guarantee of defense between member countries which requires direct military intervention. This could lead to a nuclear conflict with Russia, which considers Ukraine to be part of its territorial zone. 

For the Americans, on the contrary, the integration of Ukraine in the EU and NATO would be a way to keep and strengthen their geopolitical ascendancy in Europe insofar as these two organizations depend on the USA to ensure the defense of their members. This would also allow them to advance their gas and military-industrial interests.

Why are the Europeans once again unable to define their interests correctly and to defend them effectively in this matter?

Because the divergence of views and interests between European countries cannot be overcome since each European state conducts its own foreign policy towards Russia and to a lesser extent towards the USA, and because these multiple foreign policies are characterized by the weakness of each European country in the face of Russia and the USA. This reduces to nothing any chance of leading a coherent European foreign policy. 

 The Europeans are therefore today unable to defend Ukraine properly and to make it an independent partner open to a rapprochement with Russia if the economic and political conditions allow it.  The EU, France and Germany have been unable to deliver enough weapons and train the Ukrainian army to enable Ukraine to defend itself. European arms deliveries and financial support after the outbreak of the conflict are slow and insufficient to enable Ukraine to resist.

Given their decisive role in the war, it is naturally the USA which has influence on future peace negotiations and which is able to promote its gas and arms exports to Europe. 

With a European federal government, the decision to protect the Ukrainian partner could have been taken much more easily thanks to the centralization of the European political decision and thanks to the European military power. In order to defend European interests in the war in Ukraine and to contribute to the stability of the continent, it is the concrete steps towards European federalism that will be decisive, not the security treaties. 

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Week 21, Year 2022

European energy policy: a programmed failure?

A coherent energy policy, providing low prices, ensuring independence of supply and allowing environmental efficiency is only really possible with a European federal government capable of investing rapidly, massively and coherently. The dispersion and incoherence of energy policies in Europe concerning nuclear, wind, coal or gas are proof of this.   

The European energy dependence, the high cost of energy in Europe and the low reduction of CO2 emissions since 1990 are the consequence of this incoherence.

Until we have a federal European energy policy, what should European leaders do in the current situation?

Subsidize common projects with European funds. These European projects allow to lower the production costs and to limit the divergences of investments in Europe by proposing attractive solutions for the electrification and hydrogenation of industries and vehicles. The European battery alliance is a good example of these joint projects, but these projects can of course only develop as quickly as with a European government, which is the only one able to mobilize funds faster and more massively. As a result, there is nothing to say that the European market share of 7% for batteries can easily increase at the expense of the Chinese or American market share.   

To proceed to the concentration of the energy industries, in particular solar, wind and nuclear, in order to obtain a better competitiveness and lower costs. This will obviously be more difficult to achieve than with a European government capable of overcoming the particular interests of each country

Subsidize intra-European transport infrastructure (waterways and railways), support the electrification of heating systems, and strengthen the thermal insulation of housing to reduce European dependence on gas and oil, which characterize these sectors.  This can be achieved through financial and regulatory incentives. 

Diversifying supplies to Iran and the Gulf countries at the expense of Russia as long as gas and oil imports remain necessary. These countries are less dangerous than Russia and are less powerful than the USA commercially and do not use fracking which remains dangerous for the environment. 

To encourage European consumers to consume better and therefore to consume less by favouring high quality products and by reducing waste. 

It is in this direction that the green deal should be reoriented. The green deal does not allow the financing of European energy projects. This erroneous policy of the Commission is explained by the weight of the particular interests of each State and of each European leader for whom energy remains a politically sensitive national subject.  The objective of this new European energy policy is to move more quickly towards carbon neutrality in 2050, to further reduce CO2 emissions, to increase energy independence, including vis-à-vis the USA, and to have lower prices for consumers and industry. 
However, it will remain much less effective than the energy policy that could be conducted by a European federal government, which would have exclusive competence in energy and industrial policy. As a result, Europe's energy backwardness is likely to continue for a long time under the current European institutional political conditions.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Week 20, Year 2022

The concept of European strategic autonomy through European defence, utopia or reality?

For Europeans to become strategically autonomous, they must be able to defend their territory and their interests alone.

This requires the ability to create effective armed forces and the will to use them if necessary.

All this requires a solid and coherent political will which cannot be obtained with 27 sovereign states each defending their own particular interests. There is no superpower in the EU, so European defense is unable to overcome differences of opinion and interest and therefore does not represent a credible alternative to NATO for the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area. 

If NATO is a credible organization, it is because of the military and diplomatic superpower of the USA, which is able to direct, coordinate and support the actions of the member countries of the alliance.

So what can be done with regard to European defense in this situation?

First of all, to recognize that a European defense worthy of the name, i.e. capable of ensuring the defense of European territory and interests in an autonomous way, requires the creation of a European federal state. It is only with a European federal state that we will be able to create a European pillar of NATO allowing Europeans to become autonomous. This European pillar will make it possible to organize cooperation and transition with the American pillar of NATO as long as the Europeans are not completely united and are not sufficiently armed to do without NATO. 

Second, create a European command for cyber and space. The defensive use of these two weapons, which are largely deterritorialized, is not likely to give rise to controversy. Their offensive use may in some cases be a source of divergence of views and should therefore be the subject of a consensus between the European countries that will be part of this European command. Enhanced cooperation on this subject would make it possible to minimize the risks of blockage on the part of certain countries reluctant to defend European interests.  The integration of these two weapons at the European level will considerably reinforce their effectiveness and greatly reduce their operating costs.  

Thirdly, to pursue and amplify European defence, i.e. mainly industrial cooperation in the military sector, in order to preserve the defence industrial and technological base in Europe. In order to facilitate industrial cooperation, which is always difficult to achieve between sovereign states, each of which defends its own particular interests, it will be necessary to proceed with the defragmentation of European defence industries, notably through vertical and horizontal concentrations to create competitive companies in related civil and military fields.   

Fourthly, to pursue European military missions, being aware that these missions, which remain useful, can only be auxiliary missions (fight against piracy etc...) given the confederal nature of the EU. 

Finally, develop intra-European military exchanges and create common military institutions (training centers, command centers, logistics centers, etc.) to strengthen the pro-European feeling in the armies of European countries and to prepare minds for European federalism.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)​

Week 19, Year 2022

The risks of a Europe of small steps

Dear European citizens, dear members, dear supporters, dear friends,

Some people think that we should not talk openly about European federalism in France so as not to arouse public opinion against European construction.

Federalism would be better achieved by moving in this direction without saying so, and by limited progress that will one day bring about a change of mentality and a shift in political interests. Only then will it be possible to make European federalism a reality.

The problem with this Europe of small steps is first of all that if there is never any talk of a federal perspective, public opinion, which is necessarily driven by the need for a collective sense of purpose, remains in thrall to the French national perspective, the only political horizon on offer.  This reinforces the ideological ascendancy of the nationalists and considerably hinders the progression of the feeling of European belonging, in spite of the common achievements.

Secondly, small progress and European projects can only be achieved in areas that do not call into question the budgetary and military sovereignty of France. Otherwise, public opinion, unprepared for federalism, would refuse it. This no longer makes it possible to advance the construction of Europe, because all significant new advances now require the abandonment of a large part of budgetary or military sovereignty. The lack of significant progress in European integration since the creation of the euro underlines this. The covid debt, for example, which has been useful, cannot be extended or renewed because it is exclusively linked to the exceptional event of the pandemic. 

And waiting for the hypothetical emergence of a European consciousness, a European people or a European interest clearly identified by all to create the European federal state cannot work because of the size and historical diversity of Europe. Without a real common European destiny embodied in a federal state, we will see the gradual resurgence of national antagonisms in Europe, especially if the USA withdraws from the continent.   

This is why it is necessary to use the creation of a European federal government as a tool to facilitate the emergence of European consciousness, interests and people. 

It is possible to create this state provided that it is done gradually. The first step must be to set as an objective the creation in the more or less long term of the European federal state because the strategic and economic conditions require it. This will help to acclimatize the population to this new political horizon and to reinforce European federalism in public opinion. The second step must be to discuss the ways and means to achieve this goal.  Sovereignty of the European Parliament? Sovereignty of the European Commission? Majority rule in the European Council? Creation of a federal core within the EU with a group of founding states? This will allow us to select the best way to make European federalism a reality. In this respect, it is doubtful whether the European Parliament or the European Commission, even if appointed by European citizens, will be able to impose their budgetary and legislative authority on national governments and parliaments. 

The third step is to convince political parties to include European federalism in their political programs and election campaigns. 

In reality, for many European confederalists, the rejection of federalism is above all a way of preserving the current system, which is comfortable because it allows them to talk about Europe without upsetting their political, electoral and media habits. This allows us to avoid embarking on the path of a powerful and effective Europe, which requires taking on heavy responsibilities to properly defend the interests of Europeans. The confederalists are objectively allied to the crypto sovereignists who vainly try to use Europe to reinforce French power to the detriment of the USA in Europe and not to unite the European peoples. Yet the union of European peoples in a federal state is the only way to guarantee the independence and long-term security of Europeans.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Week 18, Year 2018

Europe and General de Gaulle

One of the reasons that explains the score of anti-European parties and candidates such as Marine Le Pen and Jean Luc Mélenchon is the constant reference in France to General de Gaulle's doctrine of sovereignty and grandeur 

This doctrine is still found today in the idea that France must use Europe to be strong thanks to the power multiplier provided by the euro, by the European trade policy and by European military cooperation. The hope is to create a European strategic autonomy dominated by France, the only continental European power with nuclear weapons and the right of veto in the UN. 

The problem is that France cannot dominate Europe politically, because it is the United States that has been defending the continent since 1945, thanks to its military credibility, its diplomatic power and its central role in the defense of Germany. France cannot provide these elements. It is therefore not in the interest of European countries to follow France in trying to create a European strategic autonomy with respect to the United States.   

This is what General de Gaulle was forced to realize when the Germans maintained their privileged ties with the United States after the signing of the Elysée Treaty in 1963. To convince the Germans to bet on France, France must accept a federal union of France with Germany, as German governments often propose. Only a Franco-German federal government could defend Europe without the help of the USA and would represent a great diplomatic and military power on a continental scale.

This federal leap that would have to be taken was not contrary to the expectations of General de Gaulle, who believed that it was not forbidden to think and hope that one day a European people would make it possible to form a European federal state.  But he had grown up in the 19th century and had fought in the European wars of 1914 and 1940. It was therefore mentally difficult for him to accept federalism from above immediately to facilitate the emergence of the European people. Hence his opposition to the EDC and the Hallstein plan, even though the creation of a European state was necessary to facilitate the emergence of the European people, just as the creation of the Italian state in 1860 facilitated the emergence of the Italian people, and just as the creation of the European Central Bank in 1998 strengthened European consciousness.   

The desire to bring France and Germany closer together to form an independent European power and the acceptance in principle of European federalism are the two elements of General de Gaulle's thinking that could allow for the renewal of Gaullism in a pro-European direction. 

If de Gaulle were alive today, who knows if he would not be in favour of the creation of a strong Franco-German federal state to be able to defend French and German interests properly. Let us not forget that General de Gaulle often surprised his contemporaries by his anti-conformist military ideas and by his innovative political orientations, notably the large autonomous armored units in 1934, the participation in 1967 and the regionalization in 1969.    

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Week 17, Year 2022

Europe and the victory of Emmanuel Macron

Marine Le Pen lost the second round of the French presidential election, but her score rose again, exceeding 40% of the votes cast, which is considerable.

This very high score is explained in particular by the legitimacy of her program of French independence in Europe and by the nationalist mobilization of spirits that this damaging program of turning inward provokes.

To counter this nationalism, a legitimate and mobilizing pro-European program is necessary. The defense of the existence of the European Union cannot be enough because the European Union is not powerful enough and is not credible enough to arouse support and mobilization.

Only the prospect of creating a powerful and efficient European federal state, starting with Germany, which will propose it in 2021, can legitimize the European project by giving it a Euro-national consistency. And only the federal European project can really mobilize the voters of the center-right, the center-left and the left by its military, diplomatic, industrial and ecological efficiency. 

As with Germany, such a European federalist project will be the result of political will. It must therefore be proposed to the people by political forces. European patriotism is too weak to generate a bottom-up federalist movement. Proposing a European federal perspective for France should be the task of President Macron, who represents French-style social democracy, is young and could one day be elected to lead this federal state.    


Week 16, Year 2022

Europe and the second round of the French presidential election. 

A little practical information first.  Davud Khan's book entitled Vers la République Fédérale Européenne is now available on Amazon in paper and Kindle versions. 

Concerning the second round of the presidential election, it is indisputable that the political project of Emmanuel Macron does not attract the support of the French. It is the rejection of the far right that will perhaps allow him to beat Marine Le Pen in the second round.
This situation is dangerous for the social democrats. The political dynamic is currently on the side of the nationalist far right, since it has a prejudicial but clear and mobilizing project: French independence in Europe and in the world.  

Without a clear and mobilizing project, the social democrats and liberals will be dominated in terms of ideas by the nationalist right and will probably be defeated one day in the ballot box by the extreme right, in particular thanks to the presence of the candidate of the nationalist left in the second round. An alliance of the nationalist right with leftist nationalism is also a possibility. Indeed, this left also advocates the independence of France in Europe at the expense of European solidarity.

Only an ambitious European project can mobilize the French, since the very strong interdependence of France with the other European countries and the decline of its power vis-à-vis the rest of the world make the project of a strong and independent France unrealistic.

It is indisputable that the confederal system of the EU in its current form does not sufficiently arouse the support of citizens. It even constitutes a factor of rejection for many of them because of its economic, energy and military inefficiency. 
The best way for social democrats and liberals to stop the nationalist dynasty of the right and the left which threatens the interests of France is therefore to propose a strong European project capable of defending itself and of implementing efficient industrial projects. For this, a single European federal government responsible for defense, foreign policy and industry is necessary.

The prospect of very gradually building this powerful European federal state with the Germans, who have proposed it in 2021 in their coalition contract, would mobilize the social democratic, ecologist and centrist electorate much more than all the proposals in Emmanuel Macron's program.

Given the threat that Marine Le Pen's victory would represent for the Franco-German relationship, for Franco-German friendship, for European solidarity, for the solidity of NATO, for the integration of immigrants and for civil peace, FEDERAL EUROPE calls to vote for Emmanuel Macron. 



Week 15, Year 2022

The result of the first round of the presidential election and Europe

The first round of the presidential election in France confirms two structural and essential political trends. 

First, the political marginalization of the pro-European right. As the national theme is a central theme for the right, it is the parties that advocate French independence to the detriment of European solidarity that continue to progress, which places the pro-European conservative right in a dead-end situation. 

If the pro-European right moves closer to nationalist ideas, it loses voters to the social democrats and does not sufficiently attract voters tempted by nationalism

This phenomenon is also at work in Germany, with the AFD party taking root, but given Germany's Nazi past, the score of the extreme nationalist right remains limited in that country, even if this score may keep the CDU out of power for a long time. 

In order to emerge from defeat, as in Germany, or from marginalization, as in France, the pro-European right must adopt European patriotism in order to win back the national theme and must defend the creation of a powerful European federal state. To achieve this, an alliance of conservative and liberal pro-European parties in France with conservative and liberal pro-European parties in Germany is necessary. 

The second structural trend confirmed by these elections is the ever-increasing distance of a large part of the French electorate from the strategic and economic realities of the world, due to the demagogy and lack of competence of most politicians. They tirelessly repeat that all the solutions formulated by General de Gaulle in 1960 when Germany was divided and when Eastern Europe was sovietized are still valid in the Europe of 2022.   



Week 14, Year 2022

The program of Yannick Jadot and Europe

Yannick Jadot, supported by the party Europe Ecologie Les Verts, is a candidate for the presidential election 2022 in France. 

How can his program be useful for the progressive realization of the federal unity of European countries, which 58% of the French consider desirable? (Odoxa survey December 2021)  

This political program proposes in particular the following measures: 

Towards a federal Europe

"Too many necessary decisions on taxation, foreign policy or social policy are blocked by the need to obtain the unanimity of the Member States. We will demand the activation of the clauses in the European treaties that allow certain areas to be moved from unanimity to qualified majority voting. Where necessary, we will set up enhanced cooperation to avoid being blocked by a handful of Member States, while allowing them to join these projects later. In this framework, we will defend the strengthening of the role of the European Parliament: we will promote the use of the ordinary legislative procedure (known as co-decision) on all policies and the creation of a real right of legislative initiative for the Parliament.

The will to build a federal Europe is a very good thing, but a federal European state cannot be created with majority votes, for which there is no consensus in the European Council.
But a European federal state cannot be created with majority votes, for which there is no consensus in the European Council. Enhanced cooperation does not allow for the creation of a European federal government, which is necessary to create a single European army, diplomacy, industrial policy and environmental policy. These cooperations could be useful for the realization of certain projects, but these projects do not allow Europe to get out of the economic and strategic impasse in which it finds itself and which is causing its decline.  
Setting up a constituent convention is an interesting idea to study how to create a federal core within the EU with a few countries that wish to create together a European federal state with limited competences and adapted resources. 

Building a Europe of the people

"We will defend the establishment of transnational lists for the European elections, in addition to the national lists. The European Commissioner will be proposed from among the elected MEPs. This will allow European citizens to have a direct influence, not only on the composition of the European Parliament, but also on the composition of the European Commission.

European Commissioners appointed from among the MEPs elected on transnational lists will help to develop European awareness. But this will not create sufficient political legitimacy for the European Commissioners to impose their fiscal, political and legislative authority on national parliaments and governments   

Strengthening the Europe of youth and democracy

"We will reinforce the place of Europe in school curricula, support the mobility of schoolchildren, students, young people and people in vocational training through an increase in the credits dedicated to Erasmus+ and complementary grants.
Strengthen the democratic control of agencies engaged in security missions (Eurojust, Europol, Eurodac and Frontex).
Make it easier for citizens to bring cases before the Court of First Instance and the CJEU and strengthen their means."

These are good ideas, but they cannot decisively improve the lot of Europeans, except for the reinforced control of European agencies. These should be placed mainly under the control of the European Council or the European Commission, since they are under the executive power. 

A European justice

"We will give a strong existence to the European Judiciary. We will ask for the possibility of citizens to bring cases before the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice of the European Union to be extended, and for the powers of the European Public Prosecutor to be expanded. We will defend the increase of the means of the Court of First Instance and the Court and to strengthen the democratic control of the bodies "Eurojust" (judicial coordination against organized crime), "Europol" (police coordination) and of the "Eurodac" system (comparison of fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants on the territory).

These are good proposals to strengthen the European consciousness and identity. 

An autonomous European budget

"A green France will have to support a real European budget for the ecological and social transition fed by own resources that contribute to social justice, by making those who escape taxation today pay. The EU budget will have to be strengthened in order to exceed by far the 1% of GNI in the medium term. In the short term, we will work to launch a major public investment plan for the ecological transition of at least 2000 billion euros over the decade, thanks to the in-depth reform of budgetary rules and the mobilization of a European budget with a permanent ecological investment and solidarity instrument. Today, 80% of the European budget is based on contributions from member states, a share that has been increasing in recent years, which reduces the budgetary power of the European Parliament. A tax on digital giants, a carbon adjustment mechanism at the borders, a tax on plastics, the strengthening and extension of the European carbon market to the maritime sector, a tax on kerosene for commercial aviation, an ambitious tax on financial transactions, must directly contribute to the European budget.

A majority of EU member states are opposed to increasing the European budget, except to deal with an exceptional, one-off economic crisis that endangers the eurozone, such as the coronavirus crisis.  Without the political will to create a sovereign European federal core, the chances of creating a significant European budget are practically nil, because each state wants to keep its financial means and capture the resources from new taxes to compensate for tax cuts and increased spending. 

Taxing multinationals

"We will raise the minimum tax rate on multinationals' profits to 25% throughout the European Union, as the European Trade Union Confederation is demanding. The agreement reached at the OECD on the taxation of multinationals is a first step, but it remains insufficient to effectively fight against tax optimization. In case of blockage by one or more Member States, we will propose to those Member States who wish to do so to adopt this rule via the enhanced cooperation mechanism. This will put an end to the race to the bottom between Member States. We will demand the harmonization of corporate tax in Europe, starting with the harmonization of its base before transferring part of its revenues to the European Union.

This is a good idea, but it has almost no chance of succeeding because several important states such as Germany are opposed to it for political reasons within the ruling coalition.
To carry out such a fiscal policy, a strong European political power of a federal type is needed.

.

A European climate budget

"We will defend a more ambitious share of the budget dedicated to the climate: today the targets of the multi-annual budget are 30% for the climate and 10% for biodiversity. We must reach at least 50% for both, and ensure that the rest of the budget respects the principle of not harming the environment. We will work with our European partners to create a European instrument for ecological investment and solidarity. It will support and accompany all the Member States in the ecological transformations to be carried out in order to achieve our climate objectives, but will also finance the infrastructures of the ecological transition that are of strategic European interest. This tool will be complementary to the financial leeway offered to Member States in the framework of the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact.
Putting an end to the Stability and Growth Pact in order to build the convergence of the States on renewed criteria in line with the requirements of ecological transition".

A European budget for the climate that comes on top of the national budgets in this field contributes to the dispersion of means and to the European inneficiency in the energy plan in particular, which is characterized by high prices, a very high dependence and a pollution that is not reducing quickly. 

For a European environmental treaty

"We will propose the signature of a new European environmental treaty that will give legal value to the protection of the environment, health and biodiversity and to the respect of planetary limits, superior to that of economic decisions and the functioning of the market. It will anchor the precautionary principle at the European level, recognize the crime of ecocide and allow the penalization of environmental damage by transnational corporations. We will also implement the European strategy for biodiversity by setting up 30% of protected areas. We will not ratify free trade agreements until there is a complete overhaul of trade policy. European trade policy should no longer aim at trading more but should contribute to relocating production and aligning democratic, social, environmental and climate standards from the top down."

This is a good idea to strengthen ecological and European awareness, but it cannot have any notable effectiveness given the factual primacy of national constitutions and governments in these areas.

Amplifying the European green deal    

"France governed by the Ecologists will be a driving force in this ecological transformation of the European continent and will amplify the Green Deal reforms in all sectors. To become the world leader in ecological transition, the status quo is no longer allowed: Europe must reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 65% by 2030. Free pollution permits for industry will have to be abandoned as of 2023. In compensation, a carbon adjustment mechanism at the borders will be defended and implemented to protect European industry from environmental dumping. We will gradually end the system of free CO2 allowances for companies. The derogatory system of CO2 emission permits for companies was initiated with the distribution of free quotas, according to a mechanism that was supposed to be temporary but which is still in place, thus weakening the incentive effect of the system. We will gradually put an end to this system in order to put a price on carbon in all sectors of the economy. We will make Europe a sovereign energy continent by developing renewable energies. Renewable energies will have to reach 50% of the energy mix by 2030. We will promote the idea of direct investments by the Union to renovate the energy needs of the poorest homes. We will organize the withdrawal of synthetic pesticides by 2035 for the entire European continent, including imported products. We will not renew the authorization of glyphosate in 2022, its use will be banned throughout Europe and for all imported products, thanks to the implementation of mirror measures at the EU's borders.

These very ambitious objectives cannot be achieved without a European federal state capable of leading an industrial policy and an environmental policy unique in Europe

Towards a social Europe

"We want to make the fight against poverty one of the priorities of the European Union (EU). In particular, we will defend an ambitious directive on minimum wages, as well as a directive on a guaranteed minimum income, and we will put an end to unpaid internships. We will support initiatives to regulate platforms and give their workers equal rights with employees. We will mobilize European funds so that they can be used to fight against poor housing and especially fuel poverty. We will commit ourselves to maintaining the European fund to help the most deprived. We will bring forward a directive on gender equality in companies that includes binding targets for equal pay, parity in the management bodies of large companies and sanctions for non-compliance with equal pay. We demand a binding and enforceable European Social Rights Framework. We will push the European Union to adopt a constitutional framework that promotes the fight against poverty and inclusive economic development.

These are good proposals, but they would be more easily achieved with a European federal state.

Towards a Europe of health.

"The Covid 19 pandemic has shown that health issues know no borders. The European Union (EU) must encourage and help Member States to guarantee universal access to health services, including mental health services, in particular by combating medical deserts. This European policy must include an important component concerning prevention and environmental health. Finally, European cooperation must be articulated with the World Health Organization (WHO)/Europe".

These are also good proposals, but they would also be more easily realized with a European federal state

Towards a Europe of rights

"We will ask for the activation of the procedures provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union in case of violations of the rule of law, as is the case for example in Poland and Hungary. We will propose that the right to abortion be included in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. France will support and even welcome any European citizen who, as a victim of discrimination, is not defended by his or her State, or people who do not yet have access to abortion in their country. In order to unify the protection of rights in Europe and to harmonize their development, we will defend the accession of the European Union as such to the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, we will defend the adoption of a European regulation on the independence of the media and propose to strengthen the European Union's Media program."

These are good ideas

Towards a humanist Europe

"We will put an end to the outsourcing of borders. We will put an end to outsourcing migration agreements with countries like Turkey and Libya, which are abusive to the people concerned. We will break with the Dublin III Regulation and with the deleterious logic of sorting at the borders, we will organize a mechanism of relocations between Member States taking into account the effective links (extended family and linguistic links) and the aspirations of asylum seekers. We will support a recast of the European border and coast guard agency Frontex. Instead of participating in refoulements at borders contrary to international asylum law, operating in third countries and repatriating illegal migrants, its activities should be refocused on sea rescue and humanitarian operations. They will be monitored by the European Parliament, in particular in the area of respect for human rights, international law and its duty of vigilance and alert regarding the illegal refoulement of migrants. We will renegotiate the migration agreement between France and the United Kingdom, which - under the guise of "making it impossible to cross the Channel" - leads to the shipwreck of our values and constitutes a tremendous boon for smugglers. We will strengthen the humanitarian search and assistance actions of Frontex at sea and support civilian and NGO boats, in accordance with international maritime law."

These proposals are demagogic and would make it impossible to defend European borders against illegal immigration. 

A Europe of peace

"We will support the strengthening of the European Union's development policy, doubling its budget and focusing it on the fight against climate change (mitigation and adaptation), the protection of fundamental rights, the fight against poverty and the promotion of gender equality. In an increasingly troubled global context, the European Union must impose itself as a major player in the service of renewed multilateralism, peace, fundamental rights and the fight against poverty. To do so, the ecologists defend a reinforcement of the diplomatic capacities of the European Union, by facilitating in particular the adoption of non-military measures such as targeted economic sanctions, customs duties, control of capital flows. We also want to strengthen military cooperation at the European level, with a greater number of external missions conducted by the European Union."

Increasing the EU development budget while each member state keeps its own development budget will contribute to the inefficiency and dispersion of European development aid. 
To pursue a policy of sanctions without having the military power to do so would place us in a situation of increased dependence on the United States, which remains the only credible protector of the Europeans.
Developing military cooperation between European countries is useful, but mainly to prepare the minds and institutions for the creation of a European federal state capable of ensuring its own defense. 

Providing Europe with a real foreign policy

"The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has ambitious objectives but remains limited by the difficulty of reaching agreement among the 27 Member States of the European Union. We will defend a strengthening of European diplomacy by increasing its means and by putting an end to the unanimity rule, so that decisions can no longer be blocked by a handful of Member States. We will support a stronger role for the European Parliament in defining the EU's diplomatic line. Any external intervention on behalf of the EU will have to be submitted to the European Parliament for approval."

The European states will not accept to move to majority rule in foreign policy because each state and each administration wants to defend its particular interests. In order to create a single European foreign policy, it is necessary to create a European federal core through the will of the citizens.

The European Parliament is not in a position to impose its authority on the member states, especially on foreign policy issues. 

Given the absence of a credible European federalist project to found a European federal state with a small number of states, Federal Europe does not give voting instructions for this presidential election. Federal Europe nevertheless invites voters not to vote for the candidates Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Eric Zemmour and Fabien Roussel because their program of national tension represents a threat to the security and prosperity of French citizens and would set back the mental and institutional construction of federal Europe. ​


Emmanuel Macron's program and Europe

Emmanuel Macron recently presented his political program and he spoke of a more independent France in a stronger Europe. This is a positive development, since a strong Europe needs a federal type of unity. 

How can this program be useful for the progressive realization of the federal unity of European countries, which 58% of the French consider desirable? (Odoxa survey December 2021)  

The presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron, supported by the center-left political party LREM, proposes the following measures in particular:

Institutions

Introduce a dose of proportional representation.
This would dangerously increase governmental instability in a country that is characterized by sudden changes in public opinion and changes in the ideas of the elites. 
The creation of territorial councillors, who will sit on both the regional and departmental councils, is costly and inefficient. The departments must be abolished. 

Social and labor

Increase the legal retirement age to 65 years oldThis is a necessary reform taking into account the demographic evolution of France and it would take into account long careers, disability and hardship.
introduce a minimum pension of 1,100 euros and abolish special schemes (EDF, RATP...) for new entrants. This is a good measure
Simplify and make more advantageous the cumulation of employment and retirement and create a support service for senior workers to pay volunteers close to retirement who wish to share their experience with society. These are good ideas. 
Triple the amount of the "Macron bonus" This can be paid by companies to their employees, without charges or taxes, and represents up to 1000 euros or 2000 for people earning up to three smic. It is useful
Mandatory profit-sharing scheme in companies paying dividends. This is also a good idea
Make the compensation of the directors of large companies dependent on the respect of environmental and social objectives. Also a good measure.
Renovate at least 700,000 homes per year over five years. This is necessary
Recipients of the Active Solidarity Income (RSA) will be able to work fifteen to twenty hours a week in exchange for this minimum social benefit. This is useful to facilitate integration. 
Continue the youth commitment contract, which defines obligations (support, training) in exchange for a financial allowance of 200 to 500 euros, over twelve months. This is necessary to improve the condition of young people.
Encourage the maintenance of elderly people at home: transformation of housing to avoid their departure in a specialized institution and two additional hours of support per week by home helpers. Good measure
Reform Pôle Emploi
Transforming Pôle emploi into France travail, a one-stop shop bringing together skills assessment, training and job search services, is a good administrative measure
Systematize testing in large companiesThis is necessary. 
Extend the public depositThis is useful in order to facilitate access to housing while sanctioning bad payers 
Extend the Culture Pass to young people, currently open to 14-18 year olds. Good idea.
 
Education and research

Reintroduce math in the core curriculum and more sports.
Increase the budget allocated to basic researchThis is useful but it is not sufficiently effective without a European research policy steered by a European federal government. 
Strengthen the autonomy of universities to make them fully-fledged research operators and allow them to be more attractive. This is essential in the context of the CAP.
Increase teachers' salaries and give them more pedagogical freedom while mobilizing more teachers. Good idea, necessary

Health

Establish a system of unique medical referents. Set up a system of referents to perform simple acts such as prescription renewals by a nurse or a pharmacist. Generalization of medical assistants to save time for city doctors, development of teleconsultation.It is useful

Immigration

Toughen access to residence permits by making them conditional on "a French language test and a real professional integration process. Not renewing visas for nationals of countries that disturb public order and deporting them. Making the granting of visas conditional on the collaboration of States in terms of return to the territory. Good measures
Facilitate the deportation of people whose right to asylum has been deniedThis is necessary

Justice

Hire 8,500 magistrates and overhaul the penal code to reduce delays in justice. It is necessary
No GPAC authorization - can be justified
Do not legalize cannabisDo not legalize cannabis, medicalize it. 

Defense

Increase the army budget to 50 billion per year by 2025This will not be effective enough without a European army led by a European federal government which would be the only one able to defend Europe and intervene in the Middle East

Industry and agriculture

Invest massively in agricultural independence, especially in the production of proteins. 
It is necessary
Invest 30 billion euros in the sectors of the future (digital, cloud, quantum, artificial intelligence) This will be ineffective without a European industrial policy. ....
Taxation
Increase the inheritance tax allowance to 150,000 euros for direct descendants. This can be justified because it concerns the middle classes but it reduces equality of opportunity.
Reduce taxes for couples living together.Good measure.

Energy and ecology

Invest in both nuclear and renewable energies to produce "more decarbonated electricity "Have the State invest in the construction of 6 nuclear reactors of the EPR 2 type by 2050, study the construction of 8 more EPRs and extend the life of all reactors that can be extended beyond fifty years. This is necessary to be able to quickly reduce CO2 emissions which is the most urgent problem
Build fifty offshore wind farms by 2050This seems necessary.
Leasing electric carsGood idea
Create 100% French green industries, without recourse to exports, in strategic energy and ecological sectors: wind, solar and electric vehicles. Without a European industrial policy, this will be costly, and has little chance of succeeding in the face of foreign competition 
Defending a carbon tax at the borders of EuropeThis tax will be very difficult to implement given the opposition of China and the United States in particular and will be very difficult to calculate.

Europe

Reforming the Schengen area and strengthening FrontexThese measures are insufficient and ineffective in the fight against illegal immigration in Europe without a European federal government in charge of Europe's borders
​
Emmanuel Macron's program has many good ideas, but it does not address the major industrial, ecological, diplomatic and military challenges facing France and Europe. Despite words that could encourage European federalism, this program does not really advance the construction of a federal Europe, which has become necessary for obvious strategic and economic reasons.​


The program of Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Europe

What is the program of candidate Mélenchon concerning Europe and how can it be useful for the progressive realization of the federal unity of European countries, which 58% of the French consider desirable? (Odoxa survey December 2021)  

The presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon supported by the left-wing political party La France Insoumise proposes to remain within the framework of the European treaties but wants to profoundly change the European and international policy of France

He mainly wants to:

To leave the integrated military command of NATO and the Atlantic alliance.
This would weaken the defense of the European territory because NATO is the only organization capable of effectively defending this territory thanks to the interoperability of the armies obtained through the integrated military command. Leaving the Atlantic Alliance would marginalize France even more, because since 1945, it is the United States that ensures the defense of the European continent through this alliance and through its relationship with Germany.  

De-globalization with a protectionism of solidarity
If it is useful to relocate certain strategic productions and to protect high value-added industries, international trade is a necessity to reinforce economic growth in developed and emerging countries. 

The end of European defense
The Europe of defense, it is mainly the common armament projects which allow to perpetuate and develop the industrial and technological base of European defense and cooperation between certain services (cyber, intelligence etc.) via agencies. Putting an end to these projects in order to relocate the production of armaments to France alone would be detrimental to the quality of armaments, would increase their production costs and would make certain equipment inaccessible to France, especially in the space and aeronautics fields. 

Develop a French foreign policy that is independent and not aligned. 
Since 1945, France has been geopolitically marginalized in Europe, while Europe naturally remains the decisive economic and security zone for France. To recreate a French diplomatic and military autonomy as before 1939 is illusory. 

Strengthen the UN as a reference point for international policy
the UN does not have sufficient legitimacy or the political will to impose its authority on the great powers, as the wars in Kosovo, Iraq, Iran and Ukraine have shown. 

Cooperate as a priority with Africa and the Brics.
France does not have the means to propose alone an attractive cooperation for these countries in front of the superpowers and the great powers. 

The proposals of candidate Mélenchon are therefore dangerous for the security and prosperity of European and French citizens. They would weaken the EU by the Franco-French theme of this program and would make more difficult the emergence of a federal Europe which is however essential to ensure the independence and prosperity of Europeans.



Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

The program of Marine Le Pen and Europe,

First of all, a point on the issue of heavy weapons deliveries to Ukraine by NATO. In order to launch powerful counter-attacks to stop the advance of the Russian forces and then to push back the Russian forces, the Ukrainian army needs modern fighter planes and armored vehicles. Naturally, Russia is opposed to such deliveries, making it known that countries that deliver heavy weapons will become belligerents in its eyes. 

What can Russia do against NATO? Attack part of the territory of the Baltic States or other European countries, while it is facing major military and logistical problems in Ukraine. And this attack would generate a determined conventional response from NATO, which has a very clear air superiority over Russia.

Vladimir Putin may also decide to strike the NATO military installations involved in these deliveries with conventional missiles. But this would expose Russia to retaliatory strikes on Russian military installations that support the invasion of Ukraine.

It is therefore unlikely that Russia will embark on these adventures. If, on the other hand, NATO does not provide heavy weapons to Ukraine, this will be interpreted as a sign of weakness and may encourage further Russian military adventures.
 
Marine Le Pen proposes to change the main diplomatic orientations of France, without however wanting to leave the European treaties.

Within the framework of the EU, the candidate of the Rassemblement National wishes to

To leave the integrated command of NATO and to rebuild the cooperation with the USA in a way more favorable to France
This would weaken the defense of European soil, as the armies of the Atlantic alliance need the interoperability provided by the integrated military command to function properly. France does not have the means to put pressure on the US because the US controls the defense of Europe through its alliance and its tutelage over Germany. The only way to defend French interests against the US is to do so at the European level and therefore through the power of a European federal government. 

Establishing a strategic and industrial partnership with Russia
If France allies itself with Russia at the industrial and strategic level to the detriment of Germany, it will not only have to face German opposition but also that of the United States.  Under these conditions, France will be the great loser of this change because the industrial and military power of the Americans and the Germans exceeds by far that of the French and the Russians. 

Putting an end to the Franco-German pairing in matters of armaments and industry 
This will accentuate the French and European industrial decline. 

Develop commercial, diplomatic and military links with Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and India in particular.
France cannot develop these ties under good conditions because it cannot compete directly with China or the United States.  It needs the tacit support of a superpower to have access to these markets in an auxiliary way. If, for example, France can sell Rafales to the United Arab Emirates to equip part of their combat aviation, it is because the military protector of these Emirates, namely the USA, agrees.   

The European and international program of Marine Le Pen therefore endangers the security of Europeans and French people and would be detrimental to their fundamental industrial and strategic interests. 

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Pécresse's program and Europe

First of all, a point about the war in Ukraine. In this war, Russia relies on China, in particular to face the Western sanctions. It is therefore counterproductive to antagonize China on certain issues, such as Taiwan. It is necessary to create diplomatic room for maneuver with China in order to put effective pressure on Russia and not to further cement the informal alliance between these 2 countries.  

The first round of the French presidential election will take place on April 10. This election is important for the future of the European construction since the German government proposes to gradually build a federal Europe. What are the candidates' programs and how are they useful for the progressive realization of the federal unity of European countries, which 58% of the French consider desirable? (Odoxa survey December 2021)  

Valerie Pecresse, supported by the conservative French party LR, proposes the following measures: 

Europe . 
Continue with the current confederal system of the EU but strengthen European defense. 
European defense cannot be strengthened in a single European diplomacy and without a European government responsible for defense and diplomatic issues. 
This conformist and comfortable position of the LR candidate does not allow to solve the economic and military problems of the French and the Europeans.

Family policy
Revaluation of family allowances
Bonus of 900 euros per child per year
These measures can be useful to boost the birth rate in France. 

Social policy
Income for young workers 670 euros with 1 training activity. This is an interesting idea to improve professional training. 
Abolition of inheritance tax. It is useless and costly for the state budget
Increase of the income of the doctors with consultation at 30 euros: Clientelist measure 
Retirement pension of at least 1 smic net per month. Useful measure to improve social justice and the situation of poor pensioners 
Increase of 10% over 5 years in net salaries. The increase in salaries is necessary but it may cause an increase in prices if capital income is not taxed to finance this measure
National youth bank to finance studies and projects. Useful but dangerous if it leads to refusing applications for short-term profitability considerations, which is often the case in the private sector.  

Education
Freedom of recruitment of teachers and adaptation of the pedagogical project. This is desirable to improve the quality of education 
10,000 additional teaching positions and a public tutoring service. 
2 more hours of French and 1 more hour of math per week

Penal policy
20,000 additional prison places. Necessary to reinforce penal efficiency and improve the situation of prisoners.  
Lowering the age of criminal responsibility to 16. There are already penal provisions to deal with juvenile delinquency. 
5 billion euros for law enforcement. Useful to reinforce their presence on the ground.  
9 billion euros for justice. Useful to make Justice more efficient. 

Housing
Priority social housing for frontline workers in their municipality
30% limit of very social housing per municipality.
These are interesting measures to improve social justice

Immigration
Social aid and family allowances for foreigners with more than 5 years of residence.   
Immigration quotas voted by the parliament
Charters for deportations
These measures are useful to improve integration 

Agriculture
Local preference in public food orders for school, hospital and administrative catering.
This is a good idea.   

Valérie Pécresse's program includes some good ideas but it does not respond to the major challenges that France and Europe must face in the industrial, ecological, diplomatic and military fields. And above all, it does not make it possible to advance the construction of a federal Europe which has become necessary for obvious strategic and economic reasons. 



Week 9, Year 2022

Europeans and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia has launched a military operation to overthrow the Ukrainian government.  
The Ukrainians have short-range anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons and a large and fairly well-trained army.
The main objective of the Ukrainian government should be to avoid annihilation of its ground forces by waging mobile defensive warfare, especially to plug gaps in the defensive posture or to escape encirclement. This will allow the struggle to continue as long as possible and thus place Russia in a very difficult situation thanks to very harsh economic sanctions coupled with prolonged Ukrainian resistance. 

After the fall of the Ukrainian government, which is likely to occur due to the air and armor superiority of the Russian forces, a pro-Russian regime will probably be installed. This Moscow-backed Ukrainian regime will be totally rejected by the population because the population is fundamentally committed to the free determination of Ukraine and to Russia's non-interference in Ukrainian affairs.

Since large quantities of weapons and many military structures will remain available after the fall of the current government, there is a good chance that a low- to medium-intensity insurgency will continue for a long time to fight the war of liberation against the Russian invader. This insurgency will cause casualties, reduce Russian determination to occupy the country and increase international sanctions against the Russian occupier. Under these conditions, it is doubtful that Russia will be able to stay in Ukraine indefinitely, which would be necessary to prevent the overthrow of the hated pro-Russian regime. 
The Americans and NATO did not succeed in dissuading the Russian attack. To do so, it was probably necessary to make the Russians understand that NATO air forces or, failing that, American air forces will defend the Ukrainian territory, as Soviet pilots defended the territory of North Korea in 1951. Or else it was necessary to create a Ukrainian air force with bases secured by anti-missile missiles and equipped with at least 300 Western 4th generation aircraft. All this the USA did not do because the Russian threat in Ukraine is not vital for their security and because Russia does not represent a global threat anymore.  
The European countries in this case, especially France and Germany have been totally unable to contribute to protect Ukraine by providing it with weapons in sufficient quantity and quality before the Russian invasion, especially anti-aircraft and anti-tank. For Germany it is the consequence of its pacifist policy of non-delivery in crisis zones and its dependence on Russian gas. For France it is perhaps to avoid being aligned with the American position and to avoid provoking Russia, with which it has common allies in Libya.

This strongly discredits the European, French and German protection of the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania. 

This structural weakness of the two main European countries in relation to Russia cannot be easily overcome in each of the two countries separately.  

France cannot alienate Russia if it wants to continue to play its traditional but illusory role as an independent power against the USA. And Germany is too weak militarily, even with a defense budget of 2% of GDP, to take the risk of provoking the Russians in Eastern Europe, which would have serious consequences for its trade and would jeopardize its investments and Russian gas deliveries. This is also the case for France, but to a lesser extent, because its economic interests in Eastern Europe and Russia are more limited. 

The result is a complete dependence of the Europeans on the USA for the defense of Eastern Europe, which of course prevents the Europeans from strengthening their arms sales in Europe, from reinforcing their autonomy, from increasing their power and from correctly defending their interests, notably commercial, against the USA. 

But the American protection of Eastern Europe will necessarily be further reduced with time, since the USA is confronted with serious social, political and budgetary problems, since it has to face China in the field of trade and technology. This gradual reduction of American protection will be all the more rapid as the Europeans remain divided and unable to take in hand an important part of their defense needs because the USA, notably for electoral reasons, do not want to find themselves in the front line against Russia in a war that is not really theirs. 

 If the Europeans do not create a federal European republic, especially with the French and Germans, in order to be able to set up a single European army and diplomacy and to have a single, and therefore effective, energy policy, they will not be able to defend Eastern Europe when it comes to doing so. In particular, when the Americans decide that the burden becomes too heavy to bear and presents too many risks compared to the disadvantages of a Russian takeover of certain countries located in Eastern Europe, as was the case in Eastern Europe in 1948, in Vietnam in 1975 or in Afghanistan in 2021.

And only a European federal republic could, thanks to its single European government, decide to conduct European air strikes against separatist or Russian forces in Ukraine, if the Ukrainian government so wishes and if the situation justifies it, or could considerably strengthen the Ukrainian air force. 
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Week 8, Year 2022

The problem of financial transfers between countries in the euro zone

Net importing countries within the zone transfer capital and taxes to net exporting countries. This happens through the taxation of the profits of exporting companies and taxes on the consumption of their workers, which accentuates the budget deficit of debtor countries, reduces their consumption and weakens their industrial fabric.
These transfers to creditor countries cause social and political unrest that fuels the rejection of the U, nationalist parties of the right and chauvinist parties of the left.

To remedy this problem, some people want to set up a vast investment program to organize financial transfers to debtor countries that will make it possible to revive activity and increase the tax revenues of these countries.
The problem is that financial transfers to debtor countries via investments necessarily encourage their economic, industrial and fiscal mismanagement by loosening their economic constraints. With financial transfers, the governments of debtor countries become less and less capable of fighting their excessive deficits and administrative inefficiencies, because these tasks are always politically difficult. The increase in the debt of European debtor countries as a proportion of their gross domestic product before the COVID pandemic and since the introduction of the ECB's debt purchase program shows this. 

Some believe that the European Commission, especially under pressure from creditor countries, will be able to prevent mismanagement, especially through sanctions in case of misuse of allocated funds or lack of seriousness in the management of their public finances. This is not realistic. To prevent the implementation of sanctions for excessive deficits, a qualified majority is needed in the European Council. This qualified majority is easily obtained, given the small number of creditor countries. Therefore, no fines have ever been imposed on countries with excessive deficits. 

Moreover, even if fines were imposed, it is unlikely that the countries concerned would pay them. This is because the European Commission has no authority over the states and it is always politically useful to refuse to pay a fine imposed by the Commission. The European Council cannot use financial police forces or armed forces to force a European country to pay.

Finally, unlike the relationship between the IMF and indebted countries, many European countries are "too big to fail" for the eurozone and therefore cannot be encouraged to improve their public finances and international competitiveness by threatening to exclude them from the eurozone. This is notably the case for Italy and France. The ESM (European Stability Mechanism) financial program was able to intervene in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland but with very little effectiveness on the international competitiveness of these countries.
It is therefore understandable why creditor countries such as Germany or the Netherlands do not want to organize massive financial transfers capable of compensating for the very large imbalances between creditor and debtor countries in Europe.

This makes the financial situation of the eurozone uncertain and fragile, which increases the cost of the European debt and further reduces the economic room for manoeuvre of European countries. In this situation, it is the ECB that is regularly called upon to plug the gaps in the financial credibility of the European debtor countries by buying back securities issued by these countries. But this also encourages mismanagement, as in the case of the Greek debt crisis with the ECB's purchases of Greek debt from 2001 to 2011 to keep Greek interest rates artificially low and allow the Greek government to get into debt easily. 
 
So we hope to reduce the competitiveness gap between European countries. But, apart from a few marginal adjustments, each European country is seeking to strengthen its competitiveness in order to face global competition. The differences in competitiveness between European countries will therefore not disappear, especially since these differences in competitiveness are the result of a long and complex economic history. 
In order to organize financial transfers between debtor and creditor states in Europe, a federal European government accountable to taxpayers and to the financial markets is therefore indispensable. This is the only effective way to ensure the sound management of public funds in Europe and to perpetuate the euro zone. 

It is true that the Next Generation EU investment program has mobilized 750 billion euros, including 500 billion in subsidies. But this program is linked to the exceptional economic situation resulting from the COVID pandemic, which justifies an exceptional and one-off solidarity effort. This program does not therefore have any consequences for the sound management of public finances in Europe.


Week 7, Year 2022

Is European federalism really feasible?

It is often said that, given the differences in culture, mentality and language in Europe, a European federal state cannot be created or that a European federal state would not be viable.

This idea can easily be disproved by showing that a federal state is designed to respect cultural differences because its institutional organisation is designed to guarantee local sovereignties on all matters that are best dealt with locally. A federal state is by nature decentralised, which makes it perfectly adapted to cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity, as is the case in India and Switzerland.

It is also sufficient to recall that the opponents of the euro insisted on the differences in monetary culture in Europe and considered that a European central bank could not impose its authority in the long term. In reality, a European federal government whose creation would be approved by France and Germany in particular would be fully legitimate. It could easily impose its authority in areas that can no longer be dealt with locally, such as the army, diplomacy, industry and the environment.  

European federalism is therefore theoretically feasible, 
 To achieve it in practice, it will be necessary to proceed in stages.

The first step is for the French and German governments to set the goal of creating a European federal republic in the more or less long term. This will allow European federalism to be progressively strengthened in society as a whole and with public opinion.

The second step is for the governments and political forces that support the principle of the creation of a European federal republic to select the method for achieving this goal. Should there be majority voting on fiscal and defence issues in the European Council, should there be a sovereign European assembly, or should the Federal Republic of Europe be created with a small group of countries and if so with which ones? This will increase the credibility and strength of European federalist ideas in society.

The third step is to convince sufficiently powerful political forces that have already declared themselves in favour of federalism to focus their political programme and election campaign on the creation of a European federal state using the selected method. This requires permanent and thorough coordination between the federalist political forces in the main European countries in order to make European federalism credible in the eyes of the voters.  

Week 6, Year 2022

Matthieu Calame's book La France contre l'Europe.

The book La France contre l'Europe by Matthieu Calame published by Les Petits Matins is an important work to understand the logic and to know the realities of European integration.

Its main thesis is to recall that a confederal system of mutualized cooperation like the EU cannot survive without the will to create a European federal nation state responsible for the major issues that can no longer be dealt with by local European nations.

And the author shows that it is very often France, out of attachment to a dream of grandeur and an illusory post-imperial ambition, that blocks the evolution towards a solid and efficient European federal system while holding a Europhile discourse. This places the European citizens in an economic and military impasse.

It is effectively a question of French political and administrative elites preserving their diplomatic and military power by placing France at the heart of the EU confederal system (euro zone, Schengen) and by demanding European financial transfers without accepting a mutualization of political power. This is particularly so as not to lose control of the nuclear weapon and the permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which gives them the thrill of power. 

The book shows well the contribution of the USA to peace on the European continent, even if it is perhaps a little underestimated from my point of view because the author forgets to mention that it is the USA and NATO, by putting an end to the political and military rivalry between Europeans, which made possible the economic and monetary confederal integration in Europe. 

The author reminds us that France's refusal to leave its status of nominal winner of the Second World War and not enter a European Federal Republic on an equal footing with Germany bears the seeds of future conflicts and cannot be accepted by those who are true Europeans.

Thanks to this book, one understands how the European countries, in the absence of federal unity, will be divided between the Russian, Chinese and American spheres of influence and will resume their age-old rivalry. The author could also remind us that a federal union is also necessary to allow Europeans to manage their internal affairs properly, particularly in the areas of industry, research, the environment and immigration. 

We learn from this book that the feeling of belonging to Europe will be strengthened when there will be a European state that can crystallize the European nation, as in Switzerland, Italy or Germany in the last century. As Matthieu Calame rightly notes, there is a historical process of transferring local sovereignty to larger organizations, in areas that are better dealt with at a higher level. This constitutes a national progress that complements social progress. 

The author is therefore right to point out that the current system of oligarchic European Councils, which are not accountable to the voters, is not inevitable, and that this system of small and often ineffective compromises facilitates the task of pressure groups and aggravates the mistrust of citizens towards the European institutions and facilitates the task of populists and other local sovereigntists.  

Other arguments of the author seem to me to be more questionable because they seem to be more a matter of personal conviction than of a cold analysis of realities.   

First of all, the author does not distinguish between the notion of state and the concept of nation, which makes him say that there is no national cultural identity.

One cannot define the nation only as a population living on a territory administered by a state. One must also necessarily admit a certain cultural homogeneity within a state. Switzerland could not create a federation with Mexico, but it could do so with the EU. If knowledge is universal, the culture that corresponds to ways of living and thinking is necessarily diverse and particular. This does not prevent pluriculturalism, but these plural cultures are then close. This does not prevent multiculturalism either, but one culture is then numerically or socially dominant.

The author draws an equivalence between socialism and federalism. Many liberals or conservatives have been federalists, such as Jean Lecanuet, Winston Churchill and Konrad Adenauer.  He also believes that the Franco-German couple did not play a decisive role. Yet it was the Franco-German couple with the ECSC that started the process of European integration and unity.  

The verticality of power and a strong executive would be incompatible with federalism in a multicultural country such as Europe: one only has to look at the examples of Bismarck's Germany or contemporary India to see that federalism is compatible with a strong executive in a multicultural country. Bismarck's federal Germany did not speak the same language in the north and south of the country, and India's quasi-federal system concentrates considerable power in the hands of the prime minister through the majority vote system. 

Switzerland differs from Europe in size and responsibility. Without a strong power, as in the USA, Russia, China or India, which are as much if not more ethnically, linguistically or religiously diverse than Europe, Europe will hardly be able to maintain its territorial unity and its political coherence​


Week 5, Year 2022

Does France really need a federal Europe ? 

It is often said that the European Union is a good way for France to multiply its power by taking advantage of the single market, the single currency and European industrial cooperation, while maintaining its budgetary and military sovereignty. This would allow it to continue to play an important role in Europe and in the world thanks to its nuclear weapons, its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its commitment to international law and the heritage of its colonial empire. 

Thus, by relying on the confederal system of the EU, France would be able to maintain its rank, thus satisfying the aspiration to greatness of the French and making possible France's independence from the USA. 

But in reality the European confederal system of the EU functions thanks to the American peace that the USA has established on the continent with NATO. Without this peace, Europeans would remain political and military rivals allied to different non-European powers for decades to come, like 19th century Italy before its unification.

However, the American peace in Europe is weakening. This is due to the relative decline in power of the United States and its significant political, social and budgetary problems.  France must therefore understand that the European confederal system is not viable in the medium term, since the United States will not want to defend a very serious economic competitor forever at the risk of its soldiers and its nuclear security against Russia, which is no longer a world superpower.

And since the European confederal system on which France relies cannot function if the USA withdraws from Europe, France must also understand that it will not be able to make confederal Europe an autonomous entity with respect to the USA. 

It should be added that the current confederal system based on a single territory and a single currency is not viable in the long term either. Without mutualization of European debts, which requires financial responsibility, the risks on the euro zone persist. But creating a permanent European debt and a significant European budget is a political prerogative that implies the creation of a European federal state. 

France must therefore gradually embark on the path of European federalism so that Europe becomes a solid reality, independent of the attitude of the United States. It must do so by first setting as its goal the creation of a European federal republic with limited competences and the budget to finance them. Once this goal is clearly established, it will be possible to discuss calmly the advantages and disadvantages of the various methods of achieving this goal.    

It is in the interest of French leaders not to overestimate France and not to overestimate the EU in order to be able to look at the realities of the European situation lucidly and thus avoid new tragedies in Europe.  

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Week 4, Year 2022

The French and European federalism

We often hear that the French are suspicious of European integration and opposed to European federalism. 

This would justify not talking to them about the federal solution for Europe, at a time when the German government is proposing a federal Europe as the goal of European construction. 

In reality, the French are not particularly suspicious of Europe compared to the Germans. More than 60% of the French, as well as more than 60% of the Germans, want more European integration for major issues such as defense, diplomacy, environment and industry (Eurobarometer surveys). 

But only about 30% of French and German citizens want to give more powers to the EU because they think that the EU is inefficient and often deals with issues that do not concern it, such as social issues or labor law (Yougov polls).  Citizens therefore want another Europe, more powerful and efficient and less invasive.  A federal Europe would be powerful and would not need to deal with everything in order to ensure the cohesion of Europe and to give itself a reason to exist. It would therefore allow societal problems and labour law to be returned to the local European nations. 

The slight surplus of distrust in France (30% of the French want more power for the EU against 36% of the Germans) comes from the particular history of France, which through its nominal victory in 1945 and its nuclear armament to preserve a national ambition of independence tinged with grandeur. But almost all French people know that the dream of an independent France is a chimera in a highly interdependent Europe in a world dominated by the great powers in which one cannot use nuclear weapons except to defend one's territory.   

Moreover, the French are among the European peoples, along with the Germans, who are most in favor of a federal Europe. Nearly 25 per cent of French people and 30 per cent of Germans are in favour of European federalism. 30% of citizens in both countries are opposed and 30% are undecided. 

So there is nothing to prevent the spread and gradual strengthening of European federalism in France, with the objective of creating a European federal state. 

This pro-federalist stance is also crucial to changing the center of gravity of the political debate in a direction that is more favourable to European construction and progress in Europe, in order to defeat nationalism and populism. By defending European federalism, one mechanically marginalizes nationalism in terms of ideas and strengthens the legitimacy of the current European confederal system. 

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Week 3, Year 2022

France, the United States and a federal Europe.

There is a conception of Europe that is quite widespread in France, which consists in thinking that the EU member states should create a European defence to establish, in stages, a European strategic autonomy as a complement to NATO. This European defense could produce a form of European sovereignty that would allow European states to do without NATO and the United States. Europeans would not need to set up a European federal state and give up the sovereignty of national states to become truly powerful and fully sovereign.   
This conception is unrealistic and has not produced any significant results since the creation of the European defense policy in 1999. It can also be used as a pretext to reject or slow down European federalism.  
A European defence based on separate and cooperating European states cannot work and cannot complement NATO. This requires the existence of a strong and legitimate European political authority, which has the necessary budget and the necessary political authority. A functioning European defence therefore requires a European federal state. 
European defence cooperation in Europe is only really useful to facilitate the transition to a European federal state by preparing minds and institutions.  As far as the cooperation of defence industries is concerned, it is useful to preserve as much as possible the European defence industrial and technological base, but this cooperation remains hampered by the particular interests of each State and by the lack of military credibility of the Europeans, which heavily handicaps their arms exports.   
And if tomorrow the United States withdraws from Europe and leaves NATO, which is possible, this will not facilitate the establishment of a European defence if there is no European federalist will. 

On the contrary, we will probably see the resurgence of geopolitical rivalries between European nations, each of which will find a protector or a main ally to choose from among the United States, Russia and China, which will stir up European divisions. The European construction based mainly on the single market and the single currency will dampen these rivalries at least for a while, but it will not make them disappear: the geopolitical interests of the States are distinct from their geo-economic interests and often take precedence over them.  In reality, it is the United States and NATO that ensure to a large extent the current unity of Europeans. The European geo-economic construction was made possible thanks to the security ́ and peace assured by the USA in Europe since 1945  
As for the USA, they have traditionally feared a politically united Europe that could compete with them and that would limit their commercial and military influence in Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. 
Their policy has therefore been to maintain the political division of the Europeans by instantly focusing on the role of the Atlantic alliance for the defense of the continent and by refusing to support initiatives that aim to create an autonomous European defense. But the US has played a positive role in encouraging European economic integration to stimulate growth on both sides of the Atlantic and marginalize the extremist political forces that thrive on economic and social misery. 
This situation has changed with the emergence of China as a rival and with the internal social, political and fiscal difficulties that characterize the US today. China has a stable and effective political system, a large, educated, hard-working, disciplined and courageous population, and great commercial and national ambition. Its economic and military potential far exceeds that of the USA, unlike that of Germany or the USSR in the last century. 

In 1960 the US accounted for 40% of the world's GDP, by 2030 it will be 20%. In 1960, the American political institutions were very solid and the social protection of Americans was among the best in the world. Today the American political system is partly discredited and social protection (health, retirement, education, salary...) is clearly insufficient, which leads to a lack of manpower and a decrease in life expectancy. 
The USA therefore needs a partner who will not be an unconditional ally against China but who will ensure stability and security and limit Chinese influence in areas where the USA is unwilling or unable to intervene on its own: Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Russian mode, Indian subcontinent and on issues where it cannot act on its own: climate, trade, investments. 
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This will allow the US to fund social, health and infrastructure spending and to concentrate its resources in the Pacific and Latin America to be able to confront China in these regions.
Both Republicans and Democrats should understand this new situation. They could and should promote the emergence of a strong, federalized Europe, which is essential to ensure the stability of the international system and to prevent the world order from being organized by China.

This development is also necessary because the defence of Europe's margins, particularly in the Baltic States, is not of vital interest to the United States. They will therefore probably not always be ready to commit themselves fully with significant military means to the defense of this area. Europeans must therefore take charge of the defence of their territory, which requires a commitment to European federalism in order to create European hard power. This European hard power will also increase the European soft power (law, economy) by completing it and giving it credibility. 

Week 2, Year 2022

Review of 2021

I would like to wish you a very good year 2022 and the best health possible. I thank you for your interest in the ideas of FEDERAL EUROPE, for your support or for your remarks and comments.  

The beginning of the year is as usual the occasion to review the action of European countries and the European Union for the past year. This assessment concerns the 6 main areas of political life in Europe for the European citizens according to the Eurobarometers: 1/ the economic situation, 2/ international influence, 3/ the environment, 4/ health, 5/ security and 6/ immigration. 

1/ The economic situation of European countries has again deteriorated more than in most other regions of the world.

This is still mainly the consequence of the persistent coronavirus crisis and the lack of a European industrial policy. The European recovery plan remains insufficient, despite the intervention of the ECB, when compared to the American and Chinese recovery plans. Moreover, essentially national and local industrial policies are not capable of producing sufficient European champions and of effectively organizing research and innovation in Europe, despite some limited successes. 

As a result, production in the European Union grew in 2021 by only 5% after a decline of 7.6% in 2020, i.e. a decline of 2.6% for the period 2020-2021. In Germany the growth was 2.9% (after a decline of 4.6% in 2021) in France the growth was 6.3% (after a decline of 8%). In the United States, production growth in 2021 is 6% (after a decline of 3.4% in 2021), i.e. an increase of 2.6% for the two years. In Russia growth is 4.2% in 2021 (after a decline of 4.1%). In Turkey the growth reaches 9% (after a growth of 1.8% in 2021, but at the cost of too low interest rates that favor inflation) and in China the production increases by 8% (after an increase of 2.3% in 2021).In India the production increased by 9.5% in 2021 after a decline of 7.3% in 2020. (IMF figures).  

With a European federal government, the economic situation in Europe would be much better.  More European funding to support fragile economies through major European projects, a coherent European industrial policy and a mutualized research policy would make it possible to relaunch economic growth in Europe and avoid the technological downgrading of Europeans. 

The deteriorating economic situation in Europe also has social consequences. The weak European growth leads to a progressive deterioration of the standard of living of Europeans, to an increase in partial unemployment, and to a decrease in purchasing power. As local European governments are not subject to a federal European government capable of regulating market forces, the deteriorating economic situation also increases social and fiscal dumping in Europe.  Tax havens like Ireland continue to exist and the condition of the working poor in Germany has not yet improved. 


2/ The international influence of the European Union and the European countries has further decreased in the year 2021 in almost all regions and on almost all issues. This has serious consequences for exports, investments, security and the prestige of Europeans. 

Even if the international influence of the EU is not at the top of the concerns of European citizens, the influence of France for the French and the influence of Germany for the Germans remain important concerns, which therefore add to the expectations concerning the influence of the EU.   

The international influence of the European Union and European countries is decreasing first of all on a geopolitical level.  

In Ukraine, the Minsk 2 agreements are still not being respected and Russia is threatening to invade. It is the United States that ensures the protection of Ukraine with arms sales and instructors and by dissuading Russia thanks to NATO and the interoperability ensured by the integrated command of the Atlantic alliance. 

The EU, France and Germany are of course unable to protect Ukraine alone, which is necessary in order to allow this country to choose its diplomatic and military orientation freely. This free choice of Ukraine is necessary especially in view of the Russian policy of aggression in Crimea and in the east of Ukraine.  

A European federal government could create a European army capable of protecting Ukraine. It would also be able to guarantee the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement for its economic part, while allowing a political and economic rapprochement of Ukraine with Russia on a fair and voluntary basis. 

The EU and the European countries are still very much divided on how to deal with Russia regarding economic cooperation (Nord Stream N 2), European political interference in Russia, the degree of European influence in the countries of the former USSR, the issue of NATO expansion and the level of risk posed by Russia. They are therefore not credible partners for Russia. As a result, Russia remains focused on China and sees Europe as a weakened and divided area that the US cannot defend forever and whose only policy is the end of Russia as a power. 

Only the European federal government can induce Russia to detach itself from China and move closer to Europe. 

The influence of France and the EU is declining in North Africa and the Middle East. Turkey, supported by the USA and Russia, is increasing its influence in all these areas. A European federal government would have the means to influence Turkey to conclude a mutual defense agreement to promote European interests in the Middle East and Central Asia.  

The influence of the EU and European countries is almost non-existent in Iran, Pakistan and India. Trade and security agreements with Iran and Pakistan are concluded by China. India continues to be isolated by Chinese policy in Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and on the Sino-Indian border. It is the USA that is developing military cooperation with India. 

Only a European federal government would have the means to carry out a policy of investment and military cooperation with these countries to prevent China from dominating the Eurasian super continent and to replace or complement the influence of the USA in this area. 

European influence is also diminishing in Africa to the benefit of China and Russia, especially in economic matters but also in military cooperation, especially in Kenya, Mali, DRC, Tanzania, Angola and in African regional security organizations. Only a European government can confront China and its Russian ally in Africa, which seeks to secure its energy and mineral supplies.  

The international influence of the European Union and the European countries is still decreasing in geo-economic terms. 

However, the European Commission's Global Gateway project to invest in and develop high-quality infrastructure around the world, to complement and compete with the Chinese New Silk Roads and, to a lesser extent, the American B3W, should be mentioned.

But the Global Gateway project will not have sufficient public funds to finance investments in countries that are not always creditworthy according to IMF criteria but which are of great geopolitical interest, such as Egypt, Iran and Pakistan. Moreover, the Global Gateway project will not have the support of a European diplomacy and army, which will not allow it to impose itself in many important countries.  

The EU has been forced to grant the U.K. access to its internal market without any obligation to abide by EU rules, which puts it in a weak position in the face of Eurosceptic forces in Eastern Europe in particular and sets a dangerous precedent that may lead other European countries to leave the EU.   

The EU has concluded an investment agreement with China in 2020 that is a step in the right direction but is far from being adopted by the European Council and the European Parliament, given the divisions between European countries on this issue.   

Only a federal European government could negotiate on equal terms with China to facilitate European exports to China, to protect strategic European companies but also to quickly put in place an embargo against Chinese products that profit from the forced labour of Uyghurs.  

The EU and European countries are still not able to respond to US legal and trade sanctions properly, especially after the extraterritorial sanctions against Iran that prevent European companies from working in that country. 

Only a European government that is independent of the US for its defense could retaliate and thus dissuade the US from taking trade sanctions against Europe.

3/ The decline in the intensity of the coronavirus crisis in 2021 has led to an increase in CO2 emissions of 30% compared to 2020 (source IEA)

The electrification of cars and heating systems in Europe is still very slow. Moreover, coal and gas continue to be used massively in 2021. The EU's environmental objectives are therefore unlikely to be met.

The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy in 2020 is unsatisfactory because of the lack of funding to clean up agricultural production. Furthermore, the food industry is still not properly regulated in Europe, despite useful efforts announced by the German Minister of Agriculture. This still leads to an increase in diabetes and health care costs. 

Only a European federal government could initiate the massive electrification of the economy through massive European infrastructure programs and clean up the food supply in Europe by strongly encouraging all European countries to act decisively. 

4/ The quality of the health system in Europe in 2021 remains insufficient because some countries still do not invest enough (Ireland, Slovenia...) or invest badly (France with hospitals still too small and administrative health staff still too large).

This can have serious consequences for all Europeans because the European zone is an integrated health zone given the single European market and the intensity of commercial and human exchanges in Europe. 

In 2020 the member states of the European Union decided to entrust the purchase of vaccines against the coronavirus to the European Commission in order to have a greater purchasing power. This is a step in the right direction. But since the European Commission is not elected and is not accountable, and since local European states intervene to direct its action, the effectiveness of the European Commission is poor. 

Only a federal European government could act effectively to protect the health of Europeans. And only a federal European government that is accountable to its voters and to its population could have a truly effective medical purchasing policy.  


5/ Security in Europe in 2020 was further penalized by the absence of a European intelligence service even though there were no notable terrorist acts in Europe. Terrorism was also absent in the USA, China, Russia and India.    

The absence of a European intelligence service makes it much easier for terrorists to act, because the internal security services of each European country do not have all the elements to identify terrorist groups. 

Only a European federal government could create a European intelligence service and could lead a European diplomacy to eradicate terrorism on European soil. 

6/ The European borders have not been protected against illegal immigration in 2021. 

European countries are each defending their own electoral interests. They are therefore not capable of distributing illegal immigrants among themselves and of putting in place a single procedure that guarantees the expulsion of those who do not obtain the right to asylum.  It is Greece and Italy that have to protect their borders and manage the refugees, while the refugees are mainly looking for Germany, the Benelux countries and France. 

It is therefore not in the interest of Italy and Greece to stop illegal immigrants. This explains why, despite the efforts of Frontex, the number of refugees in Europe in 2021 will still be much higher than in the USA, Russia or India.  

Only a European government could protect the European borders and reduce illegal immigration significantly.

In addition to this European balance sheet for 2021, all Eurobarometers still show a much higher level of satisfaction with the ECB than with the EU. This is due to the federal and therefore efficient character of the ECB, whereas the EU is an often inefficient confederal structure. 

The time has come to create a European Federal Republic, starting with a Franco-German Federal Republic, responsible for defense, diplomacy, industry, research and the environment. 
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While 30% of the French and Germans are in favor of the establishment of a European federal government, and 30% are against it, some leaders in France and Germany still refuse this solution. This is due to their lack of vision, their lack of competence and their lack of political courage. This penalizes all European citizens and harms their economic and security interests. ​


Week 50, Year 2021

The German coalition agreement and European federalism in France

The German SPD, Greens and FDP have approved the coalition contract negotiated by the leaders of these political parties and Olaf Scholz has become Chancellor.

This coalition contract specifies that it is necessary to move towards the creation of a European federal state, either by increasing the European Parliament's own resources and powers, or with a group of European countries wishing to progress along this path.
This federalist will of the German government is an important step forward that must be echoed by the French, in order to create a European government, a European army, a European diplomacy and a European industrial policy. These four instruments are essential to make Europe effective and to prevent Europeans from falling behind.

What is President Macron's position on this subject as France takes over the EU presidency? Will the French president, who presents himself as a supporter of "European unity" and an advocate of a "powerful" and "fully sovereign" Europe, give concrete expression to his convictions by making a statement in favour of the German government's federalist intentions? It is necessary that he finally commit France, in principle, to the European federalist path, because this is the only reasonable path for France's future, for strategic as well as economic reasons.    

Some people believe that this will diminish his chances of re-election. But it is the far-right voters who will never vote for Emmanuel Macron who are fiercely opposed to federalism. Voters on the right, center and left are either in favour of or indifferent to a European federalist perspective for France. 
 
It is interesting to note that it is left-wing and center parties in Germany that have adopted this principled federalist position.  The question now is whether this declaration of principle will be followed in the short or medium term by a concrete project to move towards a federal state. This concrete project must necessarily take the form of a Franco-German federal republic with limited competencies, since a federal state with 27 states cannot be created in Europe at once and since the European Parliament cannot impose its authority on national parliaments.  

Perhaps the right wing will be more capable of giving concrete expression to European federalism by assuming an approach initially limited to France and Germany and by defending a European presidential regime, which is necessary to convince voters of the solidity and effectiveness of future European federal institutions. 
This would not be surprising. It was the German left in 1848 that initially wanted German federal unity, and the conservatives opposed it to preserve the sovereignty of their local nations. This was the case, for example, with the Prussian conservatives who sat in the Prussian National Assembly. They criticized the federalism of the liberal German parliamentarians and the democratic German parliamentarians in the German National Assembly in Frankfurt. 
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But the left demanded a constitutional monarchy of the parliamentary type for all of Germany at the same time. So it was the German conservatives who were finally able to realize German federalism in 1871 through a gradual geographical process based on a constitution with a strong executive.  It should be added that the left is not very comfortable with the concept of the nation today. To create a federal state, however, the consent of the people and indisputable political legitimacy are required. It will therefore be necessary to explain to the people that Europe constitutes a great nation that brings together local European nations.


Week 49, Year 2021

Xinjiang, the USA and Europe

Dear European citizen, dear member, dear supporter,

The policy of mass detention, forced labor and forced sterilization conducted by the Chinese government in Xinjiang is totally contrary to human rights. Some even consider these practices to be cultural genocide and are alarmed at the rapidly changing ethnic proportions in the province.

The Chinese government claims that it is fighting Islamist terrorism, which struck in Beijing and Xijiang a few years ago. But terrorism is always the product of a violent and militant minority. Fighting terrorism is therefore intelligence and police work against groups that advocate or condone terrorism. This has nothing to do with mass detention and forced labor of the population. In reality, Beijing is using the pretext of terrorism to reduce the Uighur identity, which is considered too powerful, and to combat Uighur separatism.

If we can understand the Chinese fight against Uyghur separatism, we cannot accept the Chinese policy of collective repression of Uyghurs. Fighting separatism means dissolving and fighting separatist political groups. It is not a policy of attacking family structures, fighting cultural traditions and disrupting social organization through home surveillance, sterilization and forced labor. 

The US has rightly condemned China's practices in Xinjiang. The EU and most European countries have done the same but this is not enough to change China's practices. An embargo on goods from forced labor has been established by the US and the Europeans must also move quickly in this direction.

The EU and European countries should also urge Muslim countries and countries with which they have important ties to condemn Chinese practices in Xinjiang to ensure that Beijing only fights terrorism and separatism by police and administrative means. This will allow the Uyghurs to practice their language and to know their history, traditions and religion. 

It would also be desirable for the Uyghurs to enjoy real autonomy and thus for their province to be truly administered locally, except for questions of defense, diplomacy and economic policy, which must remain the responsibility of Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party.   

With a European Federal Republic, Europeans would be more powerful and more united, and therefore less subject to Chinese pressure in this matter. They would therefore be able to take a firm stand against China on this issue, which today is far from being the case, as Chinese pressure is exerted against certain financially fragile or commercially dependent European countries. 


Week 48, Year 2021

Japan, the USA and Europe 

Dear European citizen, dear member, dear supporter,

Japan is the main ally of the US in Asia and an important trading partner for the US 

Japan's foreign policy and defense are under American control through the Japanese constitution which limits the armed forces to self-defense, through its renunciation of nuclear weapons and because of the American bases in Japan. 

American protection is fully accepted by the population. Nevertheless, some left and center parties believe that a more independent and neutral policy should be adapted, especially with regard to China, because economic relations with China have grown massively and will grow further.

If South Korea comes under Chinese influence, as is likely in the long run, Japan's economic dependence on China will increase. And a Chinese invasion will become theoretically possible from South Korea.

Of course, such an invasion would be very costly and risky, and the U.S. could support and reinforce the Japanese forces quite easily. On the other hand, a blockade of Japan would become much easier, and would be an effective pressure tool.  

It is therefore likely that in the long term Japan will adopt, under pressure from Beijing, a more balanced policy towards China, sliding towards a certain neutrality coupled with a strong capacity to defend its territory, rather like Switzerland in Europe until 1945. 

What should Europeans do in the face of this development?

Not to oppose the possible Sino-Japanese rapprochement, if China favors European commercial and strategic interests. Europeans should also oppose the massive rearmament of Japan, which cannot change the balance of power in Asia and which will provoke the hostility of other Asian countries, notably the two Koreas, if this rearmament is contrary to European interests.   

But given the military weakness of Europeans, their political divisions and their dependence on the United States for their security, this policy is out of reach for Paris, Berlin and Brussels. Only a European Federal Republic capable of ensuring its own defense without the help of the USA could conduct such a policy and could properly defend European interests in this matter. 

The time has come to create a European Federal Republic, starting with a Franco-German Federal Republic, responsible for defense, diplomacy, industry, research and the environment. 
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While 30% of the French and Germans are in favor of the establishment of a European federal government, and 30% are against it, the leaders in France and Germany still refuse this solution. This is due to their lack of vision, their lack of competence and their lack of political courage. This penalizes all European citizens and harms their economic and security interests. 


Week 47, year 2021

Korea, the USA and Europe


The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula coupled with a pacification mechanism by reducing the armaments of the two Koreas thanks to the gradual convergence of the economies constitutes a realistic path for the future of the region.

To move forward on the path of denuclearization, a declaration of end of war would be welcome as North Korea claims to have nuclear weapons to deter a new American attack, the massive bombing of which during the Korean War has not been forgotten.

Once denuclearization and dialogue have been reestablished on the Korean peninsula, the two Korean states will remain independent and separate for a long time to come. But they could embark on intensive and lasting economic, commercial or even military cooperation. If a reduction in the North Korean military threat is obtained in exchange for security guarantees given by the US, this could lead the South Koreans and North Koreans to engage in an even faster process of pacification and convergence.

China by its importance for Korean exports and imports (for the North as for the South) and by its capacity of military pressure can favor this process, which is probable in the long term. Indeed, the South Koreans do not intend to initiate a rapprochement with Japan to the detriment of China Given the trauma left by the Japanese occupation. And the United States probably cannot, given its public opinion, fully engage with massive conventional means in a new Korean War that does not concern its vital interests, even if American interests in Korea are important. Finally, the South Korean government and the USA can hardly authorize the use of American nuclear weapons to restore the military balance of power given the existential risk for South Korea and the risk for the American bases in the Pacific.

For these reasons, China could gradually become the main arbiter of Korean policy and gradually become the main ally of the two Korean states. In addition, China's economic interdependence with the Korean peninsula will be strengthened by the RCEP free trade agreement signed in 2020, in particular between China, South Korea and Japan.

What should Europeans do in this situation?

The Europeans must continue to sanction North Korea because of its nuclear program while being ready to invest in this country if it abandons this program and approaches South Korea. But given their divisions, the Europeans cannot conduct an industrial and commercial policy adapted to defend their interests properly against South Korea and tomorrow against North Korea. The Europeans cannot adopt an independent position from the US on the Korean question either, given their diplomatic weakness.
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With a European Federal Republic, it would be possible to conduct an industrial policy to compete effectively with Korean products. It would also be possible to resist American pressures to be able to engage in an independent policy on the Korean question to better defend European geo-economic, geostrategic and geopol